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I. Mergers & Acquisitions and Intangibles: An Introduction 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation investigates disclosure related to the intangibles acquired in mergers & 
acquisition (M&As). The purpose of this paper is to introduce the three research 
questions dealt with in this dissertation and to demonstrate to what extent I have 
contributed to each of the three research papers. To put the research papers into context, 
I briefly discuss both the economics of information theory and the resource based view 
of the firm which provide the theoretical framework. Moreover, I give a short overview 
of the literature on mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure about intangibles and I 
summarize the basics of the accounting for intangibles.  
 
Keywords:  
Economics of Information; Resource Based View of the Firm; Intangibles; Voluntary 
Disclosure; Mandatory Disclosure; Disclosure by Information Intermediaries 
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1. Introduction 
Google Inc. (Google) announced the acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings, Inc. 
(Motorola Mobility) on August 15, 2011. Google’s interest in Motorola Mobility 
originates from its desire to acquire technological knowhow and thus strengthen its 
patent portfolio. In the months before the announcement, Google faced several patent 
infringement lawsuits against Android, its operating system for smartphones and other 
mobile devices. Motorola Mobility’s patent portfolio includes more than 17,000 
approved patents and other patents filed and pending approval (Efrati and Ante, 2011). 
In the press release announcing this acquisition, Lawrence Edward Page, Google’s co-
founder and chief executive officer, confirms that the acquired patents would “enable us 
to better protect Android from anti-competitive threats from Microsoft, Apple and other 
companies” (Page, 2011). The Wall Street Journal’s blog Deal Journal notices that the 
word “patent” is mentioned 24 times in the conference call with regard to the 
acquisition of Motorola Mobility (Ovide, 2011). The purchase price of USD 12.5 
billion, which represents a substantial premium over Motorola Mobility’s market value 
before the announcement, 1  will be allocated to the assets acquired and liabilities 
assumed. The identifiable intangibles such as the acquired patents will be recognized 
separately. In the notes to its financial statement, Google will eventually state the fair 
value of the acquired patent portfolio. 
Mergers & acquisitions (M&As)2 constitute an important opportunity to increase both a 
firm’s scale and its scope. In particular, M&As are one of the few mechanisms available 
for acquiring intangibles3 (Wernerfelt, 1984; Gupta and Roos, 2001). While generating 
intangibles internally and thereby creating a competitive advantage are subject to 
considerable uncertainty in view of the prospects of success, acquiring intangibles such 
as critical patents or well-established brands allows a company to reduce the 
uncertainties and catch up quickly with its competitors (Bryer, 2002). It is hardly 
surprising that not only high-tech acquirer firms such as Google but also many 
                                                 
1
  The premium paid in M&As provides an indication of a value gap identified by the acquirer firm’s 
management (Günther, 1997). 
2
  In accounting standards, the term business combination is employed to describe all the transactions 
commonly known as M&As. 
3
  Intangibles (or intangible resources or intellectual capital) are defined in a negative sense as being 
neither tangible nor monetary resources (Arbeitskreis „Immaterielle Werte im Rechnungswesen“ der 
Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft für Betriebswirtschaft e.V., 2005). Intangible assets are only those 
intangibles that are allowed to be recognized in financial statements. Please refer to sections 2.2 and 
3.1 for further details. 
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traditional firms show a particularly keen interest in target firms with significant 
intangibles (Bryer, 2002).  
Merging with or acquiring another firm represents a considerable change that can affect 
the interests of stakeholders beneficially or detrimentally. Every M&A is characterized 
by the presence of a number of internal stakeholders, including the target and acquirer 
firm’s management and employees as well as external stakeholders including the target 
and acquirer firm’s capital providers, the media and the general public (Freeman, 1984). 
Being an option for achieving strategic goals such as sustaining competitive advantages, 
M&As are generally part of a firm’s long-term strategy developed and pursued by its 
management. The prior literature suggests that the management possesses superior 
information (Armstrong et al., 2010). Not only the management or other internal 
stakeholders, but all stakeholders need comprehensive information about the situation in 
order to respond effectively to the firm’s decisions and assess the firm’s future 
prospects. The primary group of external stakeholders to whom a firm’s management 
must provide information are its capital providers (e.g. present and potential 
shareholders, debt holders). 4  They typically do not have this information. The 
information asymmetries that exist between the management and the capital providers 
are even higher with regard to the acquired intangibles (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Singh 
and Van der Zahn, 2008). Due to this lack of information, capital providers encounter 
difficulties in assessing the impact of this strategic decision and more specifically the 
costs incurred to acquire the target firm.  
In an effort to satisfy their information needs, firms generally supply capital providers 
with information about a firm’s current decisions and long-term strategy. The acquirer 
firm’s management typically provides information through press releases and/or 
conference calls upon the announcement of the M&A (voluntary disclosure). When a 
material M&A is completed, the acquirer firm’s management publishes a purchase price 
allocation (PPA) in the notes to its financial statement (mandatory disclosure). The 
accounting for M&As provides one of the rare opportunities for recognizing intangible 
assets. Besides corporate disclosure, information intermediaries such as analysts or the 
business press disseminate information to the capital providers. All these disclosure 
channels, which constitute the corporate information environment, help to reduce the 
information asymmetries between the firm’s management and the capital providers and 
                                                 
4
  This dissertation primarily considers the provision of information to capital providers. Capital 
providers are the core target groups of mandatory disclosures such as the firm’s financial statements. 
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thus are a prerequisite for an efficient capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et 
al., 2010).  
This dissertation explores the disclosure on intangibles acquired in M&As. The related 
empirical analyses are based on a sample of M&As that are accounted for under the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and United States Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP). In three different research papers I 
answer three distinct research questions. In order to enable capital providers and other 
external stakeholders to evaluate the PPA, the International Financial Reporting 
Standard 3 (IFRS 3) and the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 141 (SFAS 
141) require the acquirer firm’s management to disclose information about the assets 
acquired and liabilities assumed in the notes to the financial statement. The first 
research paper concentrates on the role of corporate disclosure in reducing information 
asymmetry. It focuses on the disclosure relating to acquired intangibles, which are 
generally not recognized on the target firm’s balance sheet before the M&A. Thus, the 
first research paper (see chapter II) addresses the following research question:  
 
Which information about intangibles acquired in M&As does the acquirer firm’s 
management disclose in the notes to the financial statement? 
 
The second research paper examines the factors that affect the initial recognition of 
goodwill. While the purchase price is determined easily and reliably, the allocation of 
the purchase price to assets acquired and liabilities assumed – especially with regard to 
the initial recognition and measurement of intangible assets – is far more ambiguous 
(e.g., Lonergan, 2009). This leads to the next research question, which is answered in 
the second research paper (see chapter III): 
 
Does the acquirer firm’s management opportunistically or efficiently use its 
discretion to recognize goodwill initially? 
 
The corporate information environment consists not only of corporate disclosure but 
also of disclosure by information intermediaries. The third paper examines how 
mandatory corporate disclosure requirements influence the management’s willingness to 
provide information voluntarily and the production of information by information 
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intermediaries. This leads to the last set of research questions, which is addressed in the 
third research paper (see chapter IV): 
 
Which information about intangibles acquired in M&As is provided in voluntary 
or mandatory corporate disclosures and in disclosures by information 
intermediaries? How are the disclosure channels interrelated? 
 
This dissertation contributes to the existing accounting research in several ways. First, I 
contribute to disclosure research. Beyer et al. (2010) criticize researchers for their 
tendency to focus on quantitative information, although corporate disclosures comprise 
a wide range of qualitative information. Moreover, Beyer et al. (2010) notice that most 
empirical studies focus on mandatory disclosure requirements but do not pay attention 
to other disclosure channels within the corporate information environment. I address 
their criticism by analyzing both quantitative and qualitative information about 
intangibles acquired in M&As across different disclosures channels. M&As are 
irregular, but not unusual accounting events. Moreover, M&As are generally associated 
with considerable changes, which require further explanations and thus disclosure 
through different channels is likely. I intend to strengthen and deepen the understanding 
of corporate and information intermediaries’ disclosure choices. Second, I contribute to 
the research on intangibles. Although M&As are a key mechanism for acquiring 
intangibles, very few studies address the issue of disclosure relating to intangibles 
acquired in M&As (e.g., Shalev, 2009). I provide further details on the role that 
intangibles play in determining the purchase price. Third, my dissertation contributes to 
the accounting choice literature by examining the management’s decision to allocate the 
purchase price to goodwill. The purchase price allocation decision is likely to be an 
economically important one, as it affects the net assets, the financial position and the 
results of operations. I consider both the efficiency and the opportunism perspective 
(Fields et al., 2001). Fourth, I contribute to the research on the convergence of IFRS and 
US-GAAP. Both IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 accounting standards for business 
combinations, which are the result of the first joint project of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), not only fundamentally change the accounting for business combinations, but 
they make it largely comparable between the European Economic Area and the United 
States.  
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The remainder of this introductory paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the 
theoretical framework and puts the different research questions into context. Section 3 
briefly discusses the accounting for intangibles including intangible assets and goodwill 
acquired in business combinations under IFRS and US-GAAP. Section 4 provides an 
overview of the empirical literature on disclosure related to the intangibles acquired in 
M&As. Section 5 briefly presents the three research papers addressing the three distinct 
research questions. Section 6 concludes, discusses the limitations of research on these 
questions and presents avenues for future research. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
To put the research questions into context, I introduce two theories: the economics of 
information and the resource-based view of the firm. The economics of information 
theory provides a conceptual framework for a large part of accounting and disclosure 
research including the research questions I address in this dissertation (e.g., Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). The resource-based view of the firm argues that a 
competitive advantage is based on a firm’s bundle of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991). Intangibles are not only an important subset of a firm’s bundle of 
resources, but also a prerequisite for sustaining its competitive advantage (Villalonga, 
2004). 
2.1. Economics of Information 
This dissertation is based on economics of information,5 a subfield of microeconomic 
theory, which analyses the decisions of economic agents in markets with asymmetric 
information (Milgrom, 1981).6 Information asymmetry is a situation in which some 
                                                 
5
  Information is an economic commodity that shares the characteristics of public and private goods 
(Allen, 1990). First, information is a non-rivalrous good, i.e. “information does not require exclusivity 
in use” (Allen, 1990: 270). The consumption of information by one economic agent does not exclude 
another economic agent from its consumption. Moreover, information is a non-excludable good 
(Allen, 1990). Once information becomes available, it is difficult to prevent other economic agents 
effectively from having access to it. Information is easily shared. Simply by using the information, an 
economic agent may reveal his information to other economic agents. Moreover, the other economic 
agents do not have to pay for it. As a consequence, no economic agent would be willing to pay for 
either producing or acquiring information. These characteristics lead to a market failure on the 
markets for information (Allen, 1990). However, information is still produced and can be sold at 
positive prices (Allen, 1990). Economic agents resort to private information collection and analysis at 
their own cost, if the information enables them to reach a better decision. However, from society’s 
perspective, this situation is inefficient since many economic agents simultaneously incur costs for the 
production of the same information (Rubinstein, 2001). 
6
  In 2001, Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz received the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel “for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information” (The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2001). In their seminal contributions (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 
1973; Stiglitz, 1975), the three researchers laid the foundations for the economics of information. 
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economic agents have an information advantage over other economic agents. Corporate 
transactions such as M&As create information asymmetries. 
2.1.1. Information Asymmetry 
Two major types of information asymmetry characterize the relationships between the 
firm’s management and its capital providers: the “information problem” and the 
“stewardship problem” (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Table I-1 
compares the cause and the origin of the information asymmetries, the time of 
occurrence, the theoretical problem and the problem-solving approaches. 
 
 Information problem Stewardship problem 
Cause Hidden characteristics Hidden information  Hidden action  
Origin Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous 
Time of 
occurrence 
Ex ante (before signing a contract) Ex post (after signing a contract) 
Theoretical 
problem 
Adverse selection Moral hazard 
Agent Determine actions ex ante Change actions ex post 
Principal Agent’s (or its goods’ and services’) 
characteristics not known ex ante, but 
observable ex post 
Agent’s actions and effort not known and 
not observable ex post 
Problem-solving 
approaches  
e.g. signaling, screening e.g. incentive system 
Table I-1: Two major types of information asymmetry 
 (adapted from Günther, 1997; Picot et al., 2003; Schweitzer and Küpper, 2011) 
 
Information Problem  
The “information problem” describes a situation in which the management has an 
information advantage over the other external stakeholders, such as the capital providers 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Ex ante, the management generally knows 
more about the acquirer and the target firm’s current situation as well as the future 
prospects of the combined businesses than the capital providers. The capital providers 
also need such information for their decision making. However, the management’s 
interest in providing specific information does not automatically coincide with the 
interest of the capital providers in receiving all the relevant information. The 
management may exploit these information differences at the expense of the capital 
providers. The management may selectively provide information and even manipulate 
the information to exaggerate the firm’s future prospects. In the absence of information, 
the capital providers have difficulties in assessing the firm’s future prospects. Also 
taking into account that the management has incentives to manipulate the information 
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provided, the capital providers cannot fairly value the firm’s future prospects. Akerlof 
(1970) shows that the “information problem” potentially leads to a market failure. Thus, 
the capital providers undervalue firms with good performance and overvalue firms with 
bad performance relative to the information available to the management (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001).  
Researchers propose several solutions to the “information problem” (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). 7  Spence (1973) shows that signaling is one option to mitigate information 
asymmetry. Information asymmetry is solved when a better informed economic agent is 
able to signal its superiority by providing credible information to the poorly informed 
economic agents. Much of the information provided by firms is required and regulated 
by accounting standards or law. If this information is part of the annual financial 
statement, it is also formally verified by auditors. The firm’s better informed 
management is thus able to convey information credibly to the poorly informed capital 
providers.  
Stewardship Problem 
The second major type of information asymmetry is associated with the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et 
al., 2010). The problem of inducing an economic agent (“agent”) to act on behalf of 
another economic agent (“principal”) and to maximize the principal’s welfare exists in 
different situations involving cooperative effort (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
relationship between the firm’s management and its capital providers (e.g. shareholders) 
is an archetypal principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The firm’s 
capital providers typically engage professional managers to perform the management of 
the firm on their behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is to be assumed that both the 
principal and the agent seek to maximize their individual welfare (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Once the capital providers have committed their capital to the firm and delegated 
the decision-making authority to the firm’s management, the firm’s management is 
inclined to make self-servicing decisions that do not necessarily coincide with the 
capital providers’ best interest (Beyer et al., 2010). The principal cannot directly 
                                                 
7
  Healy and Palepu (2001) summarize further solutions to the “information problem”: screening 
mitigates information asymmetry (Stiglitz, 1975). The poorly informed economic agents might extract 
information from the choices of the better informed economic agents if these choices depend on the 
private information of the better informed economic agents. Moreover, information intermediaries 
such as the business press and financial analysts might be willing to spend resources to reveal 
information of better informed economic agents. 
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observe the agent’s actions on its behalf. The firm’s management is able to assess 
whether the improvement or deterioration of the firm performance is due to its own 
effort and/or to other factors beyond its control. The capital providers have difficulties 
in obtaining full and objective information on whether the management always uses the 
capital in their best interest.  
Solutions to the “stewardship problem” are discussed by several researchers (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Armstrong et al., 2010). 8  Implicit and explicit contracts, such as 
management compensation schemes and debt covenants, should ensure that agents act 
in the principal’s best interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, these contracts 
often refer to information required to be disclosed in the annual report (e.g. profitability) 
(Beyer et al., 2010). This information eventually enables the principal to examine 
whether the agent is acting in compliance with the contracts and thus in the best 
interests of the principal.  
 
 
Figure I-1: Corporate information environment 
 (own illustration)  
 
2.1.2. Corporate Information Environment 
The corporate information environment is of vital importance both for verifying the 
extent of information asymmetry and for resolving the “information problem” as well as 
the “stewardship problem” (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Armstrong et al., 2010; Beyer et 
al., 2010). Responding to the ex-ante and ex-post demands for information requires 
                                                 
8
  Researchers also propose other solutions to the “stewardship problem” (Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Armstrong et al., 2010): the board of directors might assume the function of monitoring and 
disciplining the firm’s management on behalf of the firm’s shareholders. Information intermediaries, 
such as the business press, financial analysts or rating agencies, might be willing to spend resources to 
observe the management’s actions. 
Stakeholder
Corporate Disclosure
Voluntary Disclosure Mandatory Disclosure
Analysts Media
Disclosure by Information Intermediaries 
…
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different information (Beyer et al., 2010). If disclosure is limited to one signal only 
(e.g., only one profitability ratio), a trade-off exists between mitigating the “information 
problem” and addressing the “stewardship problem” (Gjesdal, 1981). However, 
corporate disclosures might provide additional information to address both problems. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) distinguish voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures as 
well as disclosure by information intermediaries. Figure I-1 illustrates the 
interrelationships between different disclosure channels.  
Corporate Disclosure 
Corporate disclosure contributes to the reduction of information asymmetries by 
disseminating relevant information from the firm’s management to other stakeholders 
who need it for their decision making. The unraveling result suggests that the firm’s 
management voluntarily shares all its private information about past performance and 
future prospects with other stakeholders (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 
1981; Milgrom, 1981). It is only if the following six conditions are met that full 
disclosure is optimal: “(1) disclosures are costless; (2) investors know that firms have, 
in fact, private information; (3) all investors interpret the firms’ disclosure in the same 
way and firms know how investors will interpret that disclosure; (4) managers want to 
maximize their firms’ share prices; (5) firms can credibly disclose their private 
information; and (6) firms cannot commit ex-ante to a specific disclosure policy” (Beyer 
et al., 2010: 301 f). If one or more of the six conditions are not met, the firm’s 
management might choose to make voluntary disclosures only partially (e.g., Crawford 
and Sobel, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Wagenhofer, 1990; Stocken, 2000; Korn 
and Schiller, 2003).9 In an extreme case, it might even become optimal to make no 
voluntary disclosures (e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Korn and Schiller, 2003).  
Indeed, firms follow different disclosure policies (Bassen et al., 2010). Healy and 
Palepu (2001) discriminate between voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures. 
The firm’s management voluntarily provides the stakeholders with information through 
press releases, analysts’ meetings and conference calls, websites and other means of 
                                                 
9
  In analytical models, researchers investigate when and why the six conditions affect the unraveling 
result. The two most prominent of the six conditions are examined in discretionary disclosure and 
cheap talk models (e.g., Dobler, 2008). Discretionary disclosure models analyze whether disclosure-
related costs (condition 1) provide an explanation for the management’s decision not to disclose 
information fully. While discretionary disclosure models assume that the information provided in 
voluntary disclosures is verifiable, cheap talk models do not (condition 5). The latter models analyze 
situations in which the management takes advantage of the lack of verifiability of information to 
misreport information.  
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voluntary corporate disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Press releases are one of the 
most common and widespread means of voluntary corporate disclosure used by the 
management to communicate to the firm’s shareholders and other stakeholder groups 
(Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001). In the announcement, the 
acquirer firm’s management usually publishes press releases providing information on 
the M&A.10 Voluntary disclosures typically involve a high margin of discretion with 
regard to the degree of precision and the degree of detail of information (Bowen et al., 
2005; Aerts and Cormier, 2009). Since the firm’s management does not always fully 
disclose all its private information, standard setters require the firm’s management to 
provide specific information. Mandatory corporate disclosure primarily includes 
financial reporting including the financial statements and the notes to the financial 
statement, but also the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) or the 
management commentary (MC) and other mandatory filings. After the completion of a 
material M&A, the accounting standards for business combinations require the acquirer 
firm’s management to provide information in the notes to the financial statement. The 
content of mandatory corporate disclosure is highly regulated (Bowen et al., 2005; Aerts 
and Cormier, 2009). In order to prepare the mandatory corporate disclosures, such as 
financial statements, the management is typically required to exercise judgment in 
applying accounting policies and in making estimates and assumptions. If the 
management’s incentives are consistent with those of the firm’s capital providers, the 
management may use the discretion to convey private information efficiently to address 
the “information problem” (Fields et al., 2001). The management may also use 
discretion opportunistically as discussed with regard to the “stewardship problem” 
(Fields et al., 2001).  
Moreover, corporate disclosure channels differ with regard to the privacy and the 
content of information as well as the direction of communication. García-Meca et al. 
(2005) differentiate between two types of disclosure channels with regard to their 
potential to mitigate information asymmetries. On the one hand, firms disclose 
information through private channels, such as presentations to financial analysts 
addressing the information needs of this specific group of stakeholders. On the other 
hand, firms use public channels for voluntary disclosures, such as websites or press 
releases. While public information is immediately available to all the interested groups 
                                                 
10
  Please refer to the third research paper (see chapter IV), which provides a more thorough discussion of 
the disclosure environment in M&As.  
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of stakeholders, private information is initially available only to a specific group of 
stakeholders. Since information is non-excludable, information provided through private 
channels is not immediately available, but sooner or later it becomes available to all the 
other stakeholders. In this dissertation, I focus on publicly available disclosure.  
Corporate disclosure consists not only of quantitative, but also of qualitative 
information to a large extent (Beyer et al., 2010). Quantitative information comprises all 
kinds of numerical information, whether monetary or not. Financial statements (e.g. 
balance sheet, income and cash flow statement) basically contain quantitative 
information. More experienced stakeholder groups not only understand this kind of 
unfiltered information, but they also exploit it much more intensely (Elliott et al., 2008; 
Ernst et al., 2009). Mandatory corporate disclosures through MD&A or voluntary 
disclosures through press releases typically contain a large amount of qualitative 
information. Less experienced groups of stakeholders renounce the use of unfiltered, 
more quantitative information in favor of filtered, more qualitative information (Elliott 
et al., 2008; Ernst et al., 2009). I evaluate both quantitative and qualitative information. 
Bassen et al. (2010) differentiate between one-way and two-way communication 
approaches with stakeholders. One-way communication approaches dominate corporate 
disclosure and thus are considered in this dissertation. Just by disseminating information 
to their stakeholders, firms reach a broad public. Two-way communication approaches 
(interactive dialogs) are seldom used. Conference calls are one of the rare exceptions. 
They are typically used to present results and explain significant events to financial 
analysts, considered to be a rather experienced group of stakeholders. The financial 
analysts are given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss issues with the firm’s 
management.  
Disclosure by Information Intermediaries 
Information intermediaries, such as financial analysts or the business press, help to 
reduce information asymmetries by communicating relevant information on the firm to 
other external stakeholders. They further process the information received through press 
releases and other information sources, generate new disclosures and disseminate them 
to a broader audience (Bushee et al., 2010). Less experienced groups of stakeholders 
rely more strongly on information intermediaries (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Ernst et 
al., 2009). While financial analysts evaluate the information and eventually provide 
more accurate forecasts (García-Meca et al., 2005), business press acts as a multiplier 
(Bushee et al., 2010). In this dissertation, I consider disclosure by the business press. 
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2.2. Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Intangibles (or intangible resources or intellectual capital) are usually defined in a 
negative sense as being neither tangible nor monetary resources (Arbeitskreis 
„Immaterielle Werte im Rechnungswesen“ der Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft für 
Betriebswirtschaft e.V., 2005). According to the resource-based view of the firm, a 
competitive advantage is based on a firm’s bundle of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991). Intangibles, which are part of a firm’s bundle of resources, play a major 
role in sustaining the firm’s competitive advantage (Villalonga, 2004). Moreover, 
intangibles are a major source of the information asymmetries that exist between the 
management and the capital providers (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Singh and Van der 
Zahn, 2008).  
2.2.1. Intangibles as Part of a Firm’s Bundle of Resources 
The resource-based view of the firm suggests that a firm is a bundle of resources 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). The resources have to be valuable, rare, hard to 
imitate and non-substitutable to create a sustainable competitive advantage and 
contribute to generating positive returns (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Researchers 
widely recognize that intangibles are unique resources (Aboody and Lev, 2000). 
Intangibles negatively defined as being not tangible and not monetary resources are 
more likely than the other resources of the firm to be a source of competitive advantage 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Intangibles are valuable because “they enable a firm to 
conceive of or implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” 
(Barney, 1991: 106). Intangibles are neither “possessed by large numbers of competing 
or potentially competing firms” (Barney, 1991: 106) nor can they be obtained by them 
(Barney, 1991). Dierickx and Cool (1989) suggest that “resources can be imperfectly 
imitable for one or a combination of three reasons: (a) the ability of a firm to obtain a 
resource is dependent upon unique historical conditions, (b) the link between the 
resources possessed by a firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is causally 
ambiguous, or (c) the resource generating a firm’s advantage is socially complex” 
(Barney, 1991: 107). Moreover, no other resources exist that are equally valuable, but 
are neither rare nor hard to imitate and thus might become a substitute (Barney, 1991).  
2.2.2. Intangibles and Information Asymmetries  
The information asymmetries between a firm’s management and its capital providers 
are closely related to the firm’s intangibles (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Singh and Van der 
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Zahn, 2008). Researchers discuss different aspects. First, information asymmetries 
associated with intangibles are closely related to the characteristics that distinguish the 
resources that create a competitive advantage. Since intangibles are typically not 
possessed by actual or potential competitors (rareness), it becomes difficult for capital 
providers to compare the firm’s performance with that of other firms in the industry and 
to value the firm’s intangibles fairly based on the information available (Aboody and 
Lev, 2000). Second, the lack of completeness and timeliness of information on 
intangibles contributes to the information asymmetry. While the firm’s management 
typically has information on the firm’s performance and the performance of the 
underlying assets at any time, the capital providers receive only aggregated information 
at certain points in time (Aboody and Lev, 2000). Third, most tangible and monetary 
resources are traded on active markets, allowing the stakeholders to obtain information 
about their prices and thus to value such resources easily. Almost no active markets for 
intangibles exist (Lonergan, 2009). Thus, no price-based information that can serve as a 
basis for valuation is available. Some information on the aggregate value of the firm’s 
intangibles can be derived from the firm’s market value with reasonable accuracy 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000; Lonergan, 2009). However, this information is also affected by 
concerns relating to under- or overvaluation of the firm (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  
3. Intangibles Acquired in Business Combinations Accounted for under IFRS 
and US-GAAP 
It is important to differentiate between the very broad concept of intangibles introduced 
in section 2.2 and the terms intangible assets and goodwill used in accounting. The 
accounting for intangibles depends on the acquisition situation. As a result of the first 
joint project between the IASB and the FASB, the accounting for intangibles acquired 
in business combinations has become largely comparable between IFRS and US-GAAP. 
3.1. Accounting for Intangibles 
The accounting for intangibles does not depend on their type but on their acquisition 
situation (“asymmetric accounting”, Hunter et al., 2012: 106). Both IFRS (i.e. 
International Accounting Standard 38 (IAS 38) and IFRS 3) and US-GAAP (i.e. 
SFAS 141 and SFAS 142) differentiate between internally generated and acquired 
intangibles. Internally generated intangibles are rarely recognized on the balance sheet 
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(IAS 38.51-52; SFAS 142.10).11 In connection with acquiring intangibles, it is supposed 
that acquired intangible assets result in future economic benefits and that the fair value 
of these assets can be measured reliably (IAS 38.26, IAS 38.35; SFAS 141.30, 
SFAS 141.B163). IFRS and US-GAAP further distinguish between separately acquired 
intangibles and intangibles acquired in business combinations (IAS 38.25, IAS 38.33; 
SFAS 142.4). Intangibles acquired in business combinations include both separately 
identifiable intangible assets and goodwill (IFRS 3.45; SFAS 141.39). Intangible assets 
include only those intangibles that are allowed to be separately recognized on the 
balance sheet. Goodwill includes not only intangibles that are not identifiable and thus 
not separately recognized as intangible assets (e.g., an assembled workforce) but also 
other components that are not intangibles from the perspective of the resource-based 
view (e.g., overvaluation) (Johnson and Petrone, 1998). 12  Thus, goodwill cannot 
unambiguously be subsumed under the term intangibles as defined in section 2.2.  
 
 
Figure I-2: Accounting for intangibles 
 (own illustration)  
 
3.2. Accounting for Business Combinations 
In October 2002, the IASB and the FASB issued a memorandum of understanding 
(“Norwalk Agreement”) in which they “acknowledged their commitment to the 
development of high-quality, compatible accounting standards that could be used for 
both domestic and cross-border financial reporting” (FASB and IASB, 2002). The 
                                                 
11
  With regard to internally generated intangible assets, IFRS further differentiates between a research 
and a development phase (IAS 38.52). While the costs of internally generating intangible assets which 
are still in the research phase are recognized as an expense (IAS 38.54), internally generated 
intangible assets in the development phase must be recognized if certain criteria are met (IAS 38.57). 
12
  For a detailed discussion of the components that actually contribute to the recognition of goodwill, 
please refer to the first research paper (see chapter II). 
Intangibles
Acquired IntangiblesInternally Generated Intangibles
Separate Acquisition Business Combination
Intangible 
Assets GoodwillIntangible Assets
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business combinations project was the first joint project of the two standard setters. 
Both the IFRS 3 and the SFAS 141 accounting standards for business combination 
fundamentally changed the accounting for business combinations, making them largely 
comparable between the European Economic Area and the United States. Business 
combinations of IFRS acquirer firms agreed to after March 31, 2004 are accounted for 
under IFRS 3 and business combinations of US-GAAP acquirer firms completed after 
June 1, 2001 under SFAS 141, respectively. The objective of IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 is 
to improve the financial reporting of business combinations, so that the financial 
statements of the acquirer firms reflect the business combination’s underlying 
economics better. They intend to convey the management’s information to the users of 
financial statements by allocating the purchase price to the assets acquired and liabilities 
assumed, and consequently to goodwill. In the second phase of the joint business 
combinations project, the IASB and FASB revised both accounting standards for 
business combinations to improve further the accounting for business combinations and 
to achieve a higher degree of convergence.13 In this dissertation, I focus on business 
combinations for which the original accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 are 
applied. 
All the business combinations within the scope of the original accounting standards 
IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 (IFRS 3.2-13; SFAS 141.9-12) are accounted for under the 
purchase method (cf. Figure I-3; IFRS 3.14, SFAS 141.13).14 The application of the 
purchase method comprises three major stages (IFRS 3.16, SFAS 141.15-50): 
                                                 
13
  The FASB issued the revised accounting standard SFAS 141 R in December 2007; the requirements 
took effect on December 15, 2008 (SFAS 141 R.74). In January 2008, the IASB issued a similar 
accounting standard, IFRS 3 R, which took effect on July 1, 2009 (IFRS 3 R.64). While an earlier 
application of IFRS 3 R is permitted (IFRS 3 R.64), SFAS 141 R explicitly prohibits an application 
before December 15, 2008 (SFAS 141 R.74).  
14  The entity theory and the parent company theory are two opposing theories on capital consolidation 
(e.g., Küting and Weber, 2010; Baetge et al., 2011; Pellens et al., 2011). While the entity theory 
considers a group of legally separate companies as one single unit in the consolidated financial 
statements, the parent company theory assumes that the consolidated financial statements are prepared 
from the perspective of the parent company’s shareholders. By issuing IFRS 3 and SFAS 141, the 
IASB and the FASB opt for the purchase method, which represents a mixture of the parent company 
theory and the entity theory. The purchase method itself knows different specifications with regard to 
the accounting for non-controlling interests in a partially owned subsidiary. Both IFRS 3 and 
SFAS 141 require the measurement of the non-controlling interests’ proportionate share of the target 
firm’s net identifiable assets (the purchased goodwill method). According to the full goodwill method, 
the full goodwill including the goodwill attributable to non-controlling interests is recognized. While 
SFAS 141 R requires the acquirer firms to apply the full goodwill method, IFRS 3 R permits them to 
choose between the purchased goodwill method and the full goodwill method. The term purchase 
method used in IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 is replaced by the term acquisition method in both IFRS 3 R 
and SFAS 141 R. 
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(1) Identification of the acquirer firm 
(2) Measurement of the cost of the business combination (purchase price) 
(3) Allocation of the cost of the business combination to the identifiable assets 
acquired and liabilities assumed (purchase price allocation) 
 
 
Figure I-3: Purchase method of accounting 
 (own illustration)  
 
Since the business combination is accounted for from an acquirer firm’s perspective, the 
acquirer firm is identified first (IFRS 3.17-23; SFAS 141.15-19). Second, the cost of 
acquiring the target firm – frequently referred to as the consideration or purchase price – 
must be determined (IFRS 3.24-35; SFAS 141.20-34). The cost of the business 
combination does not only include cash or other assets, the acquisition of debt or the 
issuance of equity, but also acquisition-related costs (e.g., fees paid to consultants and 
lawyers). Third, the purchase price is allocated to the assets acquired and liabilities 
assumed (IFRS 3.36-60; SFAS 141.35-46). This purchase price allocation (PPA) is 
carried out in two steps. Irrespective of whether the assets and liabilities are already 
recognized on the target firm’s balance sheet, all the assets and liabilities must be 
identified in the first step. It is to be verified whether the identified assets and liabilities 
are eligible for recognition. In the second step, the fair values of those assets and 
liabilities must be determined. Eventually, the excess of the purchase price over the fair 
value of identifiable assets and liabilities is recorded as goodwill on the acquirer firm’s 
balance sheet (IFRS 3.51-52; SFAS 141.43). If the fair value of the identifiable assets 
and liabilities exceeds the purchase price, accounting treatment under IFRS 3 deviates 
from SFAS 141. According to IFRS 3.56 (a), the acquirer firm must reassess the 
determination of the purchase price and the purchase price allocation. SFAS 141.44 







– Mergers & Acquisitions and Intangibles: An Introduction – 
18 
acquired. If an excess remains, it must be recognized in profit and loss (IFRS 3.56 (b); 
SFAS 141.45).15  
To enable the users of its financial statement to assess the accounting for the business 
combination, the acquirer firm is required to disclose information (IFRS 3.66-77, 
SFAS 141.51-58). 16  If the information specified is not sufficient, it can be 
complemented with additional information (IFRS 3.77). 
The revised accounting standards IFRS 3 R and SFAS 141 R incorporate a number of 
changes to the original accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141.17  For instance, 
acquisition-related costs are recognized as expenses and are no longer included in the 
cost of the business combination (IFRS 3 R.53; SFAS 141 R.59). Under IFRS 3 R and 
SFAS 141 R, the cost of the business combination (purchase price) is no longer 
allocated to the assets acquired and the liabilities assumed, but the fair value of the 
target firm is compared with the fair value of the assets acquired and liabilities assumed 
(IFRS 3 R.32; SFAS 141 R.34). Some differences between IFRS and US-GAAP are 
eliminated. In-process research and development (IPR&D) already had to be recognized 
as a separate intangible asset according to IFRS 3 (IFRS 3.45), while SFAS 141 
required IPR&D to be charged to expenses (SFAS 141.42). In SFAS 141 R, the FASB 
also permits the recognition of IPR&D as a separate intangible asset (IFRS 3 R.C12, 
SFAS 141 R.66). However, new differences are created.18 Whereas IFRS 3 R allows the 
measurement of non-controlling interests at fair value or at the non-controlling interests’ 
proportionate share of the target firm’s net identifiable assets (IFRS 3 R.19), 
SFAS 141 R requires the acquirer firm to measure the non-controlling interests at fair 
value (SFAS 141 R.20).  
To conclude, I compare the accounting for business combinations according to the 
original accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 and the revised accounting 
standards IFRS 3 R and SFAS 141 R. In Table I-2 and Table I-3, I therefore present a 
                                                 
15
  This section aims to provide an brief overview of accounting for business combinations. Please refer 
to the accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 or literature providing guidance on the accounting 
standards for details on more specific issues such as step and partial acquisition (e.g., Ballwieser et al., 
2008; Pellens et al., 2011; Coenenberg et al., 2012). 
16
  Please refer to the first research paper (see chapter II), which discusses the disclosure requirements of 
IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 in more detail. 
17
  The list of changes to IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 is not exhaustive. In the press release announcing the 
issuance of IFRS 3 R, the IASB summarizes the main changes to both original accounting standards 
IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 (IASB, 2008). The summary to SFAS 141 R describes the significant changes 
to SFAS 141.  
18
  In appendix G to SFAS 141 R, the FASB identifies the differences between SFAS 141 R and IFRS 3 
R.  
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small example of an acquisition of 75 % of the target firm’s outstanding shares. The 
resulting amounts of goodwill primarily differ due to the recognition of the net assets 
acquired at fair value (75 % vs. 100 %) and the accounting treatment of the non-




Target firm’s balance sheet  
(before business combination; in EUR) 
  Book value Fair value 
Proportion of the target firm’s  
outstanding shares acquired 
75 % Tangible assets 120,000 180,000 
Intangible assets 0 120,000 
Number of shares acquired 24,000 Goodwill 20,000 0 
Share price at acquisition date 12.00 EUR Cash 10,000 10,000 
Control premium per share  2.00 EUR Total assets 150,000 310,000 
Acquisition-related costs 10,000 EUR Liabilities  20,000 20,000 
Shareholders’ equity 130,000 290,000 
Tax rate19 0 % Total liabilities & 
shareholders’ equity 
150,000 310,000
Table I-2: Example – Basic assumptions with regard to the business combination and the target firm  
 (own analysis)  
 
Purchased goodwill method  
(IFRS 3 and IFRS 3 R; SFAS 141; in EUR) 
Full goodwill method  
(IFRS 3 R; SFAS 141 R; in EUR) 
Consideration 288,000 Consideration (fair value) 288,000 
Acquisition-related costs20 10,000 Non-controlling interest (fair value) 80,000 
Purchase price 298,000 Target firm value (fair value) 368,000 
Tangible assets (fair value) -135,000 Tangible assets (fair value) -180,000 
Intangible assets (fair value) -90,000 Intangible assets (fair value) -120,000 
Goodwill (fair value) 0 Goodwill (fair value) 0 
Cash -7,500 Cash -10,000 
Liabilities (fair value) 15,000 Liabilities (fair value) 20,000 
Net assets acquired (fair value) -217,500 Net Assets Acquired (fair value) -310,000 
Goodwill (total) 80,500 Goodwill (total) 78,000 
Goodwill (controlling interest) 80,500 Goodwill (controlling interest) 70,500 
Goodwill (non-controlling interest) 0 Goodwill (non-controlling interest) 7,500 
Table I-3: Example – Accounting for the business combinations using the purchased goodwill method 
and the full goodwill method 
 (own analysis) 
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  A tax rate which is unequal to zero (in contrast to the example of Table I-2 and Table I-3) affects the 
amount of net deferred taxes recognized, which, in turn, affects the amount of goodwill recognized 
under both the purchased goodwill method and the full goodwill method. 
20
  Under IFRS 3 R, no acquisition-related costs are considered in determining the purchase price, i.e. the 
total goodwill amounts to 70,500. 
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4. Related Research 
Disclosure research is a wide field of research. Beyer et al. (2010) give a comprehensive 
overview of disclosure research by discussing the current analytical and empirical work 
in this field and raising further questions. 21  Comprehensive reviews of disclosure 
research relating to intangibles are provided by Cañibano et al. (2000), Lev (2001), 
Abeysekera (2006) and Wyatt (2008). According to the topic of this dissertation, I focus 
on research related to the intangibles acquired in M&As. Although intangibles are 
associated with a high degree of information asymmetry and M&As are one of the few 
mechanisms available for acquiring intangibles, few studies address the issue of 
disclosure regarding intangibles acquired in M&As.22  
Glaum et al. (2007) analyze disclosures concerning 357 business combinations of IFRS 
acquirer firms in 2005. Applying IFRS 3 for the first time, IFRS acquirer firms allocate 
on average 53% of the purchase price to goodwill. Schilling et al. (2012) examine 62 
business combinations of Swiss acquirer firms between 2004 and 2010. They observe 
that the proportion of purchase price allocated to intangible assets and goodwill differs 
between industries. When acquiring an established compared to a young target firm, 
more intangible assets are recognized separately from goodwill. To the best knowledge 
of the author, no descriptive empirical studies are available for the time after the 
adoption of IFRS 3 R.  
Shalev (2009) examines the causes and effects of the quantity of information regarding 
the purchase price allocation under SFAS 141. Acquirer firms are more likely to forego 
extensive disclosures if the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill is above 
average and accounting choices are used in connection with the purchase price 
allocation. Acquirer firms that provide less detailed information report lower profits and 
are confronted with negative share price performance in the following years. Shalev et 
al. (2010) raise doubts with regard to the reliability of accounting for business 
combinations. In their working paper, the researchers conclude that the acquirer firm’s 
management takes into account how the recognition and measurement of assets 
acquired and liabilities assumed affect its future bonus payments. Analyzing a sample of 
                                                 
21
  Other literature reviews are provided by Healy and Palepu (2001) and Bassen et al. (2010). For 
reviews relating to empirical literature examining accounting choice, please see Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) and Fields et al. (2001). 
22
  Please refer to the individual research papers for more specific literature reviews regarding the 
research questions raised in this dissertation. 
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Swiss acquirer firms, Meyer and Bischoff (2012) conclude that the discretion related to 
the purchase price allocation is used opportunistically. 
Kimbrough (2007) and Bahadir et al. (2008) focus on a subset of intangible assets 
acquired in M&As. Kimbrough (2007) shows that the amount of the purchase price 
allocated to technology-based intangible assets is already reflected in the target firm’s 
market value prior to the M&A. Analysts’ following of the target firm and the 
recognition of technology-based intangible assets are a prerequisite for this association. 
Bahadir et al. (2008) demonstrate that firm characteristics such as marketing skills or 
the existing brand portfolio determine the fair value of brands acquired in M&As. 
5. Research Papers 
This dissertation explores the disclosure of intangibles acquired in M&As. The three 
research papers consider different disclosure channels within the corporate information 
environment. I focus on the disclosure of information related to transactions that are 
accounted for as a business combination and thus intangibles such as intangible assets 
and goodwill are typically recognized initially. The empirical analyses are based on a 
sample of business combinations accounted for under IFRS and US-GAAP. While all 
three papers consider the mandatory disclosure of information about intangibles in the 
notes to the financial statement, the third paper addresses the interrelationship between 
different disclosure channels using the example of intangibles acquired in M&As. 
Figure I-4 locates the three research papers in the corporate information environment. 
 
 
Figure I-4: Three research papers and the corporate information environment  





Press Release Purchase Price Allocation
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 Research Paper: Disclosure on Intangibles in Purchase Price Allocations 
IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 require the acquirer firm’s management to disclose specific 
information related to a material business combination (cf. section 3.2). In contrast to 
most other assets and liabilities, intangible assets and goodwill are initially recognized 
in the accounting for business combinations. Indeed, standard setters favor allocating 
the purchase price to identifiable intangible assets because they fear that the 
management may manipulate or overstate the amount allocated to goodwill. By favoring 
the recognition of identifiable intangible assets, standard setters imply that they believe 
the benefits of signaling good news (i.e. reasonable likelihood of future economic 
benefits associated with the intangible assets recognized) to exceed the cost of possible 
misstatement (cf. Ahmed and Falk, 2006, for capitalization vs. expensing of R&D 
expenditures). Thus, I examine the provision of information regarding intangibles 
acquired in business combinations in the notes to the financial statement. This leads to 
the research question, which is answered in the first paper (see chapter II): 
 
Which information about intangibles acquired in M&As does the acquirer firm’s 
management disclose in the notes to the financial statement? 
 
I individually formulated the problem and developed the research design (Konzeption 
der Studie), organized and conducted the statistical analysis as well as interpreted the 
related results (Erarbeitung und Analyse der Daten) and eventually wrote the paper 
(Formulierung des Manuskripts). The paper benefited from regular and valuable 
feedback from participants in presentations at conferences as well as in internal research 
seminars at the chair of business management, esp. management accounting/controlling. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented, inter alia, at the Workshop on 
Visualising, Measuring, and Managing Intangibles and Intellectual Capital in Hasselt, 
Belgium, in 2008. Another paper based on a different sample of the largest IFRS and 
US-GAAP business combinations and providing further insights in the accounting for 
business combinations was published in the German-language journal Die 
Wirtschaftsprüfung in 2008 (Günther and Ott, 2008).  
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 Research Paper: Determinants of Purchase Price Allocation Decisions 
While the purchase price is determined easily and reliably, the allocation of the 
purchase price to the assets acquired and liabilities assumed – especially with regard to 
the initial recognition and measurement of intangible assets – is far more ambiguous 
(e.g., Lonergan, 2009). In the second research paper (see chapter III), I examine the 
factors affecting the management’s decisions to recognize goodwill initially. There are 
always two groups of determinants of accounting choices: managerial opportunism and 
economic efficiency. The factors that explain opportunistic accounting choices are 
generally classified into three categories: contracting considerations, political 
considerations and information asymmetries (Fields et al., 2001). 23  Furthermore, I 
examine whether the discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing 
affect the initial recognition of goodwill. In order to incorporate not only hypotheses of 
managerial opportunism but also hypotheses of economic efficiency, I consider the 
underlying economics of the business combination. This leads to the research question 
that is answered in the second research paper: 
 
Does the acquirer firm’s management opportunistically or efficiently use its 
discretion to recognize goodwill initially? 
 
I individually formulated the problem and developed the research design (Konzeption 
der Studie), organized and conducted the statistical analysis as well as interpreted the 
related results (Erarbeitung und Analyse der Daten) and eventually wrote the paper 
(Formulierung des Manuskripts). The paper benefited from regular and valuable 
feedback from my supervising professor Thomas W. Günther and from participants and 
discussants in presentations at international conferences and workshops as well as in 
internal research seminars. This paper was presented, inter alia, in discussant sessions at 
the Annual Congress of European Accounting Association in Istanbul, Turkey, and at 
the Annual Congress of the American Accounting Association in San Francisco, USA, 
in 2010.  
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 Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) provide classifications similar to 
the classification proposed by Fields et al. (2001). 
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 Research Paper: Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital in Mergers 
& Acquisitions 
The corporate information environment, which consists not only of corporate disclosure 
but also of disclosure by information intermediaries, might help to reduce information 
asymmetries between the acquirer firm’s management and the other stakeholders. While 
the prior research finds that stakeholders use a combination of different disclosure 
channels (Hodge and Pronk, 2006; Elliott et al., 2008), Beyer et al. (2010) note that the 
research does not investigate the interrelation between mandatory corporate disclosure, 
voluntary corporate disclosure and the provision of information by information 
intermediaries. To contribute to a better understanding of the corporate information 
environment, I examine the relation between the note to the financial statement, the 
press release and the newspaper articles related to intangibles acquired in M&As. This 
leads to the last set of research questions, which is addressed in the third paper (see 
chapter IV): 
 
Which information about intangibles acquired in M&As is provided in voluntary 
or mandatory corporate disclosures and in disclosures by information 
intermediaries? How are the disclosure channels interrelated? 
 
I individually formulated the problem and developed the research design (Konzeption 
der Studie). Together with my co-author Ulrike Henke, I organized and conducted the 
statistical analysis as well as interpreted the related results (Erarbeitung und Analyse der 
Daten) and wrote the paper (Formulierung des Manuskripts). My co-author undertook 
the data collection through computer-aided content analysis (i.e. information on 
intangibles) and wrote the related section (section 3.2) as well as the section on 
descriptive results in the paper (section 4.1). The paper benefited from regular and 
valuable feedback from my supervising professor Thomas W. Günther and from the 
participants and discussants in presentations at international workshops as well as in 
internal research seminars. It paper was presented at the Interdisciplinary Workshop on 
Intangibles, Intellectual Capital & Extra-Financial Information in Catania, Italy, in 
2010, where it was selected as the runner-up for the Award for the “Best Junior 
Contribution to the Development of Intangibles and IC Theory and Practice.” It was 
also presented at the Accounting Research Workshop in Fribourg, Switzerland, in 2011. 
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6. Conclusion 
This dissertation extends the previous research on the corporate disclosure environment 
by investigating the disclosures relating to intangibles for a sample of IFRS and US-
GAAP business combinations. In the first research paper, I oppose the mandatory 
disclosure requirements regarding intangibles acquired in M&As and the information 
eventually provided by the acquirer firm in the note to the financial statement including 
the purchase price allocation. In the second research paper, I examine whether 
managerial opportunism and/or economic efficiency affect the initial recognition of 
goodwill in M&As. In the third paper, I exploit the setting of intangibles acquired in 
M&As in order to explore the interactions between mandatory disclosure requirements 
and prior voluntary disclosure using press releases and information provided by 
journalists in newspaper articles.  
As is the case with most empirical studies, this dissertation is not without limitations. 
One of the most important issues is to identify the appropriate empirical measures for 
the constructs of disclosure analyzed in this dissertation. Following the empirical 
analyses by Botosan (1997) and Shalev (2009), I opt for self-constructed indices based 
on content analyses of disclosures. Although this approach is more labor intensive and 
more difficult to replicate (Beyer et al., 2010), it is the only way to capture the 
information provided by one disclosure channel and to exclude information provided 
through other disclosure channels. Moreover, it is possible to focus on a subset of 
information, such as the information related to the M&A or the intangibles acquired in 
the M&A in particular. A related issue is the sample size. A detailed analysis of 
disclosures is only feasible for small samples (Beyer et al., 2010).  
The limitations notwithstanding, the findings are also potentially of interest to 
researchers and standard setters. I contribute to a better understanding of the corporate 
information environment using the example of disclosures regarding intangibles 
acquired in M&As. M&As are actually one of the few mechanisms for acquiring 
intangibles. Intangibles constitute a significant proportion of the purchase price. As a 
result of the business combinations project of the IASB and the FASB, the accounting 
for business combinations has become largely comparable for IFRS and US-GAAP 
acquirer firms. While I focus on mandatory disclosure requirements in the notes to the 
financial statement in the first two research papers, I also consider two other disclosure 
channels within the corporate information environment in the third research paper. 
Moreover, I provide insights into disclosure about intangibles acquired in M&As by not 
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only examining quantitative information (e.g., the amount of goodwill recognized), but 
also considering qualitative information (e.g., the description of factors contributing to 
the recognition of goodwill such as synergies).  
Regardless of the more detailed discussions in the three research papers, I suggest 
extending the research on the interactions between different disclosure channels and 
investigating further which disclosure channels are complements or substitutes for the 
information conveyed through other channels. Related questions concern the relation 
between private and public disclosure channels (e.g., conference calls vs. press releases) 
or the relation between one-way or two-way communication approaches (e.g., financial 
statement vs. conference calls). Moreover, the relation between the initial recognition of 
goodwill and related goodwill impairments could be of interest. 
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II. Disclosure on Intangibles in Purchase Price Allocations 




This study examines the information disclosed to enable users of financial statements to 
assess the intangible assets (IAs) and the goodwill acquired in business combinations 
(BCs). The accounting for BCs makes a rare exception by permitting the recognition of 
IAs. The sample consists of 217 randomly selected IFRS and US-GAAP BCs from 
2005 to 2008. Drawing on an evaluative framework based on disclosure requirements, I 
perform a detailed content analysis. My results indicate that IAs and goodwill play a 
major role in BCs. Customer- and marketing-related IAs are most frequently recognized 
separately. Few IAs are considered to have an indefinite useful life; the amortization 
period of finite-life IAs varies considerably. The income approach is preferred for 
determining the IAs’ fair value. The recognition of goodwill is primarily justified with 
the target firm’s stand-alone value and with the expected synergies from the BC.  
 
Keywords:  
Disclosure; Purchase Price Allocation; Intangible Assets; Goodwill; Content Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
The evolution from an industrial to a knowledge-based society is reflected by the 
increasing importance of intangibles,24 such as brands, patents, and human capital (Blair 
and Wallman, 2001; Lev, 2001). Although intangibles contribute to firm value and 
affect growth potentials, the accounting standards restrict the recognition of internally 
generated intangibles. To meet the information needs of shareholders and other 
stakeholders, firms voluntarily provide information about their intangibles (Kang and 
Gray, 2011). Besides internally generating intangibles, business combinations (BCs) are 
one of the few mechanisms available for acquiring intangibles (Wernerfelt, 1984; Gupta 
and Roos, 2001). Moreover, the accounting for BCs provides one of the rare 
opportunities for recognizing intangibles. Intangible assets (IAs) and goodwill represent 
on average 80 percent of the purchase price paid in BCs. This situation provides the 
starting point for this study. 
Both the international and the U.S. accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 require 
acquirer firms to provide disclosures that enable the users of financial information to 
understand the purchase price allocation (PPA) better and to assess its effects on future 
cash flows and earnings. Shalev (2009) investigates respective disclosures and 
concludes that they are important for the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ 
evaluation of BCs in general. My analysis is aimed at comprehensively analyzing the 
information about intangibles recognized in BCs. The notes to the financial statement 
provide not only quantitative disclosures, but also additional qualitative disclosures 
(Beyer et al., 2010). Extending the work of Shalev (2009), I examine not only the 
information that is required by accounting standards but also additional information that 
provides further details about intangibles recognized in BCs.  
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I contribute to the literature 
on intangibles. While the prior research mainly focuses on the identification of 
intangibles, additional information is often ignored (e.g., Guthrie and Petty, 2000; 
Guthrie et al., 2004; García-Meca et al., 2005; Striukova et al., 2008). The notes to the 
financial statements provide quantitative and qualitative information about the 
identification, the measurement, and the recognition of IAs (Beyer et al., 2010). 
Moreover, I look for the factors that are subsumed under goodwill, the allocation to 
                                                 
24
 Intangibles are defined here in a negative sense, that is to say intangibles are not tangible and not 
monetary resources of the firm. Intangible assets are only those intangibles that are allowed to be 
recognized in financial statements.  
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reporting or cash-generating units, and the amount that is tax-deductible. Analyzing not 
only quantitative, but also qualitative information will provide the readers with a better 
understanding of accounting for intangibles acquired in BCs. Second, I contribute to the 
debate on the development and use of international accounting standards. I answer the 
call of Frost et al. (2009) to provide comparative evidence on mandatory disclosure 
under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and United States General 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAPs). Although I am not able to compare the 
mandatory disclosure of US firms under IFRSs and US-GAAPs concurrently, I provide 
additional insights into the convergence of accounting standards by comparing 
disclosure under the two widely consistent accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141. 
For a sample of 217 randomly selected business combinations of IFRS and US-GAAP 
acquirers, I examine corporate disclosures that enable the users of the financial 
information to assess the nature and the financial effects of intangibles, which play a 
key role in BCs. Whether and which IAs are recognized depends on the industry. 
Marketing- and customer-related as well as contract-based IAs are most likely to be 
recognized. Technology-based IAs are primarily recognized by acquirers operating in 
the health care and technology industries. While the amortization periods vary strongly, 
almost all acquirer firms use the straight-line amortization method. The IAs’ fair value 
is determined primarily by applying the income approach. Although both accounting 
standards require the recognition of all the identifiable IAs separately, goodwill 
accounts for more than 50 percent of the purchase price. Goodwill is justified with the 
target firm’s stand-alone value as well as with the expected cost and revenue synergies 
from the BC. 
The remainder of my study is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss the 
prior research on disclosure about intangible assets and goodwill as well as the 
accounting for business combinations in general and for intangible assets and goodwill 
in particular. In section 3 I describe the sample selection and explain the research 
methodology. The results of the empirical analyses are presented in section 4. I 
summarize and conclude in section 5.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Corporate Disclosure Policy 
Intangibles, for which BCs are one of the most important acquisition mechanisms 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Gupta and Roos, 2001), are associated with higher information 
asymmetries between a firm’s management and their capital providers (Aboody and 
Lev, 2000; Singh and Van der Zahn, 2008). Corporate disclosure increases the 
information available in the market and thereby helps to reduce the information 
asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970). The unraveling result, which suggests that a firm’s 
management voluntarily conveys all private information to their stakeholders, is only 
valid if certain conditions are fulfilled (cf. Beyer et al., 2010). Hence, standard setters 
improve corporate disclosure by defining recognition criteria and imposing specific 
disclosure requirements. Although disclosure requirements are quite comprehensive, it 
is not uncommon that a firm’s management provides additional information voluntarily 
(Beattie et al., 2004; Beyer et al., 2010). The provision of additional information can be 
explained by referring to the positive accounting theory, the legitimacy theory, and the 
stakeholder theory (Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Deegan, 2009). According to the 
positive accounting theory, information is disclosed if it brings benefits to the acquirer 
firm’s management (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). The legitimacy theory suggests that 
firms must be perceived to act in congruence with the society’s values and norms 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). To appear legitimate in the eyes of the society, the 
acquirer firm discloses appropriate information. Within the managerial branch of the 
stakeholder theory, information plays a key role in meeting the stakeholders’ demands 
in order to gain support for the firm’s decisions (Freeman, 1984). Moreover, empirical 
disclosure research provides evidence that improved disclosure is associated with 
several benefits, such as reduced information asymmetries and a lower cost of capital 
(Lev, 1992; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998).  
2.2. Prior Research Examining the Disclosure on Intangibles 
The accounting and disclosure relating to intangibles have generated broad interest from 
researchers and practitioners. The related research centers on the development of a 
framework for the identification, management, and reporting of intangibles (e.g., 
Stewart, 1997; Sveiby, 1997; Sánchez et al., 2001), the disclosure about intangibles 
(e.g., Kang and Gray, 2011), and the value relevance of this information (e.g., Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; and for a review see Wyatt, 2008). The corporate social responsibility 
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literature has carried out pioneering work by introducing content analysis as a data 
collection method into the accounting literature (e.g., Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Gray et 
al., 1995). Content analysis eventually became a widely used data collection method in 
empirical studies investigating the disclosure about intangibles too (Guthrie et al., 2004; 
Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Studies using data from annual reports (e.g., Guthrie and 
Petty, 2000) can be distinguished from those using data from other publicly available 
corporate disclosures (e.g., Striukova et al., 2008). Moreover, studies focusing on 
intangibles in general (e.g., Guthrie and Petty, 2000) can be differentiated from those 
focusing on one specific category of intangibles in particular (e.g., Abeysekera and 
Guthrie, 2004). Beattie and Thomson (2007) note that researchers mainly use content 
analysis to identify and quantify disclosures about intangibles. As a notable exception, 
Boesso and Kumar (2007: 275) classify “disclosures in terms of type of information – 
qualitative and quantitative; nature of information – financial and non-financial; and 
information on outlook – forward looking and historical.” Examining voluntary 
disclosures provided by 200 firms from emerging economies, Kang and Gray (2011) 
also differentiate between the type and the nature of information. The vast majority of 
these companies voluntarily disclose information about intangible assets that is 
quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. While evidence on the disclosure of 
intangibles is provided for many different countries all over the world (Australia: 
Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Ireland: Brennan, 2001; Emerging Markets: Kang and Gray, 
2011), little evidence is provided for the United States (Abdolmohammadi, 2005). In a 
US setting, Shalev (2009) examines mandatory disclosures on business combinations in 
general. Although the acquirer is required to disclose material and relevant information 
to shareholders and other stakeholders, Shalev (2009) provides evidence that acquirers 
tend to withhold information about less favorable business combinations. 
Contributing to the disclosure literature, I focus on disclosures about intangibles 
acquired in a large sample of 217 randomly selected BCs that are accounted for under 
IFRS 3 or SFAS 141. In view of the convergence between IFRS and US-GAAP, I 
compare disclosures about intangibles acquired in IFRS BCs with respective disclosures 
in US-GAAP BCs. In contrast to Shalev (2009), I focus on information on intangibles in 
the notes to the financial statement in favor of a higher degree of detail. Additionally, I 
examine not only the information that is explicitly required by the accounting standards, 
but also additional information that is provided voluntarily. The next section details the 
information I intend to examine. 
– Disclosure on Intangibles in Purchase Price Allocations – 
32 
2.3. Disclosure on Intangibles Recognized in Business Combinations 
Disclosures on recognized intangibles in the notes to the financial statements should 
provide users of financial statements with a better understanding of the PPA and its 
effects on future cash flows and earnings (IFRS 3.66; SFAS 141). Table II-1 provides a 
comparison of the disclosure requirements according to SFAS 141 issued in 2001 and 
IFRS 3 issued in 2004. Moreover, any additional information to meet the information 
needs of shareholders and other stakeholders can be provided voluntarily by the acquirer 
(IFRS 3.77).  
 
Disclosure requirements SFAS 141 IFRS 3 
General information about the business combination:   
 Name of target firm x x 
 Brief description of target firm x x 
 Acquisition date  x 
 Percentage of equity interest acquired x x 
 Purchase price and the type of consideration (cash, stocks, options, etc.) x x 
 Primary reason for the acquisition x  
Information related to the purchase price allocation:   
 Amounts allocated to each class of assets acquired and liabilities assumed x x 
 Carrying amounts immediately before the combination  x 
 Fact of and reasons for a preliminary purchase price allocation x  
 Adjustments made to the preliminary purchase price allocation x  
Information related to intangible assets recognized separately from goodwill:   
 Total amount allocated to intangible assets x x 
 Amount allocated to in-process R&D x  
 Amounts allocated to major classes of intangible assets x  
 Amounts allocated to finite and indefinite-life intangible assets x  
 Amortization period and the amount of any significant residual value in 
total and for each class of finite-life intangible assets x  
Information related to goodwill recognized:   
 Total amount of goodwill x x 
 Description of the factors that contributed to a purchase price that 
resulted in recognition of goodwill x x 
 Amount of goodwill assigned to reportable segments x  
 Amount of goodwill expected to be deductible for tax purposes   x  
Notes: 
Disclosure requirements are presented in IFRS 3.66–77 and SFAS 141.51–57. 
Table II-1: Disclosure requirements under SFAS 141 and IFRS 3 
 (own illustration)  
 
2.3.1. Disclosure on Purchase Price Allocation 
The accounting treatment of IAs and goodwill acquired in IFRS and US-GAAP BCs is 
widely consistent. All BCs within the scope of IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 are accounted for 
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under the purchase method (IFRS 3.14; SFAS 141.13). 25  The application of the 
purchase method requires the following three steps. First, the acquirer and the 
acquisition date must be identified (IFRS 3.17–23; SFAS 141.15–19). Second, the cost 
of the business combination – the purchase price – must be determined (IFRS 3.24–35; 
SFAS 141.20–34). Third, the cost of the BC is allocated to assets acquired and liabilities 
assumed (IFRS 3.36–60; SFAS 141.35–46). After all the acquired assets and assumed 
liabilities have been identified, the fair values of these assets and liabilities must be 
determined. Goodwill is defined as the residual from a comparison of the purchase price 
with the fair values of the identified assets and liabilities (IFRS 3.51; SFAS 141.43). I 
pose the first research question: 
 
RQ 1: How do acquirer firms allocate the purchase price to net tangible assets, 
intangible assets, and goodwill? 
 
2.3.2. Disclosure on Intangible Assets 
If the amounts allocated to IAs and goodwill are significant in relation to the total 
purchase price, the acquirer must provide further information (SFAS 141.52; IFRS 
3.66). Both SFAS 141 and IFRS 3 allow intangibles to be recognized separately if the 
separability criterion or the contractual–legal criterion specific is fulfilled (SFAS 
141.39; IFRS 3.45–6). If the recognition criteria are not met, the acquired intangibles 
will be subsumed under goodwill. First, the acquirer is obliged to identify the acquired 
IAs (SFAS 141.52; IFRS 3.67). Second, the acquirer must note whether an IA has a 
finite or an indefinite useful life. While an indefinite-life IA is tested for impairment at 
least annually (SFAS 142.16 f; IAS 38.107–110), a finite-life IA is subject to 
amortization (SFAS 142.12–15; IAS 38.97–106). If an IA is subject to amortization, the 
acquirer must disclose information about the amortization period and method. Third, the 
IA’s fair value on the acquisition date has to be determined (SFAS 141.37; IFRS 3.36–
7). The accounting standards establish a fair value hierarchy that prioritizes observable 
over unobservable data (SFAS 141.B171–B174; IAS 38.39–41; IVS 210). Thus, I 
formulate the second research question:  
 
                                                 
25
 In SFAS 141 (revised 2007) and IFRS 3 (revised 2008) the term purchase method is replaced by the 
term acquisition method.  
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RQ 2: What do acquirer firms disclose in relation to intangible assets recognized in 
business combinations?  
 
2.3.3. Disclosure on Goodwill 
Goodwill is defined as the residual from a comparison of the cost of the BC with the net 
tangible assets and IAs at fair value (IFRS 3.53; SFAS 141.43). To provide a better 
understanding of the resources subsumed under goodwill, acquirer firms may describe 
the factors that contribute to the recognition of goodwill (IFRS 3.67 (h); SFAS 141.51 
(b)). Goodwill is not amortized, but tested for impairment at least annually (IFRS 3.55; 
SFAS 142.18). Since goodwill impairment testing takes place on the level of a reporting 
or cash-generating unit, the acquirer firm must disclose how goodwill is assigned to 
these units (IAS 36.80; SFAS 141.50). Finally, US-GAAP acquirer firms must disclose 
the amount of goodwill that is deductible for tax purposes (SFAS 141.52 (c) 1). 
Consequently, I explore this last research question:  
 
RQ 3: What do acquirer firms disclose in relation to goodwill recognized in business 
combinations? 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection 
I use the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing ZEPHYR database to identify 
European26 and US transactions completed by publicly traded acquirer firms between 
January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008. The choice of the sample period is governed 
by the fact that the BCs analyzed must be accounted for according to IFRS 3 and 
SFAS 141, respectively. The sample is limited to publicly traded acquirer firms in order 
to assure that financial information is publicly available. Since detailed disclosures 
including individual PPAs are only required for material BCs (IFRS 3.68; 
SFAS 141.53), I exclude transactions not exceeding a minimum deal value. The initial 
European sub-sample consists of 629 transactions and the US sub-sample consists of 
895 transactions.  
                                                 
26
  Europe comprises the European Economic Area including the 27 member states of the European 
Community, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, which have all adopted IFRSs. Moreover, 
Switzerland is included in the sample. 













Total number of completed deals 456,361 
Deal type Acquisition, merger - 270,535 
Listed 
companies 
Listed acquirer firm - 123,872 
Geography Acquirer firm from the United States of 
America or the European Economic Area 
(EEA) 
- 17,306 
Total number of deals in the United States and Europe 20,205 24,443 44,648 
Time period Completed between 01.01.2005 and 
31.12.2008  
- 9,646 - 14,798 - 14,798 
Deal value27  Min = 250 (million USD) OR  
min = 250 (million EUR) 
- 9,664 - 9,016 - 18,680 
Total number of deals selected from the ZEPHYR 
database 
895 629 1,524 
   
Random sample of deals considered 150 150 300 
Business 
combination 
Not according to SFAS 141 OR IFRS 3 - 13 - 32 - 45 
Materiality Immaterial - 25 - 13 - 38 
Purchase price allocations  112 105 217 
Notes: 
The data were retrieved from the ZEPHYR database on June 30, 2009. 
Table II-2: Sample selection 
 (own analysis)  
 
For the purpose of the detailed analyses of disclosures on intangibles recognized in BCs, 
I randomly selected 150 European and 150 US transactions. I manually reviewed the 
notes to the acquirer’s financial statements to identify material BCs and related PPAs. A 
transaction of the initial sample is only included in the final sample if at least an 
individual PPA is provided in the financial statements of the year of the BC.28 Forty-
five randomly selected transactions are not BCs according to IFRS 3 or SFAS 141. 
Acquirers do not provide an individual PPA for 38 transactions, since these are 
considered individually immaterial. The manual review of the randomly selected 
transactions resulted in a final sample of 105 IFRS BCs and 112 US-GAAP BCs. Table 
II-2 provides an overview of the sample selection. 
                                                 
27
 The deal value given in the ZEPHYR database equals the consideration paid for the actual stake 
acquired based on actual data and estimates.  
28
  If no PPA was available in the annual financial statement, interim financial reports were reviewed, 
too.  
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3.2. Data Collection 
Beattie et al. (2004) provide an overview of the methods for analyzing disclosures. In 
my study, I employ content analysis, which is a methodology that categorizes items of 
text and quantifies the frequency of occurrence (Krippendorff, 2004). The content 
analysis is performed on the acquirer’s financial statements. I consider the notes to the 
financial statements concerning BCs, IAs, and goodwill, as well as the paragraph 
discussing the accounting for BCs in the note concerning accounting policies. 
Consistent with Shalev (2009), I also use a keyword search to ensure that all the 
available information was collected. 
Addressing the three multifaceted research questions of my study, I first explore the 
information that is provided in the respective sections of the financial statements 
(Deumes, 2008). Using this discovery-oriented procedure, I aim to identify all the 
available information on IAs and goodwill recognized in BCs. Next I apply content 
analysis to evaluate the information systematically. The content analysis involves three 
steps: (1) the development of a coding scheme; (2) the coding; and (3) the reliability 
assessment.  
The disclosure requirements of the IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 form the foundation upon 
which I developed my coding scheme. Shalev (2009) also refers to the disclosure 
requirements of SFAS 141. I slightly modified his coding scheme and added further 
items considering my exploratory assessment of the information actually provided in the 
notes to the financial statements. Appendix II-1 summarizes the coding scheme. First, I 
analyze how the acquiring firm allocates the purchase price to assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed. I collect data concerning the allocation of the purchase price to net 
tangible assets (NTA), intangible assets (IA), and goodwill (GW). Based on the 
illustrative list presented in SFAS 141.A14, I classify the intangible assets into five 
categories (SFAS 141.A14): marketing-related (MKT), customer-related (CST), 
technology-based (TEC), contract-based (CNT), and artistic-related IAs (ART).29 If the 
IAs are not clearly attributable to one of these categories, they are subsumed under 
miscellaneous (MISC). While in-process R&D is immediately expensed under US-
GAAPs, it has to be capitalized if the recognition criteria for intangible assets are met 
under IFRSs. The amount of intangible assets is split into in-process R&D (IPRD) and 
other intangible assets that are divided further into finite-life IAs (IAFINs) and 
                                                 
29
  The Illustrative Examples of IFRS 3 provide a categorization similar to that proposed by the FASB. 
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indefinite-life IAs (IAINDs). The financial data are converted into US dollars at the 
exchange rate applicable on the acquisition date. Second, I evaluate qualitative 
disclosures concerned with the identification, the amortization or the impairment, and 
the valuation of IAs. I collect all the different descriptions of IAs identified in business 
combinations and classify them into the six categories. I look for information on the 
amortization period and method chosen. I classify the approaches applied to value IAs 
into market approach, income approach, and cost approach. Third, I analyze disclosures 
related to goodwill recognized in the BC. I explore which factors contribute to the 
recognition of goodwill. Only those disclosures are considered that establish a clear link 
between the factors contributing to the purchase price and goodwill. Following Johnson 
and Petrone (1998), I use four out of the six possible components of goodwill: the 
going-concern and synergies components of core goodwill, the overvaluation 
component, and the overpayment component. The other two components are already 
accounted for in the PPA by recognizing all the identifiable assets and liabilities 
acquired in the BC at their fair value. To provide a more detailed insight into the PPAs, 
I control for country, industry, and time. Table II-3 presents details of the acquirer and 
target firms’ industries, the acquirer firm’s country, and the year of the business 
combination. 
Content analysis in general and the coding specifically are inevitably subjective. 
Reliability is established in two ways (cf. Krippendorff, 2004). Prior to the first coding, 
coding training was provided by another researcher, who is an experienced content 
analyst. The training consisted of familiarizing the author with the content analysis 
methodology and discussing the implementation of the content analysis methodology in 
the context of the accounting for IAs and goodwill acquired in BCs and the disclosure 
requirements of the respective accounting standards. The author developed the coding 
scheme and undertook a first in depth analysis of all the sections of the financial 
statement set out above for each BC. Based on the results of this first analysis, the 
author made a few changes to the coding scheme. Using this improved coding scheme, 
the respective sections of the financial statement for the total sample of 217 business 
combinations are analyzed twice resulting in a good intra-rater reliability for both 
continuous and nominal data items.  
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Business combinations 
Panel A: Industry (Acquirer firm) 
ICB Industry  ICB Codes  US-GAAP IFRS TOTAL  
Oil & Gas 0001–0999 11 2 13 
Basic Materials 1000–1999 4 5 9 
Industrials 2000–2999 14 21 35 
Consumer Goods 3000–3999 12 10 22 
Health Care 4000–4999 9 6 15 
Consumer Services 5000–5999 14 14 28 
Telecommunications 6000–6999 2 4 6 
Utilities 7000–7999 4 7 11 
Financials 8000–8999 20 29 49 
Technology 9000–9999 22 7 29 
Panel B: Industry (Target firm) 
ICB Industry ICB Codes  US-GAAP IFRS TOTAL  
Oil & Gas 0001–0999 9 2 11 
Basic Materials 1000–1999 3 5 8 
Industrials 2000–2999 10 19 29 
Consumer Goods 3000–3999 11 10 21 
Health Care 4000–4999 10 8 18 
Consumer Services 5000–5999 16 13 29 
Telecommunications 6000–6999 1 2 3 
Utilities 7000–7999 7 7 14 
Financials 8000–8999 20 30 50 
Technology 9000–9999 25 9 34 
Panel C: Year 
Completion date  US-GAAP IFRS  TOTAL  
01/01/2005 to 31/12/2005 23 25 48 
01/01/2006 to 31/12/2006 32 33 65 
01/01/2007 to 31/12/2007 35 22 57 
01/01/2008 to 31/12/2008 22 25 47 
Panel D: Geography 
Country (Acquirer firm) TOTAL 
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The table presents descriptive statistics on the random sample of 217 business combinations that are accounted for under IFRS 3 
(IFRS sub-sample) or SFAS 141 (US-GAAP sub-sample) between 2005 and 2008. 
Table II-3: Business combinations 
 (own analysis)  
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4. Results 
4.1. Disclosure on Purchase Price Allocation 
Table II-4 presents the results for my first research question. IFRS acquirers allocate 
10.15 percent and US-GAAP acquirers 19.16 percent of the purchase price to net 
tangible assets (NTA2PP). Intangibles represent almost 90 percent of the purchase price 
in IFRS and more than 80 percent in US-GAAP BCs. Although the accounting 
standards require the acquirer firms to identify and recognize IAs separately, goodwill 
still represents more than 50 percent of the purchase price and thereby is the most 
important single asset recognized in BCs. While goodwill accounts for 54.70 percent of 
the purchase price in IFRS and 51.73 percent in US-GAAP BCs (GW2PP), IAs account 
for only 35.14 percent of the purchase price in IFRS and 29.11 percent in US-GAAP 
BCs (IA2PP). My results for US-GAAP BCs from 2005 to 2008 are similar to those 
presented by Shalev (2009) for US-GAAP BCs from 2001 to 2004.  
 
Purchase price allocation 
Panel A: Purchase price allocation (absolute) 
Sub-sample Variable N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis 
US-GAAP  PP 112 2590.49 5275.64 407.64 683.30 2200.00 4.318 22.237 
 NTA 112 270.61 1595.73 -10.55 93.65 402.36 0.794 12.262 
 IA 112 1019.27 2969.53 61.35 153.19 449.80 5.738 40.475 
 GW 112 1300.61 2916.45 164.35 347.26 944.84 4.552 24.060 
IFRS PP 105 3165.13 5987.23 487.42 1094.20 3124.62 4.599 26.025 
 NTA 105 305.72 1994.82 -79.83 106.70 550.63 -1.114 25.352 
 IA 105 1106.69 2877.06 67.11 269.29 831.51 5.392 33.601 
 GW 105 1752.72 4357.39 293.85 523.03 1621.59 7.365 64.245 
Panel B: Purchase price allocation (relative) 
Sub-sample Variable N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis 
US-GAAP  NTA2PP 112 0.1916 0.4447 -0.0179 0.1552 0.3738 -0.616 2.971 
 IA2PP 112 0.2911 0.2835 0.0977 0.2389 0.4254 2.706 13.985 
 GW2PP 112 0.5173 0.3293 0.3375 0.5276 0.7570 0.279 0.543 
IFRS NTA2PP 105 0.1015 0.5150 -0.0566 0.1335 0.4045 -2.324 10.658 
 IA2PP 105 0.3514 0.4675 0.0873 0.2388 0.4575 4.640 31.396 
 GW2PP 105 0.5470 0.3274 0.3573 0.5669 0.7101 0.504 2.046 
Notes: 
The variables are defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-4: Purchase price allocation 
 (own analysis)  
 
Table II-5 presents the correlation matrix. The amounts allocated to net tangible assets 
(NTAs), IAs, and goodwill are expected to be correlated. The discretion associated with 
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the allocation to net tangible assets is limited (Watts, 2003; Lonergan, 2009). If the 
amount allocated to NTAs increases, the amounts allocated to IAs and goodwill will 
decrease. While the aggregate value of intangibles appears to be assessed with 
reasonable accuracy, the recognition of separate IAs is not verifiable and thus goodwill 
risks subsuming every IA not recognized separately (Watts, 2003; Lonergan, 2009). The 
amount allocated to goodwill is not significantly associated with the acquirer firm’s 
decision to identify and recognize IAs separately (p > 0.10). However, the acquirer 
firms appear to allocate a certain amount to IAs depending on the amount allocated to 




































NTA2PP 1.000 -0.645 -0.652 -0.009 -0.206 -0.136 -0.316 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.895) (0.002) (0.045) (0.000) 
IA2PP -0.734 1.000 -0.029 0.185 0.194 0.213 0.400 
 (0.000)  (0.668) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
GW2PP -0.607 -0.094 1.000 -0.105 0.196 0.028 0.182 
 (0.000) (0.168)  (0.123) (0.004) (0.683) (0.007) 
IPRD2IA 0.003 0.112 0.136 1.000 -0.161 -0.129 0.190 
 (0.965) (0.098) (0.045)  (0.017) (0.058) (0.005) 
IAFIN2IA -0.262 0.168 0.188 -0.136 1.000 -0.586 0.144 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.005) (0.046)  (0.000) (0.035) 
IAIND2IA -0.055 0.049 0.024 -0.085 -0.601 1.000 0.304 
 (0.418) (0.473) (0.727) (0.211) (0.000)  (0.000) 
IA_NO_CAT -0.250 0.187 0.148 0.029 0.248 0.162 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.030) (0.670) (0.000) (0.017)  
Notes:  
The table reports the Bravais–Pearson correlation coefficients for the total sample of 217 business combinations below the diagonal 
and the respective Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal; the related p-values (two-tailed) are given in parentheses 
below each correlation coefficient. The variables are defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-5: Correlation matrix 
 (own analysis)  
 
In the following sections, I evaluate quantitative and qualitative disclosures about 
intangibles. IAs are only recognized in 193 and goodwill in 197 BCs. Thus, I consider 
only the respective BCs in my analyses. 
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Types of intangible assets recognized in purchase price allocations 
Category Type US-GAAP IFRS 
  
N % N % 
Marketing-related intangible assets  65 21.6% 37 18.4% 
thereof Trademarks, trade names 57 18.9% 11 5.5% 
 Brands, brand names 4 1.3% 23 11.4% 
 Other marketing-related intangible assets 4 1.3% 3 1.5% 
Customer-related intangible assets 80 26.6% 50 24.9% 
thereof Customer lists 3 1.0% 11 5.5% 
 Order or production backlog 7 2.3% 0 0.0% 
 Customer contracts and related customer relationships 7 2.3% 3 1.5% 
 Non-contractual customer relationships 33 11.0% 19 9.5% 
 Core deposits 8 2.7% 6 3.0% 
 Customer base 0 0.0% 3 1.5% 
 Other customer-related intangible assets 22 7.3% 8 4.0% 
Technology-based intangible assets 66 21.9% 30 14.9% 
thereof Patented technology 11 3.7% 3 1.5% 
 Computer software and mask works 3 1.0% 10 5.0% 
 Unpatented technology 27 9.0% 7 3.5% 
 Databases, including title plants 1 0.3% 1 0.5% 
 In-process research & development 20 6.6% 5 2.5% 
 Other technology-based intangible assets 4 1.3% 4 2.0% 
Contract-based intangible assets 59 19.6% 20 10.0% 
thereof Licensing, royalty, standstill agreements 6 2.0% 3 1.5% 
 Advertising, construction, management, service, or 
supply contracts 
9 3.0% 1 0.5% 
 Lease agreements 11 3.7% 1 0.5% 
 Franchise agreements 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
 Operating and broadcast rights 3 1.0% 0 0.0% 
 Use rights such as drilling, water, air, mineral, timber 
cutting, and route authorities 
6 2.0% 2 1.0% 
 Non-competition agreements 13 4.3% 0 0.0% 
 Concessions 0 0.0% 7 3.5% 
 Other contract-based intangible assets 10 3.3% 6 3.0% 
Artistic-related intangible assets 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 
Miscellaneous intangible assets 30 10.0% 64 31.8% 
Total  301 100.0% 201 100.0% 
Average  3.0  2.2  
Notes:  
Intangible assets are recognized in 93 out of 105 IFRS business combinations and in 100 out of 112 US-GAAP business 
combinations. On average 2.2 different types of intangible assets are recognized in an IFRS business combination and 2.8 on 
average in a US-GAAP business combination. 
Table II-6: Types of intangible assets recognized in purchase price allocations 
 (own analysis)  
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4.2. Disclosure on Intangible Assets 
4.2.1. Identification of Intangible Assets 
While Table II-6 presents how the identifiable IAs are classified into the six categories 
presented above, Table II-9 shows the allocation of the acquired IAs to these six 
categories. While IFRS acquirers identify on average only 2.2 different IAs, US-GAAP 
acquirer firms name on average 3.0 different IAs. To justify a higher amount of IAs, a 
higher number of different IAs is identified (rBP;IAIPRD2PP,IA_NO_CAT = 0.187; p < 0.01). If 
the amount allocated to goodwill increases, the acquirer firm will also identify a higher 
number of different IAs (rBP;GW2PP,IA_NO_CAT = 0.187; p < 0.05).  
 
Recognition of intangible assets in purchase price allocations 
Sub-sample Variable N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis 
US-GAAP  MKT2IA 100 0.1793 0.2911 0.0000 0.0054 0.2610 1.657 1.514 
 CST2IA 100 0.3526 0.3659 0.0000 0.2873 0.6789 0.518 -1.242 
 TEC2IA 100 0.1426 0.2559 0.0000 0.0000 0.1704 1.821 2.440 
 CNT2IA 100 0.1719 0.3346 0.0000 0.0000 0.0792 1.730 1.346 
 ART2IA 100 0.0004 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 10.000 100.000 
 MISC2IA 100 0.1532 0.3339 0.0000 0.0000 0.0151 2.006 2.314 
IFRS MKT2IA 93 0.1253 0.2624 0.0000 0.0000 0.1002 2.365 4.685 
 CST2IA 93 0.2275 0.3488 0.0000 0.0000 0.4737 1.155 -0.276 
 TEC2IA 93 0.0834 0.2367 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.006 7.866 
 CNT2IA 93 0.1170 0.3022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.405 4.116 
 ART2IA 93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
 MISC2IA 93 0.4468 0.4721 0.0000 0.1540 1.0000 0.249 -1.896 
Notes:  
Intangible assets are recognized in 93 out of 105 IFRS business combinations and in 100 out of 112 US-GAAP business 
combinations. The variables are defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-7: Recognition of intangible assets in purchase price allocations 
 (own analysis)  
 
In the 193 BCs 102 marketing- and 130 customer-related IAs are recognized. 
Marketing-related IAs represent 12.53 percent of the total IAs (by value) in IFRS and 
17.93 percent in US-GAAP BCs. While trademarks or trade names are referred to more 
often by US-GAAP acquirers (IFRS: 11; US-GAAP: 57), brands are more frequently 
mentioned by IFRS acquirers (IFRS: 23; US-GAAP: 4). IFRS acquirers allocate 22.75 
percent and US-GAAP acquirers as much as 35.26 percent of the total IAs (by value) to 
customer-related IAs. Customer-related IAs primarily include non-contractual customer 
relationships (IFRS: 19; US-GAAP: 33), but also customer lists (IFRS: 11; US-GAAP: 
3) or core deposits (IFRS: 6; US-GAAP: 8). Core deposits that are frequently 
recognized in BCs between financial institutions refer to the benefits derived from lower 
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funding costs compared with the market. Marketing- and customer-related IAs, which 
are frequently referred to as relational or external capital (Sánchez et al., 2001), are the 
two most important categories of intangible assets. Both categories include IAs such as 
trademarks or customer contracts that are more easily verifiable due to their direct 
connection to the market.  
In the 193 business combinations, the acquirer firms recognize 96 different technology-
based IAs, including in-process R&D. In US-GAAP BCs, unpatented technology (27), 
in-process R&D (20), and patented technology (11) are among the most important 
technology-based IAs. Computer software is the most frequently mentioned technology-
based IA in IFRS BCs. Technology-based IAs including in-process R&D account for 
only 8.34 percent of the total intangible assets (by value) in IFRS, but 14.26 percent in 
US-GAAP BCs. Although the acquirer firms recognized only 79 different contract-
based intangible assets, this category represents 11.70 percent of the total IAs (by value) 
in IFRS and 17.19 percent of US-GAAP BCs. The fair value of an average contract-
based IA is higher than the fair value of an average technology-based IA. IFRS 
acquirers primarily disclose concession assets; US-GAAP acquirers primarily disclose 
non-competition and favorable lease agreements.  
The art-related IAs that are disclosed in one US-GAAP business combination represent 
less than 1 percent of the total IAs acquired. A total of 94 different IAs cannot be 
unambiguously assigned to one of the five categories proposed by the FASB. The 
acquirers either merge IAs into one group belonging to a mix of the five categories or 
do not specify the type of IA acquired. As a consequence, the sixth category –
miscellaneous IAs – subsumes 44.68 percent of the IAs acquired (by value) in IFRS and 
15.32 percent in US-GAAP BCs.  
4.2.2. Amortization and Impairment of Intangible Assets 
In IFRS BCs, 92.22 percent of the total IAs are finite-life IAs and 7.78 percent are 
indefinite-life IAs (cf. Table II-8). While the IFRS acquirers have to distinguish 
between amortizable and non-amortizable IAs, the US-GAAP acquirers have another 
option. They can immediately expense in-process R&D. The US-GAAP acquirers 
assign 69.21 percent of the total IAs (by value) to finite-life IAs, 27.11 percent to 
indefinite-life IAs, and 3.68 percent to in-process R&D. Obviously, only a few US-
GAAP acquirers opt for immediately expensing in-process R&D. More interestingly, 
more than 90 percent of the total IAs recognized in IFRS BCs are amortized, but hardly 
70 percent of the total IAs recognized in US-GAAP BCs are amortized. In the short 
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term, the average US-GAAP acquirer’s profitability is expected to be higher due to 
lower amortization charges. In the medium to long term, the US-GAAP acquirer runs 
the risk of an impairment that may severely affect its profitability in a certain period. 
Instead of exposing itself to the risk of unscheduled impairments of indefinite-life IAs, 
the IFRS acquirer appears to accept lower earnings due to the amortization charges for 
their finite-life IAs. Maybe it is also more difficult for IFRS acquirers to justify an 
indefinite-life IA.  
 
Amortization and impairment of intangible assets in purchase price allocations 
Sub-sample Variable N Mean S.D Q1 Median Q3 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis 
US-GAAP  IPRD2IA 100 0.0368 0.1433 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.650 34.022 
 IAFIN2IA 100 0.6921 0.3707 0.3376 0.9150 1.0000 -0.737 -1.114 
 IAIND2IA 100 0.2711 0.3693 0.0000 0.0000 0.6329 0.868 -0.940 
IFRS IPRD2IA 93 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
 IAFIN2IA 93 0.9222 0.2095 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 -3.122 9.283 
 IAIND2IA 93 0.0778 0.2095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.122 9.283 
Notes:  
Intangible assets are recognized in 93 out of 105 IFRS business combinations and in 100 out of 112 US-GAAP business 
combinations. The variables are defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-8: Amortization and impairment of intangible assets in purchase price allocations 
 (own analysis)  
 
Out of 193 acquirer firms that recognize IAs in the BCs, 168 disclose information about 
their amortization period. In contrast to Shalev (2009), who states that an amortization 
period is only given for 33 percent of all business combinations, I consider more 
different sections of the financial statements, including the more general information 
provided in the note on accounting policies. Marketing-related IAs, such as trademarks, 
typically have an indefinite useful life. In other categories, indefinite-life IAs are rarely 
to be found. For finite-life IAs, the acquirers provide information about their 
amortization period (time span, weighted average). The amortization period is not only 
defined based on publicly available information, such as typical product life cycles (IAS 
38. 90 (b)), but also based on internal aspects, such as the way of using the asset (SFAS 
142.11 (a); IAS 38.90 (a)). This might explain why I find large differences in the 
amortization periods even for the same category of IA. The useful lives of marketing-
related IAs vary between half a year and 40 years and those of customer-related IA from 
less than 1 to 50 years. The useful lives of contract-based IAs of 1 to 99 years depend 
on the duration of the underlying contractual relationship. Software, patents, and 
technologies are used from 1 to 15 years. How the user of the financial statement should 
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interpret this information about the IAs’ useful life without additional information is 
questionable. 
Out of 193 acquirer firms 134 provide information about the amortization method they 
have chosen. The straight-line amortization method is most frequently applied by both 
IFRS and US-GAAP acquirers (IFRS: 91.9 percent; US-GAAP: 85.0 percent). This can 
be attributed to the fact that the accounting standards require the application of the 
straight-line amortization method, provided that the actual consumption of future 
economic benefits cannot be identified. About 17.9 percent of acquirer firms use 
amortization methods recognizing the emergence of economic benefits. Thus, the 
amortization reflects the pattern with which the IA contributes to future cash flows or 
revenues. Typically, acquirers amortize customer-related IAs based on estimates of the 
period during which they generate revenues. About 20.0 percent of US-GAAP acquirers 
but hardly any IFRS acquirers choose an accelerated amortization method, including the 
sum-of-the-months-digits method. Several acquirers use accelerated methods for 
customer-related IAs in order to take better account of the estimated customer retention 
rates.  
4.2.3. Valuation of Intangible Assets 
Accounting for intangibles acquired in BCs, fair values are to be attributed to the 
identifiable IAs. Neither the IFRS nor the US-GAAP acquirers are obliged to disclose 
the approaches and methods applied to determine the IA’s fair value. However, 89 out 
of 193 acquirer firms that recognize IAs provide at least some information about their 
valuation (cf. Table II-9). Whereas only about 50 percent of IFRS acquirer firms 
provide information directly related to the valuation of the IAs recognized in a specific 
BC, 75 percent of US-GAAP acquirer firms do so. The remaining IFRS and US-GAAP 
acquirer firms only provide information about the valuation of IAs in general.  
In order to enhance the credibility of the valuation of IAs, 38 acquirers that provide 
some information about the valuation engage an independent appraiser. He assists the 
acquirer’s management in selecting an appropriate valuation method, making reasonable 
assumptions and finally determining the fair value of the identified assets and liabilities. 
The US-GAAP acquirers appear to rely more strongly on the assistance of independent 
appraisers than their IFRS counterparts. At least they give this information in the notes 
to the financial statement more frequently and thereby assure that the fair value IAs is 
determined with reasonable accuracy (IFRS: 23.3 percent; US-GAAP: 60.9 percent).  
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Valuation of intangible assets in purchase price allocations 
Approach Method US-GAAP IFRS 
  
N % N % 
Market approach 3 11.5% 8 18.6% 
Income approach 26 100.0% 36 83.7% 
thereof Relief-from-royalty method 6 23.1% 19 44.2% 
 Premium profits method (incremental income method) 1 3.8% 3 7.0% 
 Multi-period excess earnings method 2 7.7% 11 25.6% 
 Other discounted cash flow methods  18 69.2% 20 46.5% 
Cost approach 5 19.2% 3 7.0% 
Total approaches and methods applied to value intangible assets 26 56.5% 38 88.4% 
Independent external appraiser  involved 28 60.9% 10 23.3% 
Total  46 100.0% 43 100.0% 
Notes:  
Intangible assets are recognized in 93 out of 105 IFRS business combinations and in 100 out of 112 US-GAAP business 
combinations. Information about the valuation of intangible assets recognized is disclosed in 43 out of 105 IFRS business 
combinations and in 46 out of 112 US-GAAP business combinations. The approaches and methods applied to value intangible 
assets are given in 38 out of 105 IFRS business combinations and in 26 out of 112 US-GAAP business combinations.  
Table II-9: Valuation of intangible assets in purchase price allocations 
 (own analysis)  
 
In contrast to IFRS acquirers, US-GAAP acquirers refrain from revealing the valuation 
method or approach used to determine the IAs’ fair value. In comparison with 56.5 
percent of the US-GAAP acquirer firms that provide some information about the 
valuation of IAs, 88.4 percent of the respective IFRS acquirer firms disclose the 
approach or even the method chosen. The PPA is based on the use of multiple valuation 
approaches, including the cost, income, and market approaches. The market approach 
(IFRS: 18.6 percent; US-GAAP: 11.5 percent) and the cost approach (IFRS: 7.0 
percent; US-GAAP: 19.2 percent) play only a subordinate role in valuing IAs. Since 
active markets rarely exist for IAs, acquirers refer to the income approach (IFRS: 83.3 
percent; US-GAAP: 100.0 percent). The relief-from-royalty method is the most 
frequently mentioned valuation method (IFRS: 44.2 percent; US-GAAP: 23.1 percent). 
It is used for assessing the value of acquired brand names primarily. The multi-period 
excess earnings method, the second most frequently mentioned valuation method 
(IFRS: 25.6 percent; US-GAAP: 7.7 percent), is applied for the valuation of customer 
relationships. Both IFRS and US-GAAP acquirers frequently do not name the valuation 
method, but provide the information that the valuation is based on discounted earnings, 
cash flows, or cost savings (IFRS: 46.5 percent; US-GAAP: 69.2 percent). Whereas US-
GAAP acquirer firms are rather vague in that they only disclose that the valuation of 
IAs is based on the income approach, IFRS acquirer firms are more open to providing 
information about the specific method chosen to value the IAs acquired. By assigning a 
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specific valuation method to a specific IA, the IFRS acquirers appear to enhance the 
credibility of the valuation of IAs in particular and of the PPA in general. While the 
method or at least the approach is given by several acquirers, very few acquirer firms 
provide more detailed information about the valuation. Without any information on the 
valuation method chosen and the related key assumptions such as cash flows and 
discount rates, it is actually not possible to verify the valuation of the IA acquired. Thus, 
the users of the financial statement must rely on the management, independent 
appraisers and auditors. 
4.3. Disclosure on Goodwill 
While 93.3 percent of the IFRS acquirers recognize goodwill, 88.4 percent of the US-
GAAP acquirers do so. Badwill is recognized in only one IFRS BC. Neither goodwill 
nor badwill is recognized by 11.6 percent of US-GAAP and 5.7 percent of IFRS BCs.  
 
Goodwill 
Component Element US-GAAP IFRS 
  
N % N % 
Fair value of the going-concern element of the target firm’s business 14 50.0% 33 55.9% 
thereof Stand-alone business 7 25.0% 7 11.9% 
Know how 6 21.4% 12 20.3% 
Workforce 7 25.0% 19 32.2% 
 Others  3 10.7% 12 20.3% 
Fair value resulting from the synergies between the acquirer firm and 
the target firm’s businesses  
26 92.9% 55 93.2% 
thereof Revenue synergies 22 78.6% 28 47.5% 
thereof Geography 7 25.0% 8 13.6% 
 Growth 14 50.0% 12 20.3% 
 Others 7 25.0 11 18.6% 
 Profit synergies 7 25.0% 4 6.8% 
 Cost synergies 11 39.3% 24 40.7% 
 Others  0 0.0% 18 30.5% 
Overvaluation of the cost of the business combination (purchase 
price) 
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Overpayment (or underpayment) for the target firm 2 7.1% 2 3.4% 
Total  28 100.0% 59 100.0% 
Notes:  
Information about the components of goodwill is disclosed in 59 out of 105 IFRS business combinations and in 28 out of 112 US-
GAAP business combinations. Multiple answers are possible. 
Table II-10: Goodwill 
 (own analysis)  
 
Table II-10 reports the factors that result in the recognition of goodwill in a BC. 
Although SFAS 141.51 (b) and IFRS 3.67 (h) require the acquirers to describe these 
factors, only 87 out of the 197 acquirers that actually recognize goodwill provide such a 
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description. A total of 60.2 percent of the IFRS and even 28.3 percent of the US-GAAP 
acquirers that recognize goodwill present the factors that contribute to the recognition of 
goodwill. Shalev (2009) reports that only 16.8 percent of acquirers that recognize 
goodwill provide this kind of information. Nevertheless, the share of US-GAAP 
acquirers that give details about the factors that contribute to the recognition of goodwill 
is much lower than that of IFRS acquirer firms. In addition, US-GAAP acquirers that 
actually recognize goodwill explain the primary reasons for the business combination in 
an informative and elaborate manner. However, US-GAAP acquirers do not establish a 
relationship between these reasons and the amount of goodwill recognized. In order to 
identify the resources that are subsumed under goodwill, I rather focus on the more 
specific descriptions of the factors that contribute to the recognition of goodwill. The 
descriptions are partly sparse lists and partly rather detailed explanations of the factors 
subsumed under goodwill.  
Acquirers refer to the going-concern component in 54.0 percent of the descriptions of 
the factors that contribute to the recognition of goodwill (IFRS: 55.9 percent; US-
GAAP: 50.0 percent). For 11.9 percent of IFRS and 25.0 percent of US-GAAP 
acquirers, the goodwill reflects the value of the target firm’s established business (stand-
alone value). These acquirers acknowledge that the target’s established business is more 
than the individual assets that the target firm consists of and the development of a 
comparable business (e.g., its competitive position) by the acquirer firm itself is almost 
impossible. Apart from this rather vague all-inclusive factor, some acquirers provide 
more details about the going-concern component. IFRS acquirers justify goodwill with 
the target’s assembled workforce, which includes the management team and the staff 
(IFRS: 32.2 percent; US-GAAP: 25.0 percent). Closely related to the target’s assembled 
workforce is the target’s know how, which is referred to by 20.7 percent of the acquirers 
(IFRS: 20.3 percent; US-GAAP: 21.4 percent). For instance, extensive industry 
experience and knowledge are mentioned. The going-concern component also includes 
other intangible assets that either cannot be recognized separately from goodwill or 
cannot be measured reliably (IFRS: 20.3 percent; US-GAAP: 10.7 percent).  
Goodwill is also attributable to the synergies that are expected to arise from the 
combination of the acquirer and the target firms’ businesses. In 93.1 percent of the 
descriptions of factors that result in the recognition of goodwill, the acquirer firms 
mention expected synergies (IFRS: 93.2 percent; US-GAAP: 92.9 percent). By 
leveraging the strengths of the target and the acquirer firm, the combined businesses 
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expect to increase their revenues and profits as well as to decrease their costs. Revenue 
synergies are most frequently mentioned (IFRS: 47.5 percent; US-GAAP: 78.6 percent). 
Growth opportunities play a key role in securing revenue synergies (IFRS: 20.3 percent; 
US-GAAP: 50.0 percent). The BC enables the acquirer and target firms to offer a wide 
array of products and services and to serve a broader customer base. In order to grow 
the sales of the combined businesses, the acquirer firm expands the sales of the target 
firm’s products to its existing customers and those of the existing products to the target 
firm’s customers. Another benefit is an expanded geographic footprint (IFRS: 13.6 
percent; US-GAAP: 25.0 percent). The acquirer enhances its national or international 
presence or even gains access to completely new geographic regions. The acquirer 
expects to improve its profitability by combining the acquirer and target firms’ 
businesses (IFRS: 6.8 percent; US-GAAP: 25.0 percent). Moreover, a BC provides the 
opportunity for improvements in operating efficiency through economies of scale and 
cost savings (IFRS: 40.7 percent; US-GAAP: 39.3 percent). Sprint Corp., which 
acquired Nextel Communications, Inc. in 2005, paid “a premium (i.e., goodwill) […] 
for a number of potential strategic and financial benefits […] [such as] the size and 
scale of the combined company […] [that] is expected to enable more operating 
efficiencies than either company could achieve on its own” (Sprint Nextel, 2006: F-21). 
A few acquirers mention more specific cost-saving potentials. When acquiring Schering 
AG in 2006, Bayer AG (2007: 138) recognized goodwill that was attributable to 
“significant cost savings in R&D, marketing, sales, procurement, and production 
functions.” Some IFRS acquirers just mention expected synergies without specifying 
the type of synergies (30.5 percent).  
Overvaluation, which comprises all kinds of measurement errors regarding the purchase 
price, is not mentioned at all. Overpayment is mentioned by four acquirers. According 
to Johnson and Petrone (1998: 295), an overpayment “may occur when the price is 
driven up in the course of bidding for the target firm.” Danaher Corp. (2008: 66) 
explains that the goodwill arises because of “factors including […] the competitive 
nature of the process by which the Company acquired the business […].”  
The amount of goodwill recognized in business combinations is primarily attributable to 
the core goodwill components. The acquirer firms primarily refer to these components 
in their disclosures about goodwill. Thus, my findings are consistent with Johnson and 
Petrone’s (1998) theoretical proposition and Henning et al.’s (2000) empirical findings 
that only the going-concern and synergies components of goodwill are considered as 
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assets. Knowing that shareholders perceive only core goodwill components as an asset, 
acquirers primarily justify the recognition of goodwill in a business combination with 
these components only. Whereas overpayment is still reflected in goodwill in a small 
number of BCs, overvaluation does not appear to affect the amount of goodwill at all.  
According to SFAS 141.52 c (2), US-GAAP acquirers shall disclose the amount of 
goodwill that is assigned to reporting units. Shalev (2009) shows that 63.9 percent of 
US-GAAP acquirer firms provide a breakdown of the assignment of goodwill to the 
reporting segments. I find that a breakdown is provided in 88.8 percent of US-GAAP 
business combinations but only in 60.2 percent of IFRS business combinations. US-
GAAP acquirer firms refer to segments rather than to reporting units. IFRS acquirer 
firms refer to both cash-generating units and segments.  
According to SFAS 141.52 c (1), US-GAAP acquirer firms shall disclose the amount of 
goodwill that is expected to be deductible for tax purposes. Shalev (2009) shows that 
the amount of goodwill that is expected to be deductible for tax purposes is disclosed in 
43.0 percent of the business combinations in which goodwill is disclosed. I find that 
acquirer firms disclose the amount of goodwill that is expected to be deductible for tax 
purposes in 75.8 percent of the business combinations in which goodwill is disclosed. 
23.9 percent of goodwill is expected to be deductible for tax purposes.  
4.4. Determinants of Disclosure on Intangible Assets and Goodwill 
There is evidence that disclosures vary among firms with respect to accounting 
standards, home country, firm size, and industry classification (Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999). Table II-11 and Table II-12 presents the results of univariate tests with regard to 
these determinants. The allocation to IAs and goodwill does not differ between IFRS 
and US-GAAP BCs as well as between acquirer firms from different countries applying 
IFRSs. By introducing the purchase method, both IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 appear to 
contribute to an international convergence of accounting standards. Moreover, the size 
of the business combination (proxied by the purchase price) does not affect the PPA.  
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Univariate results for intangible assets (IA2PP) recognized in purchase price allocations 
Variable Groups N Mean S.D. Statistics 
Accounting standard US-GAAP 112 0.2911 0.2835 t-statistic -1.158 
 IFRS 105 0.3514 0.4675 p-value 0.248 
Country  France 13 0.3800 0.5230 Fw-stat. 1.069 
(IFRS acquirer firms) Germany 12 0.3297 0.2818 p-value 0.409 
 Italy 8 0.2444 0.1914   
 Netherlands 6 0.2415 0.1450   
 Spain 9 0.6423 1.2582   
 Switzerland 5 0.3703 0.1652   
 United Kingdom 29 0.4021 0.3174   
 Other European 
countries 23 0.2307 0.2401 
  
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.1215 0.1820 F-stat. 1.689 * 
 Basic Materials 9 0.2415 0.2759 p-value 0.093 
 Industrials 35 0.4538 0.6946   
 Consumer Goods 22 0.2888 0.2332   
 Health Care 15 0.5112 0.2725   
 Consumer Services 28 0.3272 0.2326   
 Telecommunications 6 0.4085 0.2050   
 Utilities 11 0.2676 0.3762   
 Financials 49 0.2377 0.2608   
 Technology 29 0.3325 0.3651   
Size Small 109 0.3013 0.4221 t-statistic -0.731 
 Large 108 0.3395 0.3422 p-value 0.465 
Notes:  
The relationship between explanatory variables including accounting standards, countries, industries, and the size of the business 
combination and IA2PP is tested using the t-test in the case of two groups and ANOVA and the F-test (or Welch test (Fw) for non-
homogeneous variances across groups) in the case of more than two groups. Size is proxied by the purchase price, the sample is 
split in two groups: small and large business combinations (below vs. above the median of the purchase price). The variable 
GW2PP is defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-11: Univariate results for intangible assets (IA2PP) recognized in purchase price allocations 
 (own analysis)  
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Univariate results for goodwill (GW2PP) recognized in purchase price allocations 
Variable Groups N Mean S.D. Statistics 
Accounting standard US-GAAP 112 0.5173 0.3293 t-statistic -0.666 
 IFRS 105 0.5470 0.3274 p-value 0.506 
Country  France 13 0.5806 0.2112 F-stat. 0.597 
(IFRS acquirer firms) Germany 12 0.6154 0.4078 p-value 0.757 
 Italy 8 0.6003 0.2878   
 Netherlands 6 0.5208 0.2319   
 Spain 9 0.6510 0.4854   
 Switzerland 5 0.5177 0.1623   
 United Kingdom 29 0.5517 0.3683   
 Other European 
countries 23 0.4406 0.2767 
  
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.2010 0.2398 Fw-stat. 4.847 *** 
 Basic Materials 9 0.4092 0.2798 p-value 0.000 
 Industrials 35 0.6782 0.3945   
 Consumer Goods 22 0.6103 0.1981   
 Health Care 15 0.5040 0.2710   
 Consumer Services 28 0.5996 0.4105   
 Telecommunications 6 0.4903 0.2722   
 Utilities 11 0.3334 0.2446   
 Financials 49 0.4855 0.3330   
 Technology 29 0.5922 0.1576   
Size Small 109 0.5305 0.3717 t-statistic -0.055 
 Large 108 0.5329 0.2787 p-value 0.956 
Notes:  
The relationship between explanatory variables including accounting standards, countries, industries, and the size of the business 
combination and GW2PP is tested using the t-test in the case of two groups and ANOVA and the F-test (or Welch test (Fw) for 
non-homogeneous variances across groups) in the case of more than two groups. Size is proxied by the purchase price, the sample 
is split in two groups: small and large business combinations (below vs. above the median of the purchase price). The variable 
GW2PP is defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-12: Univariate results for goodwill (GW2PP) recognized in purchase price allocations 
 (own analysis)  
 
However, the PPA differs between acquirers operating in different industries. The 
results in Table II-13 and Table II-14 show that acquirers operating in different 
industries allocate the purchase price to different categories of IA. The acquirer firms in 
the consumer goods industry primarily recognize marketing-related IAs. Marketing-
related IAs also play a major role in business combinations in industrials and the 
consumer goods industry. Customer-related IAs are the key assets recognized by the 
acquirers in the financial and technology industries. Financial service providers 
frequently accompany their customers for a long period of time. Almost only the 
acquirers in the technology and health care industries disclose technology-based IAs. 
The telecommunications industry relies on contract-based IAs such as spectrum 
licenses. The acquirers from the consumer services and utilities industries also allocate a 
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higher proportion of the purchase price to contract-based IAs. The PPA reflects the 
target firm’s industry specifics. 
 
Univariate results for types of intangible assets recognized in purchase price allocations (I) 
Panel A: Marketing-related intangible assets (MKT2IA) 
Variable Groups N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Statistics 
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.0303 0.0904 Fw-stat. 7.485 *** 
 Basic Materials 9 0.0568 0.0921 p-value 0.000 
 Industrials 35 0.1547 0.2540   
 Consumer Goods 22 0.5038 0.4629   
 Health Care 15 0.0462 0.0943   
 Consumer Services 28 0.2532 0.3023   
 Telecommunications 6 0.0156 0.0244   
 Utilities 11 0.0035 0.0117   
 Financials 49 0.0686 0.1659   
 Technology 29 0.0312 0.0512   
Panel B: Customer-related intangible assets (CST2IA) 
Variable Groups N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Statistics 
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.1923 0.3279 Fw-stat. 3.918 *** 
 Basic Materials 9 0.0688 0.2063 p-value 0.001 
 Industrials 35 0.2527 0.3498   
 Consumer Goods 22 0.1667 0.3063   
 Health Care 15 0.2300 0.3809   
 Consumer Services 28 0.1206 0.1968   
 Telecommunications 6 0.1859 0.2037   
 Utilities 11 0.0000 0.0000   
 Financials 49 0.4341 0.4398   
 Technology 29 0.3990 0.3126   
Panel C: Technology-based intangible assets (TEC2IA) 
Variable Groups N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Statistics 
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.0324 0.0875 Fw-stat 7.178 *** 
 Basic Materials 9 0.1633 0.3056 p-value 0.000 
 Industrials 35 0.0281 0.1289   
 Consumer Goods 22 0.0564 0.1536   
 Health Care 15 0.4531 0.4701   
 Consumer Services 28 0.0235 0.1126   
 Telecommunications 6 0.0007 0.0018   
 Utilities 11 0.0285 0.0945   
 Financials 49 0.0072 0.0396   
 Technology 29 0.3371 0.2714   
Notes:  
The relationship between industries and MKT2IA, CST2IA and TEC2IA is tested using the Welch test (Fw). The variables are 
defined in Appendix II-1. 
Table II-13: Univariate results for types of intangible assets recognized in purchase price allocations (I) 
 (own analysis)  
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Univariate results for types of intangible assets recognized in purchase price allocations (II) 
Panel A: Contract-based intangible assets (CNT2IA) 
Variable Groups N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Statistics 
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.1243 0.2936 Fw-stat. 5.084 *** 
 Basic Materials 9 0.0444 0.1333 p-value 0.000 
 Industrials 35 0.1608 0.3606   
 Consumer Goods 22 0.0002 0.0010   
 Health Care 15 0.0032 0.0120   
 Consumer Services 28 0.2485 0.3850   
 Telecommunications 6 0.5081 0.3309   
 Utilities 11 0.3015 0.4581   
 Financials 49 0.1220 0.3111   
 Technology 29 0.0373 0.1523   
Panel B: Miscellaneous intangible assets (MISC2IA) 
Variable Groups N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Statistics 
Industry (ICB) Oil & Gas 13 0.1592 0.3737 Fw-stat. 0.847 
 Basic Materials 9 0.5556 0.5270 p-value 0.576 
 Industrials 35 0.3170 0.4689  
 Consumer Goods 22 0.2275 0.3746  
 Health Care 15 0.2674 0.4573  
 Consumer Services 28 0.2114 0.3923  
 Telecommunications 6 0.2896 0.3847  
 Utilities 11 0.4846 0.4797  
 Financials 49 0.2252 0.4019  
 Technology 29 0.1954 0.3530  
Notes:  
The relationship between industries and CNT2IA and MISC2IA is tested using the Welch test (Fw). The variables are defined in 
Appendix II-1. 
Table II-14: Univariate results for types of intangible assets recognized in purchase price allocations (II) 
 (own analysis)  
 
5. Conclusion 
The users of financial statements are provided with detailed information about 
intangibles acquired in business combinations under IFRS 3 and SFAS 141. The 
amounts allocated to intangibles are almost always provided for material BCs. More 
than 80 percent of the purchase price is allocated to intangibles. The acquirer’s 
management may exercise judgment in the process of identifying and valuing IAs. 
Whether and which intangible assets are recognized depends on the industry. To 
determine the IAs’ fair value, the acquirer’s management must select an appropriate 
valuation method and make reasonable assumptions. Although the applied valuation 
method or approach is given in a few cases, the key assumptions are never disclosed, 
and thus the amount allocated to an IA is difficult to reproduce. Although both 
accounting standards require the recognition of all the identifiable IAs separately, 
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goodwill alone accounts for more than 50 percent of the purchase price on average. It is 
associated with the target’s stand-alone value as well as with the expected synergies 
from the business combination.  
Contributing to the accounting literature, my study improved the understanding of the 
use of the accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 for business combinations, which 
are the result of the first joint project of the International Accounting Standards Board 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board. I show that the information provided 
under the two accounting standards is widely similar and comparable. However, there 
are also a few differences which result from differences between the two accounting 
standards (e.g., the accounting for in-process R&D, the tax-deductibility of goodwill) 
and which concern primarily additional information provided voluntarily by firms (e.g., 
the valuation methods). Moreover, I assessed not only quantitative, but also qualitative 
disclosure about intangibles. While quantitative information was almost always 
available, the acquirers provided varying degrees of qualitative disclosure.  
  




Appendix II-1: Coding scheme 
Coding scheme 
Category Definition Source 
General information about the business combination: 
Name of the acquirer firm  ZEPHYR database 
Location of the acquirer firm Country ZEPHYR database 
Industry of the acquirer firm Industry Classification Benchmark (Level 1) ZEPHYR database 
Name of the target firm  ZEPHYR database 
Location of the target firm Country ZEPHYR database 
Industry of the target firm Industry Classification Benchmark (Level 1) ZEPHYR database 
Completion date  ZEPHYR database 
Information related to the purchase price allocation: 
Purchase price (PP) Amount: PP = NTA + IA + GW Content analysis  
Net tangible assets (NTA) Amount of tangible and monetary assets and 
liabilities recognized in the purchase price 
allocation 
Content analysis  
Net tangible assets to purchase 
price (NTA2PP) 
NTA2PP = NTA / PP Calculated 
Information related to intangible assets recognized separately from goodwill: 
Recognition of intangible 
assets 
1 if intangible assets (MKT or CST or TEC or CNT 
or ART or MISC) are recognized, 0 otherwise 
Content analysis  
Intangible assets (IA) IA = MKT + CST + TEC + CNT + CNT + ART + 
MISC 
Content analysis  
Intangible assets to purchase 
price (IA2PP) 
IA2PP = IA / PP Calculated 
In-process R&D (IPRD) Amount of in-process research & development 
recognized 
Content analysis  
In-process R&D to intangible 
assets (IPRD2IA) 
IPRD2IA = IPRD / IA Calculated 
Intangible assets with finite 
useful life (IAFIN) 
Amount of intangible assets with finite useful life 
recognized  
Content analysis  
Intangible assets with finite 
useful life to intangible assets 
(IAFIN2IA) 
IAFIN2IA = IAFIN / IA Calculated 
Intangible assets with 
indefinite useful life (IAIND) 
Amount of intangible assets with indefinite useful 
life recognized (if explicitly stated) 
Content analysis  
Intangible assets with 
indefinite useful life to 
intangible assets (IAIND2IA) 
IAIND2IA = IAIND / IA Calculated 
Number of intangible assets 
(IA_NO_CAT) 
Number of intangible assets recognized 
IA_NO_CAT = MKT_NO + CST_NO + TEC_NO 
+ CNT_NO + CNT_NO + ART_NO + MISC_NO 
Calculated 
Number of marketing-related 
intangible assets (MKT_NO) 
Number of intangible assets recognized “that are 
primarily used in the marketing or promotion of 




Amount of marketing-related intangible assets  Content analysis  
Marketing-related intangible 
assets to intangible assets 
(MKT2IA) 
MKT2IA = MKT / IA Calculated 
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Coding scheme (continued) 
Category Definition Source 
Information related to intangible assets recognized separately from goodwill (continued): 
Marketing-related intangible 
assets – amortization period 
Amortization period given Content analysis  
Number of customer-related 
intangible assets (CST_NO) 
Number of recognized of assets associated with the 
contractual or non-contractual relationship with 




Amount of customer-related intangible assets Content analysis  
Customer-related intangible 
assets to intangible assets 
(CST2IA) 
CST2IA = CST / IA Calculated 
Customer-related intangible 
assets – amortization period 
Amortization period given Content analysis  
Number of technology-based 
intangible assets (TEC_NO) 
Number of intangible assets recognized (incl. in-
process R&D) that “relate to innovations or 




Amount of technology-based intangible assets Content analysis  
Technology-based intangible 
assets to intangible assets 
(TEC2IA) 
TEC2IA = TEC / IA Calculated 
Technology-related intangible 
assets – amortization period 
Amortization period given Content analysis  
Number of contract-based 
intangible assets (CNT_NO) 
Number of intangible assets recognized “that 
represent the value of rights that arise from 




Amount of contract-based intangible assets  Content analysis  
Contract-based intangible 
assets to intangible assets 
(CNT2IA) 
CNT2IA = CNT / IA Calculated 
Contract-related intangible 
assets – amortization period 
Amortization period given Content analysis  
Number of art-related 
intangible assets (ART_NO) 
Number of intangible assets recognized that are 
protected by the copyright and any related 
assignments (SFAS 141.A22) 
Content analysis 
Art-related intangible assets 
(ART) 
Amount of art-related intangible assets  Content analysis  
Art-related intangible assets to 
intangible assets (ART2IA) 
ART2IA = ART / IA Calculated 
Art-related intangible assets – 
amortization period 
Amortization period given Content analysis  
Number of miscellaneous 
intangible assets (MISC_NO) 
Number of other non-tangible, non-monetary assets 





Amount of miscellaneous intangible assets Content analysis  
Miscellaneous intangible 
assets to intangible assets 
(MISC2IA) 
MISC2IA = MISC / IA Calculated 
Miscellaneous intangible 
assets – amortization period 
Amortization period given Content analysis  
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Coding scheme (continued) 
Category Definition Source 
Information related to intangible assets recognized separately from goodwill (continued): 
Straight-line amortization 
method 
1 if straight-line amortization method applied, 0 
otherwise 
Content analysis  
Economic benefits 
amortization method 
1 if amortization method based on emergence of 
economic benefits applied, 0 otherwise 
Content analysis  
Accelerated amortization 
method 
1 if accelerated amortization method applied, 0 
otherwise 
Content analysis  
Independent external appraiser  
involved 
1 if independent third party appraiser is involved to 
value intangible assets acquired, 0 otherwise 
Content analysis 
Valuation based on market 
approach 
1 if valuation based on market approach (quoted 
market prices, similar transactions), 0 otherwise (IVS 
210.C18) 
Content analysis  
Valuation based on income 
approach 
1 if valuation based on income approach, 0 otherwise 
(IVS 210.C22–C23) 
Content analysis  
Relief-from-royalty method 1 if valuation based on relief-from-royalty method, 0 
otherwise (IVS 210.C24) 
Content analysis  
Premium profits or 
incremental profits method  
1 if valuation based on premium profits method (or 
incremental profits method), 0 otherwise (IVS 
210.C28) 
Content analysis  
Multi-period excess earnings 
method 
1 if valuation based on multi-period excess earnings 
method, 0 otherwise (IVS 210.C31) 
Content analysis  
Other discounted cash flow 
methods  
1 if no specific valuation method is given, but 
reference to  
the capitalization of earnings, cash flows, or cost 
savings, 0 otherwise (IVS 210.C22–23) 
Content analysis  
Valuation based on cost 
approach 
1 if valuation based on cost approach (replacement 
cost, reproduction cost) , 0 otherwise (IVS 210.C36) 
Content analysis  
Information related to goodwill recognized: 
Recognition of goodwill 1 if goodwill is recognized, 0 otherwise Content analysis  
Recognition of badwill 1 if badwill is recognized, 0 otherwise Content analysis  
Goodwill (GW) Amount of goodwill recognized Content analysis  
Goodwill to purchase price 
(GW2PP) 
GW2PP = GW / PP Calculated 
Primary reason for the 
acquisition 
1 if reasons for the acquisition are given, 0 otherwise Content analysis  
Description of the factors that 
contributed to a purchase price 
that resulted in recognition of 
goodwill 
1 if description of factors is provided, 0 otherwise 
(only those disclosures are considered that establish a 
clear link between factors contributing to the 
purchase price and goodwill) 
Content analysis  
Going-concern element of the 
target firm’s business 
1 if factors related to the target firm’s stand-alone 
value (e.g., intangible assets not allowed to be 
recognized separately such as human capital, 
competitive position) (Johnson and Petrone, 1998), 0 
otherwise 
Content analysis  
Going-concern element: 
Stand-alone business 
1 if factors related to the target firm’s stand-alone 
business (not specified), 0 otherwise 
Content analysis  
Going-concern element: 
Know how 
1 if factors related to the target firm’s know how, 0 
otherwise 
Content analysis  
Going-concern element: 
Workforce 
1 if factors related to the target firm’s workforce 
(e.g., staff, management team), 0 otherwise 




Other factors related to the target firm’s stand-alone 
business are mentioned (multiple answers per 
business combination possible), 0 otherwise  
Content analysis  
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Coding scheme (continued) 
Category Definition Source 
Information related to goodwill recognized (continued): 
Synergies from the business 
combination 
1 if factors related to the synergies that result from 
combining the acquirer and target firm’s businesses 
(Johnson and Petrone, 1998), 0 otherwise 
Content analysis  





1 if factors related to the revenue synergies 
(geographic expansion), 0 otherwise 
Content analysis 
Revenue synergies (growth) 1 if factors related to the revenue synergies 
(operating segment expansion), 0 otherwise 
Content analysis 
Revenue synergies (others) 1 if factors related to the revenue synergies (others), 
0 otherwise 
Content analysis 
Profit synergies 1 if factors related to the profit synergies, 0 otherwise Content analysis 
Cost synergies 1 if factors related to the cost synergies, 0 otherwise Content analysis 
Synergies: Others Other factors related to synergies are mentioned (not 
clearly attributable to revenue, profit and cost 
synergies; multiple answers per business combination 
possible), 0 otherwise 
Content analysis 
Overvaluation of the cost of 
the business combination 
(purchase price) 
Measurement errors in determining the value of the 
purchase price (Johnson and Petrone, 1998) 
Content analysis  
Overpayment (or 
underpayment) for the target 
firm 
Overpayments resulting from bidding wars or 
underpayments due to fire sales (Johnson and 
Petrone, 1998) 
Content analysis  
Number of reporting/cash-
generating unit to which 
goodwill is assigned  
Number of reporting/cash-generating unit to which 
goodwill is assigned  
Content analysis  
Level of reporting/cash-
generating unit to which 
goodwill is assigned  
Level of reporting/cash-generating unit to which 
goodwill is assigned  
Content analysis  
Tax-deductible goodwill Amount of goodwill expected to be deductible for tax 
purposes   
Content analysis  
Notes: 
When developing the coding scheme for disclosure on intangibles acquired in business combinations, I consulted the acquirer 
firm’s notes to the financial statements, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
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III. Determinants of Purchase Price Allocation Decisions 




The first convergence project of IASB and FASB created the widely equivalent 
international and U.S. accounting standards for business combinations IFRS 3 and 
SFAS 141. The purchase price must be allocated to identifiable assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed with the residual amount recognized as goodwill. This purchase price 
allocation requires the acquirer firm’s management to exercise judgment and to use their 
private information. We investigate whether the management opportunistically or 
efficiently uses the discretion to initially recognize goodwill. Our empirical study is 
based on hand-collected and archival data for a random sample of 149 IFRS and US-
GAAP business combinations of European and U.S. acquirer firms completed between 
2005 and 2008. We show that the classic motivations of accounting choice such as debt 
contracting and political visibility only marginally influence the recognition of 
goodwill. We find that discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment 
testing are already taken into account when initially recognizing goodwill in business 
combinations. However, our results provide also evidence that the accounting for 
goodwill in business combinations is not only associated with management reporting 
opportunism but also reflects the target firm’s going concern and synergies resulting 
from the business combination.  
 
Keywords:  
Accounting Choice; Purchase Price Allocation; Goodwill 
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1. Introduction 
Goodwill makes up more than half of the purchase price paid for the target firm, and 
thus, it represents by far the largest single asset acquired in an average business 
combination (Shalev, 2009).30 Not surprisingly, high amounts of goodwill characterize 
the balance sheet of most acquirer firms after a business combination (Bloom, 2009). 
Whereas goodwill impairment testing is rather well understood (e.g., Francis et al., 
1996; Schultze, 2005; Hayn and Hughes, 2006), initial recognition of goodwill has 
rarely been studied in depth (Grinyer et al., 1991; Wong and Wong, 2001). The aim of 
this study is to comprehensively investigate whether the acquirer firm’s management 
opportunistically or efficiently uses discretion inherent in accounting standards to 
initially recognize goodwill.  
Accounting for goodwill has always been one of the most controversial issues in 
research and practice. The joint standard-setting activities of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) led to a convergence of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
and the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) with 
regard to accounting for goodwill inter alia. The Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards 141 (SFAS 141) issued in June 2001 and the matching International Financial 
Reporting Standard 3 (IFRS 3) issued in March 2004 fundamentally changed the way 
business combinations are accounted for. In order to provide more decision-useful 
financial statements, the acquirer firms are required to allocate the purchase price to 
identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed with the residual amount recognized 
as goodwill. This method of accounting for business combination is commonly referred 
to as purchase price allocation (PPA). Since accounting discretion associated with the 
allocation to tangible and monetary assets, as well as liabilities, is limited (Watts, 2003; 
Lonergan, 2009), the aggregate value of intangible assets and goodwill can be assessed 
with reasonable accuracy. However, the identification of single intangible assets is 
generally not verifiable and its valuation relies heavily on management’s private 
information and their judgment (Watts, 2003; Lonergan, 2009). Regardless of whether 
intended or not, goodwill risks becoming a “black box”, subsuming every asset or 
liability not recognized separately.  
                                                 
30
  In our sample of 149 business combinations, 60 percent of purchase price is allocated to goodwill in 
IFRS business combinations and 52 percent in US-GAAP business combinations. 
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On the one hand, accounting choices create opportunities for opportunistically 
manipulating financial accounting (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Fields et al., 2001). 
Due to the discretion involved, there is scope for deliberate manipulation of PPAs 
especially with regard to the amount finally allocated to goodwill. Since the recognition 
of goodwill allows for strategically influencing the acquirer firm’s future earnings, 
financial position and net assets, the management will likely have strong incentives to 
provide a PPA that does not accurately reflect the business combination’s underlying 
economics. On the other hand, accounting choice may be beneficial, conveying 
decision-useful information to users of financial statements (Holthausen, 1990; 
Malmquist, 1990; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The acquirer firm’s management can 
use their knowledge about the target firm to properly recognize assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed, as well as to estimate its fair values, so that the accounting treatment 
best reflects the business combination’s underlying economics. Barth et al. (2008) argue 
that accounting quality increases if the management’s opportunistic discretion is limited 
and accounting numbers better reflect a firm’s underlying economics. Little prior 
research provides evidence on the determinants of the initial recognition of goodwill. 
Grinyer et al. (1991) show that the management’s reporting opportunism affects the 
recognition of goodwill. Wong and Wong (2001) disentangle the opportunistic and 
efficiency motivations associated with debt covenant restrictions. With regard to 
intangible assets in general, Wyatt (2005) concludes that its recognition is not only 
associated with the management’s reporting opportunism but more importantly with the 
firm’s underlying economics.  
In this paper, we investigate whether the recognition of goodwill reflects the business 
combination’s underlying economics in the face of the management’s reporting 
opportunism. Opportunistic reporting incentives include motivations related to future 
goodwill impairment testing (Ramanna, 2008) and the classic motivations for 
accounting choice such as contracting considerations (agency costs), political 
considerations (externalities) and information asymmetries (Fields et al., 2001). In 
contrast to limiting our sample to one specific institutional setting, we examine the 
initial recognition of goodwill under IFRS 3 in Europe and under SFAS 141 in the 
United States (U.S.) between 2005 and 2008. The present paper is – to the best 
knowledge of the authors – one of the first to analyze the initial recognition of goodwill 
in business combinations after adoption of IFRS in Europe and compares results with 
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US-GAAP business combinations under the matching standard SFAS 141.31 Thereby, 
we provide results that are generalizable to both Europe and the United States.  
The paper sheds light on the determinants of the initial recognition of goodwill. 
Although the initial recognition of goodwill reflects the business combination’s 
underlying economics such as the target firm’s going concern and synergies resulting 
from the business combination and thereby increases accounting quality, the paper 
provides evidence that the allocation of purchase price to goodwill is also affected by 
opportunistic reporting incentives that decrease accounting quality. The classic 
motivations for accounting choice in general and debt covenant restrictions as well as 
political considerations in particular only marginally influence the recognition of 
goodwill. However, discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing 
appear to be taken into account already when initially recognizing goodwill. 
Our study contributes to existing accounting research in three ways. First, we show that 
the issues of initially recognizing goodwill and goodwill impairment testing are strongly 
interrelated. Most of the prior literature investigating the accounting for goodwill has 
focused only on goodwill impairment testing (e.g., Francis et al., 1996; Schultze, 2005; 
Hayn and Hughes, 2006). Since accounting choices related to the initial recognition of 
goodwill are likely to affect future goodwill impairment testing (Beatty and Weber, 
2006), we consider this in our analyses. Second, we respond to Fields et al. (2001) by 
integrating multiple motivations when evaluating the determinants of accounting 
choices. We acknowledge that the initial recognition of goodwill is associated with both 
reporting opportunism and economic efficiency. Accounting quality is higher if the 
management’s opportunistic discretion is limited and the recognition of goodwill better 
reflects the business combination’s underlying economics. Finally, we contribute to the 
debate on the harmonization of national accounting standards with IFRS in general and 
on convergence of IFRS and US-GAAP in particular. Prior empirical research has 
concentrated on accounting choices in a single country and has rarely examined 
accounting choices in an international setting (e.g. Ball et al., 2003). While it is 
appropriate to evaluate accounting choices of national accounting standards in a single-
country setting, it is advisable to evaluate accounting choices inherent to IFRS in a 
multi-country setting (Schipper, 2005). Moreover, Frost et al. (2009) call for 
comparative evidence on accounting under IFRS and US-GAAP. We respond to both 
                                                 
31
  Meyer and Bischoff (2012) analyze the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill by Swiss acquirer 
firms. They conclude that the related discretion is used opportunistically. 
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calls and analyze the recognition of goodwill in a multi-country setting with the two 
largely consistent accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 that are a result of the 
joint standard-setting activities.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 considers the accounting 
treatment adopted by IFRS and US-GAAP acquirer firms to account for goodwill in 
business combinations. Section 3 reviews the literature on goodwill and across various 
categories of determinants of accounting choice and develops the hypotheses. Research 
design and sample selection are addressed in section 4. The results of the empirical 
analyses are presented in section 5, and results of additional analyses are presented in 
section 6. We discuss conclusions as well as limitations in section 7.  
2. Background: Accounting for Goodwill in Business Combinations  
In October 2002, the IASB and the FASB issued a memorandum of understanding 
(“Norwalk Agreement”) in which they “acknowledged their commitment to the 
development of high-quality, compatible accounting standards that could be used for 
both domestic and cross-border financial reporting” (FASB and IASB, 2002). The 
business combinations project was the first joint project of the two standard setters. As a 
result, the accounting for business combination under IFRS and US-GAAP became 
largely consistent.  
All business combinations within the scope of the accounting standards IFRS 3 or SFAS 
141 are accounted for under the purchase method of accounting (IFRS 3.2-14; SFAS 
141.9-13). 32  Both accounting standards intend to convey decision-useful financial 
information by requiring the acquirer firm to allocate the purchase price to identifiable 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed (IFRS 3.36-60; SFAS 141.35-46). However, they 
also afford considerable discretion to the management. Only little accounting discretion 
is associated with the allocation to tangible and monetary assets as well as liabilities 
(Watts, 2003; Lonergan, 2009). Valuation methods applied to value these assets and 
liabilities “are well known, widely used and generally accepted” (Lonergan, 2009: 392). 
Thus, the aggregate value of intangible assets and goodwill can be assessed with 
reasonable accuracy by deducting the value of all tangible and monetary assets net of 
liabilities from the purchase price. The case is different for the allocation to single 
                                                 
32
  In this paper, we examine the accounting for goodwill recognized in business combinations based on 
the accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141. In IFRS 3 (rev. 2008) and SFAS 141 (rev. 2007), 
IASB and FASB introduced the full goodwill method, and at the same time, replaced the term 
purchase method with the term acquisition method. 
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intangible assets. Even if the management is able to identify intangible assets in a 
reasonable manner, it must select and apply appropriate valuation methods that rely on a 
number of assumptions and thus inevitably involve discretion (Watts, 2003; Lonergan, 
2009). The excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable assets and 
liabilities is recognized as goodwill (IFRS 3.51-52; SFAS 141.43). If assets and 
liabilities are not identified separately or not valued properly, they will be 
inappropriately subsumed under goodwill (Watts, 2003; Lonergan, 2009).  
Accounting choices related to the initial recognition of goodwill are likely to affect 
future goodwill impairment testing, i.e. the probability of having a goodwill impairment 
and the amount of the goodwill impairment charge (Beatty and Weber, 2006). For the 
purpose of impairment testing, goodwill is assigned to those cash-generating/reporting 
units33  that benefit from it (IAS 36.80; SFAS 142.34). Assigning goodwill to units 
creates concern not only due to a lack of verifiability in the assignment itself but also 
due to a lack of specificity in the definition of these units (IAS 36.6; SFAS 142.30). At 
least once a year, IFRS acquirer firms use a one-step impairment test “comparing the 
carrying amount of the unit, including the goodwill, with the recoverable amount of the 
unit” (IAS 36.90). US-GAAP acquirer firms use a two-step impairment test. If goodwill 
impairment is identified for a unit in a first step, the amount of the goodwill impairment 
charge will be determined in a second step (SFAS 142.88).  
3. Theoretical Framework: Related Research and Hypothesis Development  
3.1. Related Research  
In this paper, we follow a stream of research that examines the determinants of 
accounting for goodwill in order to directly test whether the amount of goodwill 
recognized reflects a business combination’s underlying economics and management’s 
reporting opportunism is limited (cf. Wyatt, 2008). Prior literature examines different 
aspects of the accounting for goodwill.  
Ramanna (2008) investigates the firms’ lobbying support for goodwill impairment 
testing that was introduced by the accounting standard SFAS 142. Firms with more 
numerous reporting units, lower book-value-to-fair-value ratios and fewer verifiable net 
                                                 
33
  IFRS use the term cash generating unit (CGU), US-GAAP use the term reporting unit (RU). 
Following a bottom-up approach, IFRS define a cash generating unit as “the smallest identifiable 
group of assets that generates cash inflows” (IAS 36.6). According to the top-down approach in US-
GAAP, “a reporting unit is an operating segment or one level below an operating segment” (SFAS 
142.30). In this paper, we use the term unit when referring to both cash generating and reporting units. 
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assets profit from discretion potentials associated with goodwill impairment testing. As 
predicted, these firms strongly supported the introduction of the new accounting 
standard. In this paper we refer to these firm characteristics to develop hypotheses about 
discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing that affect the initial 
recognition of goodwill.  
Several researchers address the accounting treatment of goodwill in transition to the 
adoption of the new accounting standards for business combinations IFRS 3 and 
SFAS 141 (e.g., Sellhorn, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Hamberg et al., 2011). 
Sellhorn (2004) and Beatty and Weber (2006) investigate the determinants of whether 
making an impairment and, in case, of the amount of the impairment charge upon the 
initial adoption of SFAS 142. Whereas findings by Sellhorn (2004) indicate that 
impairments primarily reflect a firm’s underlying economics (e.g. stock performance), 
Beatty and Weber (2006) show that opportunistic reporting incentives (e.g. management 
compensation, debt covenants) also affect the management’s decision to take an 
impairment. Examining the initial adoption of IFRS 3 by Swedish firms, Hamberg et al. 
(2011) expect to find that opportunistic reporting incentives such as management 
compensation concerns and debt covenant restrictions also take effect in an European 
setting. However, only management tenure is statistically significant in explaining the 
management’s willingness to take an impairment.  
Prior to the application of the accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141, researchers 
examine accounting for goodwill in specific institutional environments (e.g., Grinyer et 
al., 1991; Wong and Wong, 2001). Grinyer et al. (1991) study the choice between the 
immediate write-off and the recognition of goodwill which was allowed in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s. The authors conclude that the recognition of goodwill 
depends on debt contracting and political visibility. In a New Zealand pre-IFRS setting, 
Wong and Wong (2001) disentangle the opportunistic and efficiency perspective on the 
relationship between debt covenants and the recognition of goodwill. Their results 
suggest that the recognition of goodwill is associated with the acquirer firm’s 
underlying economics.  
Few working papers investigate the accounting for business combinations under 
SFAS 141 in the U.S. (Shalev, 2007; Zhang and Zhang, 2007; Shalev et al., 2010). The 
authors provide evidence that the management's reporting opportunism influences the 
PPA. Zhang and Zhang (2007) show that the PPA is affected rather by opportunistic 
reporting incentives such as executive compensation concerns and future discretion 
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potentials in the U.S. business services industry (2-digit SIC code 73). For US-GAAP 
business combinations between 2001 and 2004, Shalev (2007) confirms that the PPA is 
influenced by the management’s reporting opportunism. In their latest working paper, 
Shalev et al. (2010) focus on the acquirer firm’s management compensation scheme and 
find that it affects the recognition of goodwill.  
Our study investigating the initial recognition of goodwill under IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 
not only differs from the previous studies in the setting examined but also considers a 
more comprehensive set of determinants. We answer the call of Fields et al. (2001) to 
not only separately test but to integrate multiple motivations when evaluating the 
determinants of accounting choices. By examining whether the acquirer firm’s 
management opportunistically or efficiently uses discretion to initially recognize 
goodwill, we provide insights into the reliability of the accounting for business 
combinations. Prior empirical literature on the recognition of goodwill is almost 
exclusively limited to the United States. To the best knowledge of the authors, only a 
few descriptive studies exist with regard to accounting for business combinations in 
Europe (e.g., Glaum et al., 2007; Meyer and Bischoff, 2012). We do not limit our 
sample neither to one specific institutional setting nor to one specific industry. Our 
sample includes firms from 19 European countries and the United States as well as from 
7 different industries. 
3.2. Hypotheses Development 
Research on accounting choice has been ongoing since the seminal work by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978). Fields et al. (2001) review the literature that studies the 
motivations for accounting choice, thereby classifying them into three categories based 
on market imperfections: contracting considerations, political considerations, and 
information asymmetries.34 In addition to the classic motivations for accounting choice, 
we consider accounting choices that affect the discretion potential related to future 
goodwill impairment testing. Further, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) suggest 
incorporating not only hypotheses of management opportunism but also of economic 
efficiency. Thus, we also consider the business combinations’ underlying economics.  
                                                 
34
  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) provide similar classifications. 
– Determinants of Purchase Price Allocation Decisions – 
68 
3.2.1. Contracting Considerations 
Management Compensation  
In order to mitigate agency costs by better aligning the interests of the management and 
shareholders, management compensation schemes are based on measures of a firm’s 
financial performance (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Fields et al., 2001). As indicators 
of financial performance, compensation schemes frequently contain objectives such as 
accounting earnings or stock market performance (Murphy, 1999). However, even if the 
management does not receive bonuses explicitly related to financial performance, it is 
reasonable to assume that their salaries are positively associated with the financial 
performance (Ball and Foster, 1982). It is argued that the use of financial performance 
measures in compensation schemes provides a setting in which the management has 
strong incentives to manage earnings (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). The 
management prefers maximization of future earnings, and thereby maximizing their 
compensation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Since goodwill is not amortized, the 
management’s preference for income-increasing accounting policies is expected to bias 
upwards the amount of purchase price allocated to goodwill. However, impairment 
charges reduce accounting income when goodwill impairment is ascertained. The 
management is able to manage goodwill impairment testing in the short term. 
Nonetheless, the risk of goodwill impairment increases with the amount allocated to 
goodwill (Beatty and Weber, 2006). Moreover, impairment charges are shown to have a 
negative effect on stock market performance (e.g., Hayn and Hughes, 2006). To 
conclude, a trade-off exists between increasing earnings with the amount allocated to 
goodwill and decreasing the risk of goodwill impairments. Thus, we formulate the 
following non-directional hypothesis: 
 
H 1: The compensation concerns affect the amount of purchase price the acquirer 
firm’s management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
 
Debt Covenants 
Debt covenants are used to alleviate the agency conflicts between debt and equity 
holders by limiting the management’s ability to create wealth transfers between both 
parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). By referring to 
reported accounting numbers as estimates of a firm’s resources, debt covenant 
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restrictions create strong incentives for accounting choice (Christie, 1990). On the one 
hand, the acquirer firms with strong debt covenant restrictions are more likely to choose 
income-increasing accounting policies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Since goodwill 
is tested for impairment, accounting income is reduced only occasionally when 
impairments are ascertained. On the other hand, information asymmetries associated 
with the residual amount allocated to goodwill lead to the assumption that it has no 
value in bankruptcy (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2003). By disclosing assets 
instead of goodwill, the acquirer firm strengthens its balance sheet and increases its 
capacity to service the debt and to access new debt. To sum up, a tradeoff exists 
between increasing the amount allocated to goodwill, and thereby increasing future 
accounting earnings, and decreasing the amount, and thereby strengthening the balance 
sheet. This motivates the following non-directional hypothesis:  
 
H 2: The debt covenant restrictions affect the amount of purchase price the acquirer 
firm’s management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
 
3.2.2. Political Considerations 
Political considerations concern contractual and non-contractual relationships with third 
parties such as tax authorities or government (Fields et al., 2001; Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that visible firms run the risk of attracting 
new taxes or regulatory interventions inter alia. In view of the risk of third-party 
reactions, the management is more likely to choose income-decreasing accounting 
policies. It is reasonable to assume that larger business combinations and larger acquirer 
firms attract more attention and are observed by a higher number of stakeholders. A 
high residual amount allocated to goodwill may provide evidence that the acquirer firm 
paid a high premium on top of the fair value of the target firm’s assets. Stakeholders are 
more likely to feel comfortable with visible business combinations for which a higher 
proportion of the purchase price is justified by identifiable assets. These arguments 
suggest that the amount allocated to goodwill is negatively associated with the visibility 
of the business combinations and the acquirer firm. This motivates the next hypothesis: 
 
H 3: The higher the visibility, the less purchase price the acquirer firm’s management 
allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
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3.2.3. Information Asymmetries 
Information asymmetries result from the relation between the firm’s management and 
its shareholders (Fields et al., 2001). The management may use accounting choices in 
order to convey information to shareholders, allowing them to better assess the timing, 
magnitude, and risk of future cash flows and earnings. Capron and Shen (2007) argue 
that target firm ownership is an important source of information asymmetries related to 
business combinations. Because information on private target firms is limited and its 
financial statements are generally not available, the verification of a PPA for a private 
target firm is more difficult for the shareholders. Thus, the acquirer firm’s management 
can increase the amount allocated to goodwill by not properly identifying and valuing 
assets acquired and liabilities assumed of private target firms. This reasoning leads to 
the following hypothesis:  
 
H 4: The higher the information asymmetries related to target firm ownership, the 
more purchase price the acquirer firm’s management allocates to goodwill in 
PPAs. 
 
3.2.4. Future Accounting Discretion Potential 
Criteria for impairment defined in IAS 36 and SFAS 142 provide a high level of 
interpretation and judgment not only in future periods, but also at the time of the initial 
recognition of goodwill. Ramanna (2008) identifies three firm characteristics to capture 
the management’s capability to avoid future impairments: the number of units, the 
units’ book-value-to-fair-value ratio and the verifiability of net assets. Moreover, he 
proposes to take the significance of intangible assets into consideration. We suppose 
that these factors explaining lobbying behavior during elaboration of the accounting 
standard SFAS 142 (ex-ante) actually affect accounting behavior after its adoption (ex-
post). Since these factors are developed based on impairment rules of SFAS 142, which 
are similar but not equivalent to those of IAS 36, we always control for the accounting 
standard applied.  
Number of Cash Generating Units / ReportingUnits 
Goodwill recognized is assigned among the acquirer firm’s cash generating/reporting 
units (IAS 36.80; SFAS 142.34). If more than one unit benefits from the business 
combination, the allocation becomes ambiguous, unverifiable, and arbitrary (Watts, 
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2003; Ramanna, 2008). The allocation to low growth units permits acceleration of 
goodwill impairment by favoring big bath accounting; the allocation to units with high 
internally-generated growth options and thus growing fair value decelerates goodwill 
impairments. Following Ramanna (2008) who argues that the acquirer firms’ flexibility 
in initially assigning goodwill to units, and thus the discretion in ascertaining goodwill 
impairments, is likely to increase with the number of units, we formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H 5a: The higher the number of reporting units, the more purchase price the acquirer 
firm’s management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
 
Cash Generating Units / Reporting Units’ Book-Value-to-Fair-Value Ratio  
In goodwill impairment testing, all of the excess of a unit’s fair value over book value is 
allocated to goodwill, even if part of the excess is likely to be generated internally in 
periods after initial recognition of goodwill (IAS 36.88; SFAS 142.19). Because the 
management has greater discretion in avoiding goodwill impairments for units with low 
book-value-to-fair-value ratios, the amount allocated to goodwill is likely to be biased 
upwards (Ramanna, 2008). This motivates the following hypothesis: 
 
H 5b: The lower the book-value-to-fair-value ratio of the acquirer firm’s units, the more 
purchase price the acquirer firm’s management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
 
Verifiability of Net Assets 
A goodwill impairment must be recorded when the fair value of the unit’s goodwill is 
less than its book value. In determining the amount of the goodwill impairment charge, 
the management has more discretion if net assets are less easily verifiable. Ramanna 
(2008) highlights that fair values of assets such as cash, investments, and payables are 
more easily verifiable than the fair values of firm-specific assets. The amount allocated 
to goodwill is likely to increase with the discretion in determining the fair value of the 
unit’s net assets. This motivates the following hypothesis: 
 
H 5c: The lower the verifiability of the acquirer firm’s net assets, the more purchase 
price the acquirer firm’s management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
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Significance of Intangible Assets 
The risk of future goodwill impairments is reduced by the acquirer firm’s capacity to 
internally generate intangible assets which are subsumed under goodwill in impairment 
testing (Shalev, 2007; Ramanna, 2008). The acquirer firms with a balance sheet 
characterized by a high amount of intangible assets and goodwill are supposed to have 
more experience in developing intangible assets and thus are better able to reduce the 
risk of goodwill impairments. Moreover, the intangible assets already recognized on the 
acquirer firm’s balance sheet are less easily verifiable than many other assets. Thus, the 
amount allocated to goodwill is likely to be overstated by the acquirer firms with higher 
amounts of intangible assets and goodwill already recognized. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H 5d: The higher the amount of intangible assets and goodwill already recognized on 
the acquirer firm’s balance sheet, the more purchase price the acquirer firm’s 
management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
 
3.2.5. Underlying Economics 
 
 
Figure III-1: Decomposition of the purchase price 
 (own illustration)  
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Introducing IFRS 3 and SFAS 141, the standard setters intend that the acquirer firm’s 
financial statements better reflect the business combination’s underlying economics and 
the assets acquired such as goodwill. Figure III-1 shows that the purchase price is 
composed of six components (e.g., Johnson and Petrone, 1998; Roychowdhury and 
Watts, 2007). Component 1 corresponds to the book value of net assets already 
recognized on the target firm’s balance sheet and verifiable changes in these net assets’ 
values. Component 2 represents the fair value of separable net assets not recognized by 
the target firm due to restrictions of accounting standards. If the acquirer firm’s 
management identifies and measures the target firm’s total net assets properly, 
components 1 and 2 are recognized separately in the PPA. Following Johnson and 
Petrone (1998), only components 3 and 4 are considered to be an integral part of the 
goodwill – also called “core goodwill”. Henning et al. (2000) show that especially the 
“core goodwill” components are considered to be assets by shareholders. The going 
concern component (component 3) represents the stand-alone value of economic 
benefits arising from the combined net assets of the target firm (Johnson and Petrone, 
1998; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). These benefits are either internally generated 
(e.g., internally-generated goodwill) or externally acquired in previous business 
combinations (e.g., acquired goodwill). Combination goodwill (component 4) reflects 
the value that arises from expected synergies between the acquirer and the target firm 
(Johnson and Petrone, 1998). Synergies are generally not identifiable, and thus they are 
subsumed under goodwill. Components 5 and 6 are no assets and thus “are not 
conceptually part of goodwill” (Johnson and Petrone, 1998: 295).35 To conclude, only 
the “core goodwill” components reflect the business combination’s underlying 
economics. This motivates our last hypothesis: 
 
H 6: The more important the “core goodwill” components, the more purchase price 
the acquirer firm’s management allocates to goodwill in PPAs. 
  
                                                 
35
  Component 5 includes all kinds of measurement errors in determining the value of the purchase price 
which arise primarily in all-stock and mixed cash/stock transactions (Johnson and Petrone, 1998). 
Component 6 refers to overpayments resulting from bidding wars or underpayments due to fire sales 
(Johnson and Petrone, 1998). 













Total number of completed deals:  456,361 
Deal type Acquisition, merger - 270,535 
Listed 
companies 
Listed acquirer firm - 123,872 
Geography Acquirer firm from the United States of 
America or the European Economic Area 
(EEA) 
- 17,306 
Total number of deals in the United States and Europe 20,205 24,443 44,648 
Time period Completed between 01.01.2005 and 
31.12.2008  
- 9,646 - 14,798 - 24,444 
Deal value 
(incl. est.)  
Min = 250 (million USD) OR  
min = 250 (million EUR) 
- 9,664 - 9,016 - 18,680 
Total number of deals selected from the ZEPHYR 
database 
895 629 1,524 
   
Random sample of deals considered 150 150 300 
Business 
combination 
Not according to SFAS 141 OR IFRS 3 - 13 - 32 - 45 
Materiality Immaterial - 25 - 13 - 38 
Purchase price allocations  112 105 217 
Industry Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate  
(SIC 60-67) 
- 22 - 29 - 51 
Data 
availability 
Missing values - 11 - 6 - 17 
Purchase price allocations to be analysed 79 70 149 
Notes: 
The data were retrieved from the ZEPHYR database on June 30, 2009. 
Table III-1: Sample selection 
 (own analysis) 
 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Sample Selection 
Transactions made by acquirer firms from Europe36 or the United States are identified 
with the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing ZEPHYR database.37 The sample is 
limited to transactions by publicly traded acquirer firms in order to assure that financial 
information is disclosed. The choice of the sample period is governed by the fact that 
                                                 
36
  For financial years beginning after January 1st, 2005, publicly traded companies located in member 
states of the European Union or European Economic Area must publish consolidated financial 
statements in conformity with IFRS as adopted by The European Parliament and The Council of the 
European Union (2002). Europe includes the European Economic Area including the 27 member 
states of the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, which all adopted IFRS. Moreover, 
Switzerland is included in the sample, because listed Swiss firms must prepare their financial 
statements using either IFRS or US-GAAP. 
37
  The data was retrieved from the ZEPHYR database on June 30, 2009. 
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the business combinations analyzed are accounted for according to IFRS 3 or 
SFAS 141.38 For the purpose of the empirical analyses, we refer to material business 
combinations (IFRS 3.67-68; SFAS 141.51-52). Particularly in material business 
combinations, the PPA significantly affects the acquirer firm’s future earnings, financial 
position and net assets. Thus, the management’s incentives to provide a PPA that does 
not accurately reflect the business combination’s underlying economics are likely to be 
strong. In order to exclude individually immaterial business combinations upfront, we 
decide to include only transactions with a minimum deal value.39 The initial sample 
consists of 629 transactions from Europe and of 895 from the United States. Table III-1 
provides an overview of our sample selection. 
Individual PPAs of material business combinations are disclosed in the annual report.40 
A preliminary PPA is to be disclosed shortly after the completion of the business 
combination. The acquirer firms then have to finalize the identification and valuation of 
assets and liabilities until one year after the completion (IFRS 3.62; SFAS 141.B183). 
In order to identify the final PPAs, we manually reviewed the notes to the acquirer 
firm’s financial statements, that are hand-collected from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission EDGAR database for U.S. acquirer firms and from the websites of 
European acquirer firms. With respect to the time and effort for hand collection of data 
on individual PPAs, we use a random sample, which permits us to make generalizations 
about the total population. A transaction of the initial random sample of both 150 
transactions of the IFRS and the US-GAAP acquirer firms is only included in the final 
sample, if at least an individual PPA is provided in the notes to the financial statements. 
Forty-five transactions are not business combinations according to IFRS 3 or SFAS 141 
(IFRS 3.4; SFAS 141.9). Additionally, the acquirer firms do not provide individual 
PPAs for 35 transactions, since these are considered individually immaterial (IFRS 
3.68; SFAS 141.53). Moreover, we exclude 51 business combinations with acquirer 
firms involved predominantly in the financial services industry (2-digit SIC codes 60-
                                                 
38
  Our sample period spans from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2008 for both IFRS and US-GAAP 
business combinations. We exclude business combinations under IFRS 3 (rev. 2008) or SFAS 141 
(rev. 2007) from the sample. The revised accounting standards IFRS 3 (rev. 2008) became effective 
on January 1, 2009; SFAS 141 (rev. 2007) became effective for business combinations completed in 
fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 2008. 
39
  The deal value (incl. deal value estimates) provided by the ZEPHYR database equals the 
consideration paid for the actual stake acquired. We include only transactions with a minimum deal 
value of EUR 250 million for IFRS acquirer firms and of USD 250 million for US-GAAP acquirer 
firms. 
40
  If no PPA was available in the annual report, interim financial reports were reviewed as well. 
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69). By restricting the sample to business combinations for which the necessary data 
(see discussion in section 4.2) is available from other databases, the final sample size 
decreases further to 149 PPAs. 
 
Descriptive statistics – Business combinations (I) 
Panel A: Industry (Acquirer firm) 
SIC Industry  SIC-Codes  US-GAAP  IFRS  TOTAL  
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing  01-09 0 0 0 
Mining  10-14 7 2 9 
Construction  15-17 1 4 5 
Manufacturing  20-39 41 31 72 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services  40-49 8 17 25 
Wholesale Trade  50-51 3 1 4 
Retail Trade  52-59 7 7 14 
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 60-69 0 0 0 
Services  70-89 12 8 20 
Public Administration  91-99 0 0 0 
Total  79 70 149 
Panel B: Industry (Target firm) 
SIC Industry  SIC-Codes  US-GAAP  IFRS  TOTAL  
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing  01-09 0 0 0 
Mining  10-14 4 1 5 
Construction  15-17 2 2 4 
Manufacturing  20-39 30 28 58 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services  40-49 13 16 29 
Wholesale Trade  50-51 3 3 6 
Retail Trade  52-59 6 6 12 
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 60-69 2 3 5 
Services  70-89 18 11 29 
Public Administration  91-99 1 0 1 
Total  79 70 149 
Panel C: Year 
Completion date  US-GAAP IFRS  TOTAL  
01/01/2005 to 31/12/2005 14 18 32 
01/01/2006 to 31/12/2006 22 16 38 
01/01/2007 to 31/12/2007 25 16 41 
01/01/2008 to 31/12/2008 18 20 38 
Total 79 79 149 
Notes:  
Random sample of business combination that are accounted for under IFRS 3 (IFRS sub-sample) or SFAS 141 (US-GAAP sub-
sample) between 2005 and 2008. 
Table III-2: Descriptive statistics – Business combinations (I) 
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Descriptive statistics – Business combinations (II) 
Geography: Country (Acquirer firm) N 
US-GAAP United States 79 
IFRS Europe 70 
 




































United Kingdom 21 
Total   149 
Notes:  
Random sample of business combination that are accounted for under IFRS 3 (IFRS sub-sample) or SFAS 141 (US-GAAP sub-
sample) between 2005 and 2008. 
Table III-3: Descriptive statistics – Business combinations (II) 
 (own analysis) 
 
Table III-2 and Table III-3 provide descriptive statistics about the final sample, which 
consists of a sub-sample of 70 IFRS and 79 US-GAAP business combinations.41 The 
acquirer firms of IFRS business combinations are mainly located in the United 
Kingdom (21), France (9) and Germany (7). Forty-eight percent of acquirer firms (39 % 
of target firms) operate in manufacturing, 17 % (20 %) in transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services, 13 % (19 %) in services, 10 % 
(8 %) in retail trade and 12 % (14 %) in other industries. Twenty-one percent of 
business combinations are completed in 2005, 26 % in 2006, 27 % in 2007, and 26 % in 
2008. Seven acquirer firms were involved in more than one business combination.  
                                                 
41
  The terms IFRS (US-GAAP) business combinations and business combinations with an acquirer firm 
located in European Economic Area member states (the United States) are used interchangeably in 
this paper. 
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4.2. Data 
4.2.1. Explained Variables 
Appendix III-1 summarizes definitions and measurements of explained variables. The 
goodwill is derived from the difference between the purchase price and the sum of 
assets acquired less liabilities assumed. Data on goodwill recognized in business 
combinations is compiled manually from the notes to the financial statement. We 
examine the amount of purchase price (PP) finally allocated to goodwill (PPA_GW). 
Financial data was converted to USD at the exchange rate applicable at the acquisition 
date. The dependent variable of interest is the ratio of goodwill to purchase price 
(GW2PP). Table III-4 provides related descriptive statistics.  
4.2.2. Explanatory Variables 
Appendix III-1 summarizes definitions and measurements of explanatory variables that 
are constructed using data from the Thomson Reuters DATASTREAM and 
WORLDSCOPE databases, the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing ZEPHYR 
database, and the acquirer and the target firms’ financial statements. Table III-5 
provides descriptive statistics. 
In order to assess the effect of compensation schemes (H 1), we use the acquirer firm’s 
return on assets (A_ROA) and total shareholder return (A_TSR) in the fiscal year prior to 
the completion of the business combination. The management compensation schemes 
often explicitly tie compensation to those measures (Murphy, 1999). We manually 
checked for more specific information about the management compensation schemes. 
The majority of the acquirer firms seem to have some kind of management 
compensation scheme tied to the firm’s financial performance, but not all countries in 
the sample require firms to disclose more specific information. Even if a formal bonus 
plan does not exist, measures of financial performance typically inform shareholders 
about the management’s performance (Watts, 2003; Astami and Tower, 2006). We use 
the acquirer firm’s leverage (A_LEV) at the end of the fiscal year prior to the completion 
of the business combination as a proxy for debt covenant incentives (H 2). Debt 
covenants usually restrict the amount of debt issued, specify a maximum leverage ratio 
or indicate a minimum interest coverage ratio (Beneish and Press, 1993; Loh and Tan, 
2002). Several studies show that leverage is a reliable proxy for those restrictions (Duke 
and Hunt, 1990; Demiroglu and James, 2010). As in prior accounting choice studies 
(e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1978), we use acquirer (A_SZ) and target firm size (T_SZ)  
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as a proxy for the acquirer and target firm’s political visibility (H 3). Moreover, we 
include a variable interacting acquirer and target firm size (A_SZxT_SZ) to characterize 
highly visible business combinations. To capture information asymmetries (H 4), we 
differentiate between publicly traded and private target firms (PUBLIC) (Capron and 
Shen, 2007). 
Discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing (H 5a-d) are 
characterized by the number of units, the units’ book-value-to-fair-value ratio, the 
verifiability of net assets and the significance of intangible assets. Since the number of 
units is only rarely disclosed in financial statements, we use the number of distinct 4-
digit SIC codes of the acquirer firm (A_UNIT). We expect that the acquirer firms’ 
number of business sectors is more comparable to its number of units than its number of 
operating segments.42 An acquirer firm that operates in one specific business sector but 
is organized in several operating segments is supposed to have more homogenous cash 
flows across its operating segments compared to an acquirer firm that operates in 
various business sectors and is organized in one operating segment (Ramanna and 
Watts, 2009). Impairment policies are more likely to differ between units operating in 
different business sectors than between units operating in the same business sector. 
Since book-value-to-fair-value ratios of units are unobservable (Ramanna, 2008), we 
calculate the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity for the acquirer firm 
at the end of last fiscal year as a proxy (A_B2M). Consistent with Ramanna (2008), we 
use the ratio of [Cash + Short-term Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] to [Assets – 
Liabilities] at the end of the last fiscal year to proxy for the verifiability of net assets 
(A_VRF). The fair values of assets such as cash, investments, and payables are more 
easily verifiable than firm-specific assets (Richardson et al., 2005; Ramanna, 2008). 
Moreover, we include the ratio of intangible assets (incl. goodwill) already recognized 
on the acquirer firm’s balance sheet to the acquirer firm’s total assets at the end of the 
last fiscal year to proxy for the significance of intangible assets (A_IA2A). As the US-
GAAP impairment rules are similar but not equivalent to those of IFRS, we introduce 
variables interacting the accounting standard applied (IFRS) with the factors capturing 
the discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing.  
                                                 
42
  IAS 14 is replaced by IFRS 8 Operating Segments effective for annual periods beginning January 1, 
2009. Both IFRS (IAS 14) and US-GAAP (SFAS 131) require firms to disclose the number of 
operating segments. 
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To capture the business combination’s underlying economics (H 6), we disaggregate 
goodwill into the “core goodwill” components as only those justify the amount allocated 
to goodwill (Johnson and Petrone, 1998). The going concern component is 
characterized by both internally- and externally-generated benefits from the combined 
net assets of the target firm (Johnson and Petrone, 1998). Externally-generated benefits 
(GC_EXT) are calculated as goodwill already recognized on the target firm’s balance 
sheet divided by target firm’s market value of equity at the end of last fiscal year. 
Internally-generated benefits (GC_INT) are typically not allowed to be recognized on 
the balance sheet. We measure internally-generated benefits as target firm’s market 
value of equity less book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the end of 
the last fiscal year. We expect that the industry year average represents those 
characteristics for private target firms within our sample. Combination goodwill reflects 
the value arising from synergies between the acquirer and target firm of the business 
combination. First, cost synergies result from economies of scale in horizontal business 
combinations with acquirer and target firm operating in the same 2-digit SIC code 
industry (SYN_CST). Second, revenue synergies result from expanding into and 
developing new geographical markets (Doukas and Travlos, 1988). We use the location 
of a target firm relative to the acquirer firm as a proxy (SYN_REV). Moreover, we 
include a variable interacting cost and revenue synergies (SYN_CSTxSYN_CST).  
Finally, we control for industry membership, institutional environment and 
macroeconomic effects. The idea behind these control variables is that PPA decisions 
were due to circumstances beyond the control of the acquirer firm’s management. The 
accepted set of accounting methods is likely to differ across industries (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). An industry dummy variable (INDi) is coded 1 if an acquirer firm is 
from a specific industry and 0 otherwise. Although the accounting standards for 
business combinations IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 are widely equivalent, Schipper (2005) 
points out that institutional environments differ considerably not only between United 
States and Europe, but also across Europe. Therefore, we include country dummy 
variables (CNTRj), which are coded 1 if a firm is from a specific country and 0 
otherwise. The accounting standards do not change in our sample period. Nevertheless 
we include a year dummy variable (YRk) for 2006, 2007 and 2008 to take 
macroeconomic developments into account.  
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4.3. Methodology 
To test our hypotheses H 1 through H 6 developed in section 3.2, we model the 
allocation of purchase price to goodwill as a function of the classic motivations of 
accounting choice, the future discretion potentials and the business combination’s 
underlying economics, as shown in our basic research model in Figure III-2. To 
independently examine the hypotheses, we use bivariate correlations. The entire set of 
hypotheses is examined using robust ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. 
Using the White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimator, we automatically 
correct the t-statistics of regression coefficients for heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
Figure III-2: Research model 
 (own illustration)  
 
First, we discuss the classic motivations of accounting choice including contracting and 
political considerations, and information asymmetries. The following equation (1) is 
























Executive compensation (H 1)
Political visibility (H 3)
Information asymmetries (H 4)
Future discretion potential (H 5)
Underlying economics (H 6)
Debt covenants (H 2)
Controls for countries,
years, and industries
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Second, we refer to the discretion potentials associated with future goodwill impairment 





























Third, we examine the underlying economics of the business combination (H 6) using 























Finally, all variables developed from the hypotheses H 1-H 6 in section 3.2 are included 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table III-4 provides descriptive statistics for the random sample of 70 IFRS and 79 US-
GAAP business combinations as well as for the explained variables of interest. The 
randomly selected business combinations have a mean and median purchase price of 
USD 2,549.9 million and USD 761.2 million respectively. A high standard deviation for 
the purchase price of USD 5,033.0 million reveals a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
sample. 
Mean and median goodwill (PPA_GW) recognized in a business combination amount to 
USD 1,278.6 million and USD 450.1 million respectively. Goodwill represents about 
37 % of total assets acquired in business combinations,43 and about 56 % of purchase 
price (GW2PP). As these descriptive statistics suggest, it seems reasonable to 
thoroughly examine the allocation of purchase price to goodwill. While US-GAAP 
acquirer firms allocate 52 % of the purchase price to goodwill on average, IFRS 
acquirer firms allocate 60 % to goodwill. We use an unpaired two-sample t-test to 
analyze whether the amount of purchase price allocated to goodwill differs between 
IFRS and US-GAAP business combinations. The difference between the goodwill 
recognized in the two sub-samples is statistically significant (p < 0.10). However, the 
difference is not statistically significant using a Mann-Whitney two-sample rank-sum 
test as a nonparametric alternative to the t-test. The differences between the two sub-
samples appear less pronounced than the differences within each sub-sample.  
5.2. Bivariate Statistics 
Table III-6 presents the correlation matrix of the explained and explanatory variables. 
The degree of statistical relationship is assessed with the help of the Bravais-Pearson 
correlation coefficient. The allocation of purchase price to goodwill is not accounted for 
by the classic motivations for accounting choice (H 1 - H 4). With the exception of the 
proxy for market-based management compensation that is positively associated with the 
recognition of goodwill (A_TSR: p < 0.10), all other variables are not significant. 
Discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing (H 5a-H 5d) affect 
the initial recognition of goodwill. The number of units is significant and positively 
associated with the purchase price allocated to goodwill (A_UNIT: p < 0.05). Our  
  
                                                 
43
  Results not presented in Table 4. 
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proxies for the units’ book-value-to-fair-value ratio (A_B2M) and the verifiability of 
assets (A_VRF) are not significant. Consistent with our expectations, the amount of 
intangible assets already recognized on the acquirer firm’s balance sheet is positively 
related to the proportion of purchase price allocated to goodwill (A_IA2A: p < 0.05). For 
business combination’s underlying economics (H 6), we find a significant positive 
correlation coefficient for externally-generated going concern (GC_EXT: p < 0.01), and 
a negative but not significant correlation coefficient for internally-generated going 
concern (GC_INT). Moreover, the results indicate a significant positive correlation 
between the value arising from revenue synergies and the recognition of goodwill 
(SYN_REV: p < 0.10). Inconsistent with our expectations, cost synergies are not 
positively associated with the recognition of goodwill (SYN_CST). Similar conclusions 
apply when Spearman correlation coefficients are used instead of Bravais-Pearson 
correlation coefficients. 
Because the correlation coefficients indicate the presence of some correlation among 
our explanatory variables (e.g., A_SZ and T_SZ with rbp = 0.509), we must check for the 
presence of multicollinearity in the regression analysis. We calculate condition number 
and variance inflation factor (VIF). As a rule of thumb, a condition number between 15 
and 30 indicates moderate, and a condition number above 30 strong multicollinearity. If 
the VIF is above 10, we must consider the effects of multicollinearity on confidence 
intervals and t-tests. 
5.3. Multivariate Statistics 
The bivariate correlation analyses are relatively weak tests of hypotheses that are not 
mutually exclusive and may in fact be reinforcing. Therefore, we integrate the different 
variables that represent the various hypotheses into four linear regression models that 
examine the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill. Results arising from the robust 
OLS estimation of equations (1) to (4) are presented inTable III-7.  
First, the classic motivations for accounting choice including contracting and political 
considerations as well as information asymmetries explain the smallest part of the 
variance in the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill (adj. R² = 9.7 %). However, 
equation (1) provides overall significant results (p (F-stat) < 0.01). As the correlation 
matrix already indicates, market-based compensation concerns appear to affect the PPA 
(A_TSR: p < 0.01, two-tailed). Moreover, the amount allocated to goodwill is 
significantly lower for acquisitions of highly visible target by highly visible acquirer 
firms (A_SZxT_SZ: p < 0.10, one-tailed). Accounting-based compensation concerns, 
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debt covenant restrictions, target or acquirer firm size as well as information 
asymmetries are not significantly associated with the recognition of goodwill.  
Second, the management’s capability to avoid future goodwill impairments (H 5 ) is 
significant in explaining the allocation of purchase price to goodwill (Equation (2): 
adj. R² = 14.1 %; p (F-stat) < 0.01). Since the rules of IFRS and US-GAAP differ with 
regard to future goodwill impairment testing, we introduce the interaction variables to 
disentangle the influence of the explanatory variables from the influence of the 
accounting standards. While the number of units in general does not affect the 
recognition of goodwill, the number of cash generating units appears to do so 
(A_UNITxIFRS: p < 0.1). Inconsistent with our expectations, the acquirer firm’s book-
to-market ratio and the verifiability of assets are not significant in explaining the 
allocation of purchase price to goodwill. The significance of intangible assets (A_IA2A) 
is positively associated with the amount allocated to goodwill (p < 0.05, one-tailed).  
Third, equation (3), which focuses on business combination’s underlying economics (H 
6), not only provides overall significant results, but also explains a larger part of the 
variance in the recognition of goodwill than the two other categories of determinants of 
accounting choice considered (adj. R² = 18.1 %; p (F-stat) < 0.01). The goodwill’s 
going concern component related to externally generated goodwill (GC_EXT: p < 0.01, 
one-tailed) and revenue synergies (SYN_REV: p < 0.05, one-tailed) are significant. 
Inconsistent with our expectations, internally generated going concern, cost synergies 
and the synergies interaction variable are not significantly associated with the 
recognition of goodwill.  
Finally, the explanatory power of equation (4) integrating all determinants for the 
recognition of goodwill in business combinations is greater than for any of the equations 
focusing on one of the three categories of determinants only (adj. R² = 29.1 %; p (F-
stat) < 0.01). This result suggests the PPA is not only influenced by management 
opportunism as hypotheses H 1 to H 5 predict but also by economic efficiency as 
hypothesis H 6 predicts. The condition number of 21.136 falls within the range of 
concern of 15 to 30 and indicates a problem with moderate multicollinearity. However, 
the variables’ VIFs that range from 1.483 to 4.416 are all well below 10. So, VIFs show 
no indication of severe multicollinearity.  
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Management compensation concerns do not affect the initial recognition of goodwill; 
the coefficients for A_ROA and A_TSR are not significantly different from zero. 
Therefore, the hypothesis H 1 is not supported for both accounting-based and market-
based compensation concerns. Inconsistent with our expectations, the acquirer firm’s 
management restrains from increasing future accounting earnings by increasing the 
amount allocated to goodwill. Moreover the management’s decision-making is also not 
dominated by the risk of goodwill impairments. Both effects might overlap. However, 
management compensation schemes might exclude goodwill in the calculation of 
measures of financial performance due to information asymmetries (Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001). Even if goodwill is not excluded before, business combinations are 
significant events that change the general conditions for contracts in place and might 
trigger the revision of compensation schemes. The conditions of compensation schemes 
are renegotiated and cannot be used opportunistically by the acquirer firm’s 
management. Thus, the management does not to consider the actual compensation 
scheme when allocating the purchase price to goodwill. Furthermore, we must 
acknowledge that the two measures employed in our study are only proxies for 
compensation schemes because detailed disclosures are frequently not available. The 
results for market-based compensation concerns contrast with results for the correlation 
matrix and for equation (1), where these concerns are observed to be significantly 
related to the recognition of goodwill. A plausible explanation is that market-based 
compensation concerns implicitly capture the business combination’s underlying 
economics. When these are considered, the acquirer firm’s stock market performance no 
longer acts as a surrogate.  
The debt covenant restrictions seem to explain the recognition of goodwill (A_LEV: 
p < 0.10). Thus, the hypothesis H 2 is supported. Consistent with the results provided by 
Grinyer et al. (1991) for a pre-IFRS setting, the amount of goodwill recognized is 
significantly negatively associated with the debt covenant restrictions in our setting. 
Developing hypothesis H 2, we supposed that a tradeoff exists between increasing the 
amount allocated to goodwill to increase future accounting earnings and decreasing it to 
strengthen balance sheet. Looking at the sign of the regression coefficient, our results 
suggest that information asymmetries associated with goodwill appear to be more 
important than the opportunity to increase future accounting earnings. Since debt 
covenant restrictions also frequently exclude goodwill due to information asymmetries 
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Dichev and Skinner, 2002), the acquirer firm’s 
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management may only be able to strengthen its balance sheet by instead recognizing 
assets other than goodwill. Thus, the acquirer firm increases its capacity to service the 
debt and to access new debt.  
In highly visible business combinations that attract public interest due to highly visible 
acquirer and target firms, political cost is an issue. The management avoids allocating a 
high proportion of purchase price to goodwill. Although acquirer and target firm 
visibility alone take on the expected negative sign, they are insignificant in explaining 
income-decreasing behavior. Hypothesis H 3 only holds for the coefficient of the 
variable interacting acquirer and target firm size (A_SZxT_SZ: p < 0.01).  
The information asymmetries associated with target firm ownership (PUBLIC) do not 
affect the recognition of goodwill. Thus, the hypothesis H 4 is not supported. The 
acquirer firm’s management does not deliberately increase the amount of goodwill 
recognized for the private target firms. In general, more information is available for the 
public target firms. However, the acquirer firm’s shareholders appear to challenge the 
recognition of goodwill if the amount allocated to goodwill is relatively high for the 
private target firms and they do not have the necessary information in order to verify the 
PPA. In sum, the amount of purchase price allocated to goodwill does not differ 
between private and public target firms.  
Discretion potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing affect the initial 
recognition of goodwill in business combinations. As a direct result of the joint 
standard-setting activities of IASB and FASB, the amount of goodwill recognized is not 
significantly different between business combinations accounted for under IFRS 3 or 
SFAS 141 (IFRS). The number of units is rather considered by IFRS acquirer firm’s 
management (A_UNITxIFRS: p < 0.05). Thus, hypothesis H 5a is only supported for the 
IFRS business combinations. The lack of consistency in the definition of the units might 
explain the different assessment of the discretion potential related to cash generating or 
reporting units (IAS 36.6; SFAS 142.30). While goodwill impairments are rather 
inevitable in the smaller cash generating units (IAS 36.6: bottom-up approach), 
avoiding goodwill impairments seems to be easier on the more aggregated level of a 
reporting unit (SFAS 142.30: top-down approach). Only IFRS acquirer firms with 
different business segments dare to allocate a higher amount of purchase price to 
goodwill. The US-GAAP acquirer firms with one or more business segments do not 
differ with regard to the recognition of goodwill. Furthermore, goodwill is assigned 
among the units based on estimates of how a certain unit benefits from the business 
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combination (IAS 36.80; SFAS 142.34). The IFRS and US-GAAP acquirer firms might 
also perceive this lack of verifiability in the assignment of goodwill differently. The 
acquirer firm’s book-to-market ratio significantly explains the recognition of goodwill 
under IFRS and US-GAAP (A_B2M: p < 0.05, one-tailed). Thus, we corroborate the 
hypothesis H 5b. The acquirer firms with reporting units with lower book-value-to-fair-
value ratios use their discretion in determining future goodwill impairments. Consistent 
with our expectation, the verifiability of assets is significantly negatively associated 
with the recognition of goodwill under IFRS and US-GAAP (A_VRF: p < 0.05, one-
tailed). Thus, the hypothesis H 5c is supported. If the net assets are less easily verifiable, 
the acquirer firm’s management will allocate more purchase price to goodwill due to 
future discretion potentials. The intangible assets-to-total assets ratio positively affects 
the amount of goodwill recognized under IFRS and US-GAAP (A_IA2A: p < 0.05). 
Thus, hypothesis H 5d is supported. If the acquirer firm’s balance sheet is characterized 
by intangible assets before the business combination, the acquirer firm’s management is 
more inclined to allocate a higher proportion of purchase price to goodwill. To sum up, 
the results provide some support for the hypotheses H 5a-d. 
The recognition of goodwill reflects the business combination’s underlying economics 
including going concern and synergies components; hypothesis H 6 is supported. Both 
target firm’s externally-generated and internally-generated going concern is significant 
(GC_EXT: p < 0.01, one-tailed; GC_INT: p < 0.05, one-tailed). Goodwill recognized in 
a prior business combination of the target firm is not only disclosed in the target firm’s 
financial statements, but has also been tested for impairment annually. Both the 
recognition of goodwill and the annual goodwill impairment testing appear to contribute 
to the verifiability of going concern estimates. Being in doubt as to whether it can 
confer internally-generated going concern to the combined firm, the acquirer firm’s 
management is more reluctant to recognize goodwill based on estimates of internally-
generated going concern. For instance, the target firm’s internally-generated going 
concern includes the target firm’s assembled workforce. It is not uncommon that 
employees quit and change to another firm especially when they are unsure about their 
future in the combined company. Preparing the PPA, the acquirer firm’s management 
appears to consider the going concern component rather than the synergies component 
of goodwill. While revenue synergies are reflected in the amount allocated to goodwill 
(SYN_REV: p < 0.05, one-tailed), cost synergies are not (SYN_CST). Synergies are 
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frequently difficult to realize; the shareholders might not be willing to accept a high 
amount of goodwill due to unverifiable synergies estimates.  
In conclusion, the classic hypotheses of accounting choice (H 1-H 4) only marginally 
explain the allocation of purchase price to goodwill. The discretion potentials related to 
future goodwill impairment testing (H 5) help to explain the initial recognition of 
goodwill in IFRS and US-GAAP business combinations. However, the accounting for 
business combinations is not only influenced by management reporting opportunism, 
but also by reporting efficiency as goodwill reflects the business combination’s 
underlying economics (H 6).  
6. Robustness and Additional Analyses 
6.1. Robustness Analyses 
Using Tobit regression and rank regression, we try to ensure that our results presented 
in section 5.3 are robust across methods. Results for estimation (4) using Tobit 
regression and rank regression are presented in Table III-8. 
Tobit Regression 
The ratio of goodwill to purchase price (GW2PP) is left-censored at zero, meaning this 
ratio is zero or greater than zero, but not less than zero. No badwill is recognized in the 
149 business combinations of our sample. However, the acquirer firm’s management 
does not recognize goodwill in nine business combinations resulting in a zero value for 
GW2PP. The explained variable is thus not a continuous variable. In this case, the OLS 
estimator is inconsistent and the estimates are potentially biased; econometrics literature 
suggests to use the Tobit estimator instead (Greene, 2011). In a Tobit estimation of 
equation (4), the variables capturing our three categories of determinants for accounting 
choice influence both the probability of the zero goodwill and the amount of goodwill 
recognized. The results of the robust Tobit regression coincide with results of the robust 
OLS regression, i.e. the estimates from the OLS estimation of the regression reported in 
section 5.3 are only slightly biased. We thereby confirm the results for the different 
explanatory variables discussed in section 5.3. 
  








 GW2PP GW2PP 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
H 1 A_ROA ? -0.003  -0.90 -0.103  -1.06
 A_TSR ? 0.000  0.01 0.060  0.67
H 2 A_LEV ? -0.435 ** -2.15 -0.272 * -1.85
H 3 A_SZ - -0.006  -0.34 0.010  0.10
 T_SZ - -0.009  -0.32 -0.098  -0.95
 A_SZxT_SZ - -0.038 *** -2.65 -0.147 ** -1.91
H 4 PUBLIC + 0.008  0.16 0.063  0.59
H 5 A_UNIT + 0.000  0.04 0.078  0.72
 
A_UNITxIFRS ? 0.093 *** 2.78 0.244 ** 2.24
 
A_B2M - -0.180 ** -2.21 -0.278 *** -2.37
 
A_B2MxIFRS ? 0.264  1.53 0.157  1.42
 
A_VRF - -0.012 ** -2.11 -0.082  -0.50
 
A_VRFxIFRS ? -0.064  -1.37 -0.011  -0.09
 
A_IA2A + 0.508 ** 2.12 0.442 *** 3.23
 
A_IA2AxIFRS ? -0.344  -1.18 -0.193  -1.44
H6 GC_EXT + 0.880 *** 4.76 0.246 *** 3.16
 
GC_INT + 0.187 ** 1.88 0.012  0.16
 
SYN_REV + 0.174 ** 2.21 0.343 ** 2.01
 SYN_CST + -0.022  -0.40 0.101  0.90
 SYN_REVxSYN_CST ? -0.082  -0.91 -0.158  -0.89
C IFRS ? 0.038  0.59 -0.638  -0.05
C A_INDDUM ? Incl. Incl. 
C A_CNTRDUM ? Incl. Incl. 
C YRDUM ? Incl. Incl. 
 
Constant ? 0.534 *** 4.80 46.353  1.42 
 Number of observations 149 Number of observations 149 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.780 R-squared 0.420 
 Adj. Pseudo R-squared 0.720 Adjusted R-squared 0.260 
 Log Pseudo-Likelihood -12.285   
 F-statistic 8.22 *** F-statistic 4.447 *** 
Notes: 
The table reports the coefficients and t-statistics (t-stat) from robust multiple linear Tobit or rank regressions of the goodwill 
recognized in business combinations (GW2PP) on a series of variables capturing different categories of determinants of accounting 
choice. We present (Pseudo) R-squared, adjusted (Pseudo) R-squared, Log Pseudo-Likelihood, and F-statistic for each regression 
model. The regression model (4) is defined in section 4.3; variables are defined in Appendix III-1. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed tests for predicted signs, two-tailed otherwise), 
respectively. 
Table III-8: Robustness analyses 
 (own analysis)  
 
Rank Regression 
Prior literature has suggested employing rank regression to check for the robustness of 
results (Cooke, 1998). Explained and explanatory variables proximate underlying 
theoretical constructs. Although we specified how theoretical constructs are related, 
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empirical proxies rarely reproduce this relationship perfectly. When using ranks, we 
obtain non-parametric test statistics and are better able to control for potential non-
linearity in the relation between explained and explanatory variables. Moreover, we 
alleviate the influence of outliers. We rank explained and explanatory variables, and 
then apply robust OLS estimation to equation (4) with these ranked variables. The 
robust rank regression results do not alter the tenor of the robust OLS regression results 
presented in section 5.3 and the robust Tobit regression results presented above. 
However, the coefficient of A_VRF takes on the expected negative sign, but it becomes 
insignificant. With regard to our proxies for the business combination’s underlying 
economics, we find that the coefficient of GC_INT is positive as predicted, but not 
significant.  
6.2. Additional Analyses 
In this section, we perform several additional analyses (cf. Table III-9). We compare 
results of the final with the preliminary PPAs. Finally, we include indefinite-useful-life 
intangible assets which are also not amortized, but tested for impairment annually.  
Preliminary Purchase Price Allocation 
The PPA is considered preliminary until one year after the business combination was 
completed (IFRS 3.62; SFAS 141.B183). The amount of goodwill recognized is 
potentially higher in the preliminary PPA (GW2PP_1) than in the final PPA (GW2PP). 
Not all assets acquired and liabilities assumed are identified in a preliminary PPA 
and/or preliminary estimates of values are not available. In preliminary PPAs, the 
determinants of accounting choice are not as confounded by additional information 
becoming available after the completion date. To address this issue, we manually 
reviewed the notes to the financial statements in annual reports referring to the year of 
the business combination in order to identify preliminary PPAs (GW2PP_1). While 
56 % of the purchase price is allocated to goodwill in final PPAs, 55 % is allocated in 
preliminary PPAs. According to a paired two-sample t-test, the difference between the 
preliminary and final goodwill is not statistically significant. The regression model for 
the preliminary allocation of the purchase price to goodwill provides overall significant 
results (p (F-stat) < 0.01). The explanatory power of the regression on preliminary 
goodwill is similar to the regression on final goodwill (adj. R² = 29.2 %). The results for 
the different coefficients of explanatory variables differ only marginally. In preliminary 
PPAs, the verifiability of assets is even more negatively associated with the PPA for 
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business combinations under IFRS (A_VRFxIFRS: p < 0.10). The variable interacting 
the revenue and cost synergies (SYN_REVxSYN_CST: p < 0.10) is significantly 
negatively associated with the allocation of purchase price to goodwill. We do not 
observe different results for the other coefficients of equation (4). Preliminary and final 
PPAs appear to be generally affected by the same determinants of accounting choice. 
 
Additional analyses 
 Equation 4  Equation 4 
 GW2PP_1 IAINDGW2PP 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Coefficient t-stat VIF Coefficient t-stat VIF 
H 1 A_ROA ? -0.002  -0.66 1.650 -0.004  -1.05 1.650 
 A_TSR ? 0.000  -0.09 2.258 0.000  0.41 2.258 
H 2 A_LEV ? -0.372 ** -2.00 2.146 -0.168  -0.78 2.146 
H 3 A_SZ - -0.006  -0.31 2.425 -0.003  -0.16 2.425 
 T_SZ - -0.014  -0.47 2.439 0.016  0.45 2.439 
 A_SZxT_SZ - -0.028 ** -1.85 1.559 -0.038 ** -2.29 1.559 
H 4 PUBLIC + 0.019  0.34 1.932 0.011  0.17 1.932 
H 5 A_UNIT + 0.001  0.10 1.953 -0.003  -0.17 1.953 
 
A_UNITxIFRS ? 0.084 ** 2.44 1.819 0.093 ** 2.28 1.819 
 
A_B2M - -0.156 ** -1.84 2.311 -0.203 ** -1.98 2.311 
 
A_B2MxIFRS ? 0.181  0.99 2.016 0.276  1.44 2.016 
 
A_VRF - -0.011 ** -2.01 1.483 -0.004  -0.77 1.483 
 
A_VRFxIFRS ? -0.098 * -1.93 1.860 -0.023  -0.42 1.860 
 
A_IA2A + 0.469 ** 1.87 3.453 0.842 *** 3.09 3.453 
 
A_IA2AxIFRS ? -0.315  -0.99 3.004 -0.726 ** -2.18 3.004 
H6 GC_EXT + 0.789 *** 4.07 3.432 1.096 *** 4.91 3.432 
 
GC_INT + 0.163 * 1.42 2.013 0.184 * 1.58 2.013 
 
SYN_REV + 0.232 *** 2.64 4.213 0.194 ** 2.04 4.213 
 SYN_CST + -0.026  -0.45 1.967 -0.005  -0.07 1.967 
 SYN_REVxSYN_CST ? -0.152 * -1.55 4.416 -0.137 * -1.31 4.416 
C IFRS ? 0.040  0.59 3.035 -0.054  -0.71 3.035 
C A_INDDUM ? Incl. Incl. 
C A_CNTRDUM ? Incl. Incl. 
C YRDUM ? Incl. Incl. 
 
Constant ? 0.545 *** 4.73  0.513 *** 3.84  
Number of observations  149  149 
R-squared  0.445  0.477 
Adjusted R-squared  0.292  0.332 
F-statistic (p) 5.35 *** 12.73 *** 
Notes: 
The table reports the coefficients, t-statistics (t-stat), and variance inflation factors (VIF) from robust multiple linear OLS 
regressions of the preliminary goodwill (GW2PP_1) and of the goodwill and indefinite-life intangible assets recognized 
(IAINDGW2PP) recognized in business combinations on a series of variables capturing different categories of determinants of 
accounting choice. We present R-squared, adjusted R-squared, and F-statistic for each regression model. The regression model (4) 
is defined in section 4.3; variables are defined in Appendix III-1. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at less than 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed tests for predicted signs, two-tailed otherwise), respectively. 
Table III-9: Additional analyses 
 (own analysis)  
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Identifiable Intangible Assets with Indefinite Useful Life 
In addition to goodwill, identifiable intangible assets with an indefinite useful life are 
also tested for impairment annually. It is supposed that the management allocates part of 
the purchase price to indefinite-useful-life intangible assets. We expect that the 
determinants of accounting choice detected in the recognition of goodwill are also 
reflected in the allocation of purchase price to both goodwill and indefinite-useful-life 
intangible assets (IAINDGW2PP). As Table III-9 shows, the tenor of the robust OLS 
regression results for GW2PP is not altered by the robust OLS regression results for 
IAINDGW2PP. The regression model still provides overall significant results (p (F-
stat) < 0.01). However, the adjusted R² increased to 0.332. In contrast to the results for 
equation (4) for GW2PP, we find that A_LEV and A_VRF are not significant, but still 
negative. Furthermore, we observe that the interaction variable between A_IA2A and 
IFRS becomes significant and takes on a negative sign (A_IA2AxIFRS: p < 0.05). The 
risk of impairments apparently plays a more important role for IFRS than for US-GAAP 
acquirer firms. A high amount of intangible assets on the acquirer firm’s balance sheet 
is not as positively associated with the allocation to indefinite-useful-life intangible 
assets and goodwill for the IFRS acquirer firms as for US-GAAP acquirer firms. The 
risk of a goodwill impairment is reduced by the acquirer firm’s capacity to internally 
generate intangible assets. However, the risk of an impairment of indefinite-useful-life 
intangible assets is not affected by internally generated intangible assets (Shalev, 2007). 
In contrast to goodwill, indefinite-useful-life intangible assets are separable assets and 
thus exclude other internally-generated intangible assets by definition. Moreover, the 
variable interacting the revenue and cost synergies (SYN_REVxSYN_CST: p < 0.10) is 
also weakly negatively associated with the allocation of the purchase price to indefinite-
useful-life intangible assets and goodwill.  
7. Conclusion 
This study aimed to evaluate the recognition of goodwill in business combinations 
under IFRS 3 and SFAS 141, which requires the acquirer firm’s management to 
exercise judgment and to use their private information. We provide evidence that the 
initial recognition of goodwill in business combinations is motivated by both 
management reporting opportunism and business combination’s underlying economics. 
In order to alleviate the debt covenant restrictions, the acquirer firm’s management 
strengthens the balance sheet by increasing assets other than goodwill. It also allocates 
less purchase price to goodwill in business combinations of large acquirer firms with 
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large target firms, and hence decreases future earnings. Moreover, the discretion 
potentials related to future goodwill impairment testing are already taken into 
consideration when initially allocating the purchase price to goodwill, meaning that the 
management’s capacity to manage future impairments affects the initial recognition of 
goodwill. Furthermore, goodwill reflects the target firm’s going concern and synergies 
resulting from the combination of the target and acquirer firms’ businesses. 
Our study contributes to existing accounting research in three ways. First, we extend the 
results of prior studies about the motivations for the initial recognition of goodwill (e.g., 
Muller III, 1999; Wyatt, 2005). Although the recognition of goodwill is affected by 
management opportunism, goodwill also reflects the business combination’s underlying 
economics under both IFRS 3 and SFAS 141. Second, we examine whether today’s 
accounting decision is associated with future accounting decisions. We provide 
evidence that the management takes advantage of some of the discretion afforded by the 
rules of accounting standards IFRS 3 and SFAS 141 to avoid or at least manage future 
goodwill impairments right from the start. Third, the present paper is one of the first that 
analyses accounting for goodwill in IFRS business combinations and compares the 
results with US-GAAP business combinations. Joint standard-setting efforts led to 
widely consistent accounting standards for business combinations and financial 
reporting for business combinations became comparable.  
Some limitations of our study point to potential research opportunities. First, the 
acquirer firms provide detailed PPAs for material business combinations only. 
Insufficient disclosures might affect the results and conclusions. Second, the 
interpretation of the results hinges on the validity of variables used to proxy for the 
hypotheses developed. As it was not feasible to obtain specific data on management 
compensation schemes and debt covenants, our results could have been weakened. If 
goodwill is not excluded, it remains unclear whether the accounting for material 
business combinations changes the general conditions for contracts in place, so that the 
conditions are renegotiated and cannot be used opportunistically. Third, it is not 
possible to exclude the possibility that the sample was systematically affected by 
omitted variables. Although we are convinced that we identified important variables that 
explain the recognition of goodwill, other explanations can be considered as well. For 
example, our study only implicitly accounts for international differences in institutional 
factors. Leuz et al. (2003) shows that institutional factors such as investor protection 
explain international differences in earnings management. It is open to discussion 
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whether the convergence of US-GAAP and the introduction of IFRS in many countries 
with different legal and institutional characteristics reduced the differences in earnings 
management between these countries. We leave this issue to future research. Fourth, our 
sample includes only business combinations accounted for under IFRS 3 and SFAS 141. 
Meanwhile, the revised accounting standards for business combinations IFRS 3 R and 
SFAS 141 R are introduced. In phase II of the business combinations project, both 
accounting standards became even more similar. Whether the differences we found 
regarding future discretion potentials between the IFRS and US-GAAP subsamples 
remain the same is an issue for further research. Despite these limitations, we believe 
our paper sheds new light on the determinants of accounting choice in general and on 
the initial recognition of goodwill in particular.  
 
  




Appendix III-1: Variable definition and measurement  






Purchase Price Allocation 
Purchase price PP Purchase price paid Notes to the 
financial statements 
(hand-collected) 







PP  = 
Goodwill
Purchase price , for final PPA 







PP  = 
Goodwill
Purchase price , for preliminary 
PPA 












IAINDGW2PP PPA_GW + PPA_IAIND
PP  = 
Goodwill + Indefinite-life intangible assets
Purchase price  , for 
final PPA 
Calculated based on 
hand-collected data 




A_ROA (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + 
((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest 
Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) divided by 
average of year t-2 and year t-1’s total assets * 
100, for acquirer firm in year t-1  






A_TSR (Market Price Year End t-1 + Dividends Per 
Share) divided by (Market Price Year End t-2 – 
1) *100, for acquirer firm in year t-1 
Calculated based on 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
H2: Debt covenants 
Acquirer firm’s 
leverage  
A_LEV Total Debt divided by Total Assets, for acquirer 
firm in year t-1 
Calculated based on 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
H3: Political considerations 
Acquirer firm size A_SZ Natural logarithm of total assets, for acquirer 
firm in year t-1  
Calculated based on 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
Target firm size T_SZ Natural logarithm of purchase price (PP) Calculated based on 
hand-collected data 
H4: Information asymmetries  
Public target firm PUBLIC Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is a 
listed firm, and 0 otherwise, for year t-1 
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H5: Discretion potential  
Number of 
reporting or cash 
generating units 
A_UNIT Number of different 4-digit SIC codes, for 
acquirer firm in year t-1 





A_B2M Total Shareholder’s Equity divided by Market 
Capitalization, for acquirer firm in year t-1 





net assets  
A_ VRF (Cash + Short-term Investments - Total Debt -
Preferred Equity) divided by (Total Assets –
Total Liabilities), for acquirer firm in year t-1 





to assets ratio 
A_IA2A Total Intangible Assets divided by Total Assets, 
for acquirer firm in year t-1 
Calculated based on 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
H6: Business combinations underlying economics 
Going concern: 
derivate goodwill  
GC_EXT If PUBLIC = 1: Goodwill divided by Market 
capitalization, for target firm in year t-1  
If PUBLIC = 0: Industry-average (Goodwill 
divided by Market capitalization), for target 









GC_INT If PUBLIC = 1: (Market capitalization - Total 
Shareholders Equity) divided by Market 
capitalization, for target firm in year t-1  
If PUBLIC = 0: Industry-average ((Market 
capitalization - Total Shareholders Equity) 
divided by Market capitalization), for target 





Cost synergies SYN_CST Dummy variables equal to 1 if the target firm 
operates in the same industry as the acquirer 
firm, classification based on primary two-digit 
SIC codes, and 0 otherwise 





SYN_REV Dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer firm 
and the target firm are not located in the same 
country, and 0 otherwise, for year t-1 
Calculated based on 




IFRS Dummy variables equal to 1 if the business 
combination is accounted for under IFRS, and 0 
otherwise 
Notes to the 
financial statements 
(hand-collected) 
Industry IND Dummy variables equal to 1 if the acquirer firm 
operates in a specific industry, classification 
based on primary two-digit SIC codes, and 0 
otherwise  
Calculated based on 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
Country CNTR Dummy variables equal to 1 if the acquirer firm 
is located in a specific country, and 0 otherwise 
Calculated based on 
ZEPHYR database  
Year YR Dummy variables equal to 1 if the business 
combination was completed in a specific year, 
and 0 otherwise  
Calculated based on 
ZEPHYR database  
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IV. Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital in 
Mergers & Acquisitions 




In order to reduce information asymmetries about a firm’s current decisions and long-
term strategy, firms must consistently provide information to stakeholders. This paper 
investigates intellectual capital (IC) information, provided through different disclosure 
channels. For a sample of the 100 most economically significant European and U.S. 
mergers & acquisitions, we analyze 94 press releases, 2,641 newspaper articles, and 100 
purchase price allocations. 
Stakeholders have to be concerned about the informativeness of more qualitative 
forward-looking information in voluntary corporate disclosures. Our findings suggest 
that disclosure on IC in press releases is not perceived as informative. Prior research 
suggests that voluntary corporate disclosure activities, disclosure by information 
intermediaries, and corporate mandatory disclosure requirements are interdependent. 
The business press seems to verify and filter IC information provided in press releases, 
and then refers to it. IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statement is associated 
positively with prior IC disclosure in newspaper articles, but negatively with IC 
disclosure in press releases. The acquirer firm’s management appears to pay attention to 
the news coverage and public opinion. However, both voluntary and mandatory 
corporate disclosures appear to substitute rather than complement each other.  
 
Keywords:  
Corporate information environment; Disclosure; Mergers & Acquisitions; Intellectual 
capital; Computer-Assisted Content Analysis 
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1. Introduction 
Theory predicts information asymmetries about a firm’s current decisions and long-term 
strategy, between a firm’s stakeholders and its management (Akerlof, 1970; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Information asymmetries and uncertainty about firm value are strongly 
associated with the firm’s intellectual capital (IC) (Aboody et al., 2000; Singh and Van 
der Zahn, 2008), which is a major source of future value creation (Hall, 1992). Prior 
literature suggests that disclosure decreases information asymmetries (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Owing to restrictions of accounting standards, IC is not fully recognized 
in the firm’s financial statements (Barth et al., 2001).44 To satisfy the stakeholders’ 
information needs, and to thereby reduce information asymmetries, firms voluntarily 
disclose information about IC and inherent value creation potentials (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Information intermediaries, besides mandatory and voluntary corporate 
disclosure, support firms in disseminating information, which is a prerequisite for 
reducing information asymmetries effectively (Miller, 2006; Bushee et al., 2010). Beyer 
et al. (2010) call for investigating interdependencies between the different disclosure 
channels that shape the corporate information environment. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore information dissemination around mergers & 
acquisitions45 (M&As), and assess the interdependencies between corporate disclosure 
activities and disclosure by information intermediaries. M&As represent an interesting 
and powerful setting to discuss information dissemination, with regard to IC in 
particular. M&As are not only important strategic decisions which need explanation 
(Kimbrough and Louis, 2011), but also a key mechanism for acquiring IC (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Gupta and Roos, 2001). Anecdotal evidence supports these arguments. In January 
2005, Procter & Gamble (P&G) announced the acquisition of Gillette. In the press 
release on the announcement date (Procter & Gamble, 2005), the former chairman, 
president and chief executive officer of P&G, A. G. Lafley, explained the reasons for 
this strategic decision: “Gillette and P&G have similar cultures and complementary core 
strengths in branding, innovation, scale and go-to-market capabilities, making it a 
terrific fit.” Obviously, Gillette’s IC, including USD 5 billion brands such as Braun, 
                                                 
44
  While the accounting standards generally permit the recognition of acquired IC (SFAS 142.9; IAS 38-
25-43), they are more restrictive with regard to the initial recognition of internally generated IC 
(SFAS 142.10; IAS 38.51-67). In particular, problems relating to the identification (e.g. the 
probability of future economic benefits) and the reliable measurement of internally generated IC (e.g. 
lack of active markets) raise concerns (SFAS 142.10; IAS 38.51).  
45
 The terms mergers & acquisitions and business combinations are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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Oral-B or Duracell, as well as its innovation capabilities, aroused P&G’s interest in 
acquiring the company. Financial journalists took up this reasoning provided in the 
press release. The Wall Street Journal wrote that, “P&G and Gillette would have 21 
brands with more than $1 billion in annual sales each” (Deogun et al., 2005), and The 
Financial Times added that, “at a time when new product innovation is widely regarded 
as the key to staying ahead in the fiercely competitive consumer market, the 
combination of these two leaders could pose a serious threat to rivals” (Goff, 2005). 
Business press reports about and comments on the M&A. Journalists thereby verify the 
information presented by the acquiring firm’s management in its press release. The 
M&A must be accounted for under the purchase method which requires allocating the 
purchase price to identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed.46 P&G acquires 
assets of USD 74.7 billion and assumes liabilities of USD 21.3 billion. Tangible assets 
amount to only 13 percent, identifiable intangible assets (primarily including brand 
assets) to 40 percent, and goodwill to 47 percent of the total assets acquired.  
For 100 economically significant M&As of U.S. and European acquirer firms, this 
paper studies the press releases and the notes to the financial statement, used by the 
management to disseminate information on the IC acquired. Moreover, we consider 
newspaper articles reporting about the M&As. Thus, we investigate not just one, but 
three major disclosure channels of the corporate information environment. Disclosure 
channels differ in their timeliness, completeness and credibility of disseminating 
information about a firm’s past performance and future prospects (Bassen et al., 2010). 
Disclosure about the target firm’s IC contains valuable information about a firm’s future 
prospects. Since this information is not immediately verifiable, the acquirer firm’s 
management has incentives to make self-servicing disclosures, and so the credibility of 
voluntarily disclosed information is not given a priori (e.g., Gu and Li, 2007). Healy and 
Palepu (2001) suggest that the credibility of voluntary disclosure is enhanced by future 
mandatory disclosure requirements, and by the disclosure of information intermediaries. 
Our research is designed to analyze how much information about IC is disclosed 
through press releases, how the business press processes this information, and how this 
                                                 
46
 The revised accounting standards SFAS 141 R and IFRS 3 R use the term acquisition method instead 
of the term purchase method. Since the sample includes only business combinations accounted for 
under the original accounting standards SFAS 141 or IFRS 3 respectively, the terms purchase method 
and purchase price allocation is used throughout this paper. 
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information is related to subsequent mandatory disclosures in the notes to the financial 
statement.  
Our findings suggest that IC disclosure in press releases appears not to be perceived as 
informative. The stock market reaction is not associated with the IC related information 
provided by the acquirer firm’s management. However, we are able to show that 
voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures, as well as disclosure by information 
intermediaries, are interdependent. The business press verifies and filters the IC related 
information provided in press releases, in order to report on the announcement of the 
M&A, and help their readers to evaluate the acquirer firm’s strategic decision. The 
acquirer firm’s management seems to pay attention to the news coverage and public 
opinion (transmitted via the business press). Mandatory corporate IC disclosure is then 
associated positively with prior IC disclosure by information intermediaries. However, 
both voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures appear to substitute rather than 
complement each other. The results indicate that mandatory corporate IC disclosure is 
associated negatively with voluntary corporate IC disclosure.  
This study contributes to existing streams of research in four ways. First, Beyer et al. 
(2010) criticize prior research that focuses primarily on single disclosure channels, and 
neglects interdependencies between different channels in the corporate information 
environment. In her analytical model, Einhorn (2005) shows that voluntary disclosure 
activities are affected by mandatory disclosure requirements. We assess empirically the 
interdependencies between voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosure and disclosure 
by information intermediaries. Moreover, current research centers on the dissemination 
of quantitative historical financial information, but rather ignores qualitative 
information that provides details about current decisions, and explains the firm’s long-
term strategy (Beyer et al., 2010). We study the corporate information environment in 
the context of a strategic decision by analyzing disclosure about IC acquired in M&As. 
Second, the majority of prior research about disclosure by information intermediaries 
focuses on the role of financial analysts as information intermediaries, and information 
such as earnings forecasts provided by them (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 
2010). In this study, we examine information about a firm’s future prospects provided 
by the business press, which plays a key role in disseminating information to the public 
(Miller, 2006; Bushee et al., 2010). Third, prior research examines the credibility of 
voluntary disclosure, using the example of management earnings forecasts (e.g., 
Williams, 1996). However, few researchers address the credibility of voluntary 
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disclosure of forward-looking, less quantitative, and less objective information (Gu and 
Li, 2007; Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2009). We examine the corporate information 
environment as a mechanism establishing credibility. Fourth, we contribute to the 
literature on IC disclosure. Although M&As are one of the few mechanism available for 
acquiring IC, few studies examine related IC disclosures. Most prior studies focus on IC 
disclosure in annual reports (Singh and Van der Zahn, 2008). To the authors’ best 
knowledge, we are also one of the first studies to address IC disclosure in press releases 
and newspaper articles. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework for analyzing corporate information environment, and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 focuses on sample selection and research design. Results are 
reported in Section 4. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.  
 
 
Figure IV-1: Corporate information environment 
 (own illustration)  
 
2. Theoretical Framework: Related Research and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Corporate Information Environment 
Typically, a firm’s management has more information about the firm’s future prospects 
than shareholders and other outsiders. The demand for the disclosure of information 
arises for two major reasons: information asymmetries, and the separation of ownership 
and control (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Apart from mitigating agency 
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conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), disclosure of information plays a key role in 
reducing information asymmetry among firms, information intermediaries and 
stakeholders (Akerlof, 1970). Corporate disclosures, as well as disclosures by 
information intermediaries, enhance the information available in the market. Figure 
IV-1 gives an overview about the corporate information environment. 
Firms only disclose their private information voluntarily under certain conditions (for a 
detailed discussion cf. Beyer et al., 2010). Restraining from disclosing all private 
information voluntarily gives rise to mandatory disclosure requirements. Although 
mandatory disclosure requirements are quite comprehensive, firms still provide 
additional information voluntarily to the shareholders and other outsiders (Einhorn, 
2005). Firms not only disseminate information directly to stakeholders through 
corporate disclosures, but also indirectly through information intermediaries, such as the 
business press (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Figure IV-2 shows an exemplary timeline of 
disclosure events around M&As, which are investigated in this paper.  
 
 
Figure IV-2: Timeline of disclosure events 
 (own illustration)  
 
Voluntary Corporate Disclosure  
When strategic decisions such as M&As are announced, stakeholders immediately 
demand additional information to assess the impact of, and react properly to the firm’s 
decision. Typically, the management satisfies the information needs by providing 
voluntary corporate disclosures, such as press releases, or by holding investor 
conferences (Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). Press releases are by far the most important 
type of voluntary corporate disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 2000; García Osma and 
Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). A press release is not only issued to announce a firm’s 
decision, but also provides first-hand information to shareholders, journalists and other 
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incentives to favorably skew voluntary corporate disclosure (Gu and Li, 2007). 
Timeliness is a key advantage of voluntary corporate disclosure such as press releases.  
Disclosure by Information Intermediaries 
In addition to corporate voluntary disclosure, information intermediaries play a crucial 
role in disseminating information to the public (Healy and Palepu, 2001). They collect, 
evaluate and package information for shareholders and other stakeholders. Reaching a 
wider audience of sophisticated and unsophisticated stakeholders, information 
intermediaries, and business press in particular, act as multipliers (Bushee et al., 2010). 
One underlying event or press release typically generates multiple newspaper articles. 
The depth of press coverage depends on the accessibility of information provided by the 
firm itself and other sources. Journalists’ incentives to skew the newspaper articles 
positively are rather weak, so that they are expected to report in an objective and 
unbiased way (Miller, 2006; Kothari et al., 2009). Moreover, newspaper articles are 
quite timely. Thus, information such as the announcement of an M&A is disseminated 
to the readers shortly after it has taken place. If some information is leaked to the 
business press in advance, journalists may take it up even before the public 
announcement.  
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure  
Mandatory corporate disclosure about M&A is provided through the financial 
statements, the notes to the financial statement, and other mandatory filings (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). According to the largely consistent accounting standards for business 
combinations Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 141 (SFAS 141) and 
International Financial Reporting Standard 3 (IFRS 3), all business combinations within 
their scope are accounted for under the purchase method (SFAS 141.13; IFRS 3.14).47 
In the so-called purchase price allocation (PPA), the purchase price is allocated to 
identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed (SFAS 141.35-42; IFRS 3.36-60). 
After identifying all assets and liabilities, their fair values have to be determined. The 
accounting for business combinations thereby provides one of the rare opportunities for 
recognizing intangible assets. Goodwill is defined as the residual from a comparison of 
the purchase price with the fair values of identifiable assets and liabilities (SFAS 
141.43; IFRS 3.51). In the notes to the financial statement, the acquirer firm is obliged 
                                                 
47
 The accounting for business combinations is discussed based on the original accounting standards 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 141 (SFAS 141), issued in July 2001,and the matching 
International Financial Reporting Standard 3 (IFRS 3), issued in March 2004.  
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to disclose information concerning intangible assets and goodwill acquired in the 
business combination (SFAS 141.51-53; IFRS 3.67-77).  
The ability of corporate mandatory disclosures, to convey information about a firm’s 
future prospects, is generally limited, since they hardly include any forward-looking 
information (Kothari et al., 2009). However, the identification of acquired intangible 
assets and the disclosure of their fair values contain such information. Even if 
management faces incentives to skew disclosures favorably, the financial statements are 
regarded as a rather credible source of information, as they are highly regulated and also 
audited. Corporate mandatory disclosure is less timely than corporate voluntary 
disclosure (Kothari et al., 2009). A preliminary PPA is published at the completion date 
at the earliest, and the final PPA can be published even one year after completion date at 
the latest. 
2.2. Related Research 
When investigating corporate voluntary or mandatory disclosure, prior theoretical and 
empirical literature rather ignores the existence of a corporate disclosure environment, 
and analyzes each disclosure channel separately. However, Kothari et al. (2009) 
consider the corporate information environment in its entirety. They show that voluntary 
and mandatory corporate disclosures, as well as disclosure by information 
intermediaries, “all enhance the information reflected in stock prices” (Kothari et al., 
2009: 1640). Einhorn (2005) infers analytically that mandatory disclosure requirements 
are associated with corporate voluntary disclosure decisions. Francis et al. (2008) and 
Athanasakou and Hussainey (2009) provide empirical evidence on the relationship 
between corporate voluntary and mandatory disclosure. They suggest that a firm’s 
earnings quality reflects the adherence to mandatory disclosure requirements. Francis et 
al. (2008) demonstrate that voluntary disclosures, in the less regulated narrative sections 
of the firm’s annual report, are positively associated, while other voluntary disclosures, 
such as press releases and conference calls, are negatively associated with the firm’s 
earnings quality, for a sample of U.S. firms. Using a sample of UK firms, Athanasakou 
and Hussainey (2009) find that mandatory disclosure requirements enhance the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure, as the market reaction to the unexpected component 
of voluntary disclosures is higher for firms with higher earnings quality. Investigating 
market reactions to management earnings forecasts, Hutton et al. (2003) conclude that 
favorable voluntary disclosure is only informative if it is supplemented by better 
verifiable quantitative information.  
– Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital in Mergers & Acquisitions – 
110 
Few researchers examine corporate voluntary and mandatory disclosure about M&A 
transactions in general, and about IC acquired in M&A transactions in particular. 
Examining mandatory corporate disclosure of U.S. acquirer firms, Shalev (2009) finds 
that the quantity of disclosure decreases with the uncertainty regarding the value of the 
target firm’s IC, i.e. a higher amount of purchase price is allocated to goodwill. 
However, the quantity of disclosure does not explain stock market reactions. In contrast 
to Shalev (2009), who observes a lower level of corporate mandatory disclosure when 
the uncertainty is higher, Gerbaud and York (2007) find that acquirer firms provide 
more information in corporate voluntary disclosure announcing knowledge-based than 
property-based M&As. They also provide evidence that the stock market reaction to 
voluntary disclosures at the announcement date is more negative for knowledge-based 
than property-based M&A transactions. Kimbrough and Louis (2011) focus on the 
interdependencies between different types of voluntary disclosure. They examine 
whether a U.S. acquirer firm holds a conference call, in addition to the press release, 
around the announcement of an M&A transaction. If the acquirer firm holds a 
conference call, the market reaction to the M&A announcement is more positive. Using 
conference calls, the acquirer firm’s management is able to credibly convey information 
to the market. Gu and Li (2007) investigate disclosure on innovation strategy in press 
releases by U.S. firms in the largest and most research and development (R&D) 
intensive industries. They observe a positive market reaction to this kind of voluntary 
disclosure, and an even more positive market reaction, following insider buying 
transactions, which increase the perceived credibility of voluntary disclosures. 
We extend prior research by not only referring to corporate disclosure, but also to 
disclosure by information intermediaries at the same time. Not only mandatory 
disclosure requirements may affect voluntary disclosure decisions, but corporate 
disclosure activities may also influence disclosure by information intermediaries or vice 
versa. Using the example of disclosure on IC acquired in M&As, our study contributes 
to the understanding of the corporate disclosure environment and the flow of 
information.  
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
Information asymmetries that exist between a firm’s management and its stakeholders 
(Akerlof, 1970; Healy and Palepu, 2001) are associated strongly with the firm’s IC 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000; Singh and Van der Zahn, 2008). The acquirer firm’s 
– Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital in Mergers & Acquisitions – 
111 
management has private information to which the shareholders and other outsiders don’t 
have access, or which, at least, is difficult to obtain.  
In press releases announcing the M&A, the management voluntarily discloses 
information about the target firm’s IC. The benefits associated with voluntary corporate 
disclosure depend primarily on its informativeness (Bassen et al., 2010), i.e. the novelty 
of information contained in voluntary corporate disclosures and its credibility affecting 
shareholders and other stakeholders’ reactions to voluntary corporate disclosures 
(Jennings, 1987). Consistent with prior research investigating the informativeness of 
voluntary disclosures (Jennings, 1987; Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Hutton et al., 2003; 
Gu and Li, 2007), we define informativeness as the shareholders’ “perception of the 
believability of the disclosure” (Gu and Li, 2007: 780). Only if stakeholders perceive 
new information as credible, they will take corporate disclosures into consideration 
when evaluating a firm’s current decisions and long-term strategies (Mercer, 2004). In 
that case, we will observe a stock market reaction on the announcement day, which 
reflects the shareholders’ reaction to the voluntary disclosure about IC acquired in the 
M&A. This gives rise to the first hypothesis H1: 
 
H 1: Stock market reaction to the announcement of the M&A is associated with the 
amount of IC disclosure in press releases announcing the M&A.  
 
The corporate information environment — the interdependencies between different 
disclosure channels — plays a key role in reducing information asymmetries (Beyer et 
al., 2010). In the press release, the acquirer firm provides information about the  IC 
acquired in the M&A, being aware of the acquirer firm itself, and information 
intermediaries disclosing related information in newspaper articles, as well as the notes 
to the financial statement afterwards. Healy and Palepu (2001) point out that the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure is enhanced by future mandatory disclosure 
requirements, and by disclosure of information intermediaries. External assurance, 
either by auditors for mandatory disclosures, or by business press journalists, thereby 
increases the credibility of voluntary disclosure (Mercer, 2004). Whereas auditors 
formally verify the information provided through financial statements (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001), the verification by the business press “is not in any way formal nor can it 
be argued to be necessarily complete” (Kothari et al., 2009: 1647). The business press’ 
propensity to disseminate information is affected by voluntary corporate disclosure 
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activities. The business press verifies the information provided in the press release and, 
if it is perceived as credible, reports on it. We formulate hypothesis H 2: 
 
H 2: The amount of IC disclosure in newspaper press articles related to the M&A is 
positively related to the amount of IC disclosure in press releases announcing the 
M&A. 
 
Since the management does not always voluntarily disclose all their private information, 
accounting standards force the management to disclose specific information (mandatory 
disclosure) (Beyer et al., 2010). Analytical accounting research provides conflicting 
predictions as to whether the relation between voluntary and mandatory corporate 
disclosure activities is substitutive or complementary (e.g., Francis et al., 2008). On the 
one hand, firms may be more inclined to refrain from providing information voluntarily, 
if mandatory disclosure requirements are already quite comprehensive (substitutive 
relation). Since disclosure of favorable forward-looking information is perceived as less 
credible, the firm’s management is more reluctant to reveal all their private information 
(Verrecchia, 2001). Moreover, the threat of litigation reduces the management’s 
incentives to release information about IC acquired in M&As voluntarily (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). On the other hand, mandatory disclosure requirements may be related 
positively to the propensity to convey information voluntarily (complementary relation). 
Einhorn (2005) shows that the firms are more likely to provide voluntary disclosure if 
mandatory disclosure requirements are quite comprehensive. Lundholm (2003) argues 
that mandatory corporate disclosure serves as an ex-post validation of prior voluntary 
corporate disclosures. Shareholders and other stakeholders evaluate the voluntary 
corporate disclosure, based on related mandatory corporate disclosure over a longer 
period; the firm then builds a reputation for communicating credible information (Sobel, 
1985). Whereas the management does not voluntarily provide any information in a 
single-period setting, Stocken (2000) shows, for a multi-period setting, that the 
management almost always releases credible forward-looking information, that is useful 
for assessing the firm’s future prospects accurately. Even if M&As are not regular 
events, voluntary corporate disclosure about M&As is an element of the acquirer firm’s 
disclosure policy in the end. When providing information about IC acquired in the 
M&A, in the notes to the financial statement, the acquirer firm’s management may take 
up and thereby confirm the information presented in the press release (complementary), 
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or may disclose more (less) detailed information in the notes to the financial statement, 
if less (more) detailed information is released in the prior press release (substitutive). 
This gives rise to the following mutually exclusive hypotheses H 3a and H 3b:  
 
H 3a: The amount of IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statement about the 
M&A is negatively related to the amount of IC disclosure in press releases 
announcing the M&A. 
 
H 3b: The amount of IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statement about the 
M&A is positively related to the amount of IC disclosure in press releases 
announcing the M&A. 
 
The press shapes the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ concerns and expectations, 
and, consequently, influences corporate disclosure (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Carroll and McCombs, 2003). When providing information in the notes to the financial 
statements, the acquirer firm’s management refers to the newspaper articles by taking 
the information presented therein into consideration. This gives rise to the following 
hypothesis H 4:  
 
H 4: The amount of IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statement about the 
M&A is positively related to the amount of IC disclosure in newspaper articles 
related to the M&A. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Sample Selection 
With the help of the Bureau von Dijk ZEPHYR database, we identify an initial sample 
of transactions by listed acquirer firms, either from the United States or Europe. The 
sample period spans from July 1, 2001 to December 31, 2008 for M&A transactions of 
United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) acquirer firms, 
and from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2008 for M&A transactions of IFRS acquirer 
firms. The choice of the sample periods is governed by the fact that analyzed M&A 
transactions have to be accounted for, according to SFAS 141 and IFRS 3. The sample 
was restricted to the most economically significant M&A transactions of U.S. and 
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European acquirer firms. This restriction imposed on the sample selection has at least 
three advantages. First, the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ demand for 
information is stronger (Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). Second, information 
intermediaries, such as the business press, cover rather larger firms (Miller, 2006; Fang 
and Peress, 2009). Third, the notes to the financial statement only contain an individual 
PPA for material business combinations.  
For all material M&As under SFAS 141 or IFRS 3, the acquirer firm provides an 
individual PPA in the notes to their financial statement (mandatory disclosure). This 
specific note to the financial statement is hand-collected from the acquirer firm’s annual 
financial statements, taken from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
EDGAR database, for U.S. acquirer firms and corporate websites for European ones, 
respectively. We chose the English-language annual financial statements wherever 
possible. 50 U.S. and 50 European M&As constitute our final sample. Table IV-1 
summarizes the sample selection.  
 
Press releases, newspaper articles and purchase price allocations related to M&A transactions 
Region M&A transactions Press releases Newspaper articles 
Purchase price 
allocations (PPA) 
United States (US)  50 47 1376 50 
Europe (EU) 50 47 1265 50 
Both regions (TOT) 100 94 2641 100 
Average number of 
words per document 
 2226 498 1027 
Notes:  
The sample comprises the most economically significant M&A transactions (by deal value) of US-GAAP acquirer firms completed 
between July 1st, 2001 and December 31st, 2008, and of IFRS acquirer firms completed between January 1st, 2005 and December 
31st, 2008. The M&A transactions were retrieved from the ZEPHYR database on June 30, 2009. Press releases (PR) commenting 
on the M&A transactions are normally published at announcement date, newspaper articles (NA) considered are published between 
seven days before and seven days after date of announcement. Final purchase price allocations (PPA) have to be published no later 
than one year after the completion of the M&A transaction in the notes to the financial statements. 
Table IV-1: Press releases, newspaper articles and purchase price allocations related to M&A 
transactions 
 (own analysis)  
 
Most acquirer firms issue a press release at the announcement date of the M&A. Thus, 
press releases are the voluntary disclosure channel of choice in this study, and are 
gathered from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database. If not 
available from this source, we searched the corporate websites of the acquirer firms 
manually. If more than one press release is published on the announcement date of the 
M&A, we consider only the longest one, which is supposed to provide the most detailed 
information (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). We select the English-language press release 
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when versions in several languages are available. In six cases, press releases could not 
be found, because neither the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR 
database nor the news archives of the acquirer firm’s websites dated back so far. 
Eventually, 94 press releases were collected.  
Since the business press collects information and spreads it to a wide audience of 
stakeholders (Bushee et al., 2010), we use newspaper articles about the M&As as a 
proxy for disclosure by information intermediaries. We focus on daily business 
newspapers in order to assure timely and broad coverage of the M&A. We included not 
only English-language, but also German- and French-language business newspapers, in 
order to consider additionally two economically important European countries, 
Germany and France, and avoid a possible language bias in the press coverage of 
acquirer firms from non-English speaking countries. We choose The Wall Street Journal 
and The New York Times, as these two U.S. newspapers have the most comprehensive 
coverage of U.S. firms (Fang and Peress, 2009).48 Fang and Peress (2009) observe a 
high overlap in the coverage for a sample of four U.S. newspapers. However, it is 
reasonable to include European business newspapers where the overlap is probably 
lower. We select The Wall Street Journal’s European counterpart Wall Street Journal 
Europe, and four influential business newspapers from the biggest European countries 
including The Financial Times (United Kingdom), La Tribune (France), as well as 
Handelsblatt and Financial Times Deutschland (both from Germany).49 Focusing on 
these seven newspapers, and anticipating a high overlap in coverage in same-language 
newspapers in the same region (Fang and Peress, 2009), we provide data that is 
representative of the press coverage of U.S. and European M&As. We searched the 
Dow Jones FACTIVA database, and the German-language database WISO PRESSE, 
                                                 
48
  According to the North American Audit Bureau of Circulation, The Wall Street Journal and The New 
York Times had average daily circulations of 2.0 and 1.1 million paid copies from July 1, 2001, to 
December 31, 2008, respectively. 
49
  Our sample of European newspapers includes influential and highly circulated daily business 
newspapers from the United Kingdom, France and Germany. According to the British Audit Bureau 
of Circulation, The Financial Times and Wall Street Journal Europe had average daily circulations of 
0.44 and 0.08 million paid copies from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2008, respectively. 
According to the French equivalent Office de Justification des Tirages, La Tribune had an average 
daily circulation of 0.08 million paid copies from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2008. According 
to the German equivalent Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von 
Werbeträgern, Handelsblatt and Financial Times Deutschland had average daily circulations of 0.14 
and 0.10 million paid copies from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2008, respectively. Moreover, 
German financial experts rank Handelsblatt and Financial Times Deutschland first and second as 
important sources of financial information, according to a study about the financial community by iq 
media marketing in 2006 and 2008.  
– Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital in Mergers & Acquisitions – 
116 
for newspaper articles that refer to M&As. The search items consist of the name of the 
acquirer firm and the target firm. Since the majority of business press articles are 
published from 7 days before until 7 days after the announcement date of the M&A, we 
collected the relevant newspaper articles in this time period. Thus, we also include the 
information leaked to the business press before the actual announcement date (e.g., 
insiders, rumors). After eliminating duplicates, we eventually collected 2,641 
newspaper articles.  
3.2. Content Analysis 
Content analysis has become a widely used method of analysis in financial accounting 
research (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). It is a methodology which codifies text into 
categories, and quantifies frequencies of occurrences within each category 
(Krippendorff, 2004). In the present paper, we use content analysis to gain an insight 
into mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure activities about IC acquired in 
M&As, as well as related disclosure by information intermediaries. The maintained 
hypothesis throughout our analysis is that the amount of information disseminated 
reflects the importance of IC in an unbiased manner. We use a self-constructed 
disclosure index, which ensures a high degree of consistency and comparability across 
disclosure channels, firms and time (for a discussion of (dis)advantages, cf. Beyer et al., 
2010). The application of the method consists of four different steps (Krippendorff, 
2004): the choice of the framework used to clearly classify information; the definition 
of the recording unit; the coding; and the assessment of the level of reliability achieved.  
Framework 
Beattie and Thomson believe, “that a broad consensus exists that intellectual capital 
comprises three major categories: human capital, structural capital and relational 
capital” (2007). Primarily, researchers use this framework in IC related content analyses 
(e.g., Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 2001; Orens and Lybaert, 2007). Synonymous 
terms, such as employee competence for human capital, internal capital or 
organizational capital for structural capital, or external capital for relational capital, are 
used interchangeably (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Following Sveiby (1997) and 
further detailed in the influential MERITUM Report (2001), we also adopt this 
framework in the present paper. Our framework consists of 134 items (cf. Appendix 
IV-1): 
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(1) External capital includes all resources linked to relationships of the firm with 
external stakeholders, such as the firm’s customers. The category comprises 40 
items, such as customer relation, trademark and brand. 
(2) Internal capital covers the organizational routines, procedures, systems, databases, 
etc. Some of them may be legally protected and become intellectual property 
rights, legally owned by the firm under separate title. This category comprises 47 
items, including R&D, patent, and management process. 
(3) Human capital encompasses the knowledge, skills, experiences and abilities of 
people. Some of this knowledge is unique to the individual; some may be generic. 
Employee, expertise and corporate culture are a few examples of the 47 items in 
this category. 
Recording Unit 
For the quantification of IC disclosure, the recording unit, i.e. the basis for coding 
information, needs to be defined. Abdolmohammadi (2005) argues that the most reliable 
form of content analysis is to search the text for specific instances of disclosure, so that 
the coder does not have to make any subjective judgement about the meaning or 
importance of the subject, which may be required in coding sentences, paragraphs or 
pages. The term instance indicates semantically equivalent textual units, including word 
synonyms and idioms (Weber, 1990; Beattie and Thomson, 2007). The coding of 
instances of disclosure has the advantage of being categorized more easily, and permits 
the counting of possibly more than one IC instance per sentence, paragraph or page 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Another aspect is the etymological structure of different 
languages, resulting in a different length of words for the same content (Campbell et al., 
2005). As we analyze texts in English, German, and French we have to consider 
translations with different numbers of words. Therefore, we use instances of IC 
disclosure as recording units. Regarding the translation of the instances of IC disclosure, 
we employ a mixture of translation methods advocated by Harpaz (2004). First, the 
second named author translated all terms in English and French, including synonyms 
and idioms. Second, the first named author reproduced the translation. Both authors are 
proficient in the three languages; German, English, and French. After the individual 
translating process, both authors discussed their results and completed the translation of 
the IC items. For a sample of five companies the translated coding scheme was 
pretested and extended. 
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Coding 
The coding is conducted with the help of MAXQDA, a software for qualitative data 
analysis. We decided on computer-assisted content analysis as it produces more reliable 
results than the coding procedure of individual coders making subjective evaluations 
(Krippendorff, 2004). Furthermore, a larger sample of data can be processed 
(Krippendorff, 2004). The analysis units (press release, newspaper articles, and the note 
to financial statement including the PPA) must be available in digital form. Similar to 
Orens and Lybaert (2007) we use a coding scheme, coding items with “1” when they 
occur in the analysis units. This is often criticized since it does not take into account the 
different information attached to the various items (e.g., narrative, numerical, or 
monetary information; Orens and Lybaert, 2007). However, previous studies found 
similar results, whether the information items were weighted according to their 
information content or not (Cooke, 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
The main premise of content analysis is that the frequency with which a recording unit 
appears in a text indicates the importance of the unit (Krippendorff, 2004; Striukova et 
al., 2008). Repetitions and redundancies are means of communication strategy used for 
emphasis and reinforcement, and signal the importance placed by management upon 
these messages (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Concluding that a firm’s management, as 
well as journalists, emphasize certain aspects in the disclosure by repeating them, we 
consider repetitions of instances in the coding process. 
Following García-Meca et al. (2005), we use a general disclosure index, which reports 
the quantity of IC items of the established framework that are considered as 
communicable by the acquirer firm in press releases, and in the notes to the financial 
statement, as well as by the information intermediaries in the newspaper articles. The 
disclosure index for disclosure by information intermediaries is put in proportion to the 
total number of newspaper articles, as it provides a better comparison across the three 
types of disclosure (Striukova et al., 2008). If no disclosure document is available, the 
disclosure index takes a value of zero. Hence, we are able to formulate general 
disclosure indices for: (1) voluntary corporate disclosure in press releases (PR_IC); (2) 
disclosure by information intermediaries in newspaper articles (NA_IC); and (3) 
mandatory corporate disclosure in purchase price allocations (PPA_IC) for a firm j over 
the three categories external capital (EXT), internal capital (INT) and human capital 
(HC). Before we compute the general disclosure indices, we compute the disclosure 
subindices relative to external capital (PR_EXT, NA_EXT, PPA_EXT), internal capital 
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(PR_INT, NA_INT, PPA_INT) and human capital (PR_HC, NA_HC, PPA_HC) for all 
three disclosure channels. 
 
(1) jjjj HC_PRINT_PREXT_PRIC_PR ++=  
(2) jjjj HC_NAINT_NAEXT_NAIC_NA ++=  
(3) jjjj HC_PPAINT_PPAEXT_PPAIC_PPA ++=   
 
Reliability  
A major concern in using the method of content analysis is its reliability. Krippendorff 
(2004) identifies three types of reliability: accuracy; reproducibility; and stability. We 
refer to these three dimensions of reliability and to our measures, to ensure the 
reliability of our findings. First, accuracy is the degree to which a process conforms to a 
predefined standard (Krippendorff, 2004). In the present study, it is ensured by intensive 
coder training with experienced coders (the two first-named authors), and the consistent 
coding procedure with the analysis software MAXQDA, as well as well-specified 
categories in the IC framework (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Second, reproducibility is 
achieved when a process can be replicated by different coders, working under varying 
conditions and at different locations (Milne and Adler, 1999; Krippendorff, 2004). 
Coders that work independently have to apply the same recording instructions to the 
same units of analysis. In the present study, reproducibility can be assured by the 
application of the same recording instructions, and the use of the analysis software by 
the two coders. Third, stability refers to the ability to code data in the same way over 
time (Milne and Adler, 1999). By conducting computer-assisted content analysis 
stability is verified, as the results stay the same over time. 
3.3. Methodology 
In this section, we present the methodology applied to test the hypotheses developed in 
Section 2.3. We first examine the informativeness of IC disclosure in press releases 
(Hypothesis H 1). Following prior research (Hutton et al., 2003; Gu and Li, 2007; 
Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2009), we use cumulative stock market reactions to 
disclosure as a stock-market-based measure of its informativeness. To test hypothesis H 
1, we estimate the following model, which regresses stock market reactions to the 
announcement of the M&A on IC disclosure, in press releases and a series of control 
variables:  

























The stock market reaction to the announcement of the M&A (i.e. issue of the press 
release) is measured by the acquirer firm’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), over a 
three-trading-day period around the announcement date (days -1, 0, +1).50 If the stock 
market extracts new and credible IC information from the press releases, the coefficient 
of the explanatory variable of interest PR_IC will be significant. Moreover, to take 
potentially divergent effects between the IC categories into account, we estimate the 
following extended model that distinguishes among disclosures about external capital 





























In equations 1a and 1b, we include several control variables which are used in 
accounting, finance and strategy literature to explain stock market reaction to M&A.51 
Moeller et al. (2004) demonstrate that announcement abnormal returns are lower for 
large acquirer firms. Acquirer firm size (A_SZ_A) is measured as the natural logarithm 
of the acquirer firm’s market value of equity, at the end of fiscal year, prior to the 
announcement of the M&A. Since, generally, public listed target firms have more 
available information than private firms, the announcement abnormal returns are lower 
for public than for private target firms (Fuller et al., 2002; Capron and Shen, 2007). We 
include a dummy variable for the type of target firm ownership (PUBL), which is 1 if 
                                                 
50
  The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of stock returns in excess of the estimated stock returns, 
over a specific time period. We calculate the estimated return using the market model (e.g., Fama et 
al., 1969; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), which is a rather robust estimation 
procedure compared to other more complex alternatives used in event studies (Armitage, 1995; Cable 
and Holland, 1999).  
51 
 Please refer to Appendix IV-2 for more detailed information on definition and measurement of control 
variables. 
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the target firm is publicly listed, and 0 otherwise. As researchers show that 
announcement abnormal returns are associated positively with relative size (Asquith et 
al., 1983; Fuller et al., 2002), we control for relative size, which is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the purchase price for the target firm divided by the acquirer firm’s 
market value at the end of fiscal year, prior to the announcement of the M&A 
(REL_SZ). Previous literature suggests that announcement abnormal returns are lower 
for M&As paid in shares than for those paid in cash (Travlos, 1987; Eckbo and 
Langohr, 1989). We include a dummy variable (SHARE), coded 1 if the method of 
payment is shares, and 0 otherwise. Higher announcement abnormal returns are 
associated with synergistic M&As (e.g., Morck et al., 1990), because the acquirer firm’s 
management has better knowledge of a target firm operating in the same than in another 
industry. The synergies dummy variable (SYN) is 1 if the acquirer and target firm 
operate in the same industry, and 0 otherwise. Since foreign target firms are less visible 
and less well-known to the acquirer firm’s shareholders, acquirer firms in cross-border 
M&As generally exhibit lower announcement abnormal returns (e.g., Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). We include a dummy variable for cross-border M&As (XBORD), 
which takes a value of 1 if a target firm has its legal location in another country than the 
acquirer firm, and 0 otherwise. If the rumor date is close to the announcement date, the 
stock market reaction to rumor and announcement might overlap, and thus the 
announcement abnormal returns might be underestimated (Malatesta and Thompson, 
1985). We control for the time period between rumor and announcement date (RUMR), 
which is measured as the natural logarithm of 1, plus the number of days between both 
dates. Since Kimbrough and Louis (2011) observe higher announcement abnormal 
returns when a press release is accompanied by analyst and investor conferences in the 
M&A context, we introduce a dummy variable, coded 1 if an analyst or investor 
conference is announced in the press release, and 0 otherwise (CONF).  
We control for the accounting standard to be applied when accounting for the business 
combination (Gerbaud and York, 2007). The accounting standard dummy variable 
(IFRS) is coded 1 if the business combination is accounted for under IFRS, and 0 
otherwise. Moreover, we control for industry using industry dummies (IND), 
institutional environment using country dummies (CNTR), and macroeconomic effects 
using year dummies (YR_A). A separate industry dummy variable is coded 1 if an 
acquirer firm is from one of the five 1-digit ICB code industries that dominate the 
sample, and 0 otherwise. A separate country dummy variable is coded 1 if a firm is from 
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a European country that dominates in the sample (i.e. Germany, France or the United 
Kingdom), and 0 otherwise. Since all firms from the United States prepare their 
financial statements according to US-GAAP, we do not include a separate variable for 
the United States, to avoid multicollinearity owing to the IFRS dummy variable. A 
separate announcement year dummy variable is included for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2008.  
As we discussed in Section 2.3, voluntary and mandatory disclosure, and disclosure by 
information intermediaries on IC acquired in M&As, may influence each other 
(Hypotheses H 2, H 3a and H 3b, H 4). Our system of simultaneous equations includes 
equations of determinants of corporate voluntary disclosures (equation 2a), disclosure 
by information intermediaries (equation 2b), and corporate mandatory disclosure 
















































































To address the issue of endogeneity of disclosure, we apply a simultaneous equation 
approach, in which the endogenous disclosure variables (PR_IC; NA_IC; PPA_IC) are 
determined jointly (Zellner and Theil, 1962; Greene, 2011). As a result of expected 
cross-equation correlations, we use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method, which 
is more efficient in estimating the parameters than the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
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method (Atkinson, 1978; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). When we apply the 3SLS 
method to the system of equations, we consider all the available information. In a first 
stage, regressions are estimated individually to get predicted values for the endogenous 
variables, using ordinary least squares. In a second stage, the residuals are calculated for 
each equation, to estimate the cross-equation correlation matrix. In the third and final 
stage, this cross-equation correlation matrix is used to estimate the parameters of the 
system, using generalized least squares.  
Before addressing the interdependencies between different disclosure channels, we 
regress the IC disclosure in press releases (PR_IC) on determinants of voluntary 
corporate disclosure, while controlling for accounting standards applied (IFRS), 
industry-specific (IND), country-specific (CNTR), and year-specific effects (YR_A) in 
equation 2a. In order to isolate the impact of IC disclosure in press releases, we consider 
factors that prior research advances to explain why a firm discloses information 
voluntarily at all. Prior empirical evidence, with regard to determinants of IC disclosure, 
is rather inconclusive (e.g., García-Meca et al., 2005). Ahmed and Courtis (1999) 
investigate the results of studies examining the association between firm characteristics 
and corporate disclosure. Based on the findings of their meta-analysis, we include 
several proxies for firm characteristics that may be associated with corporate disclosure. 
In order to distinguish themselves from a less profitable firm, more profitable firms 
disclose more information voluntarily (Akerlof, 1970). We control for the acquirer 
firm’s profitability (A_PROF_A) by including the acquirer firm’s return on sales ratio. 
High leverage firms are supposed to provide more detailed information, to satisfy the 
information needs of creditors, and thereby reduce monitoring costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Leverage (A_LEV_A) is proxied by the long-term debt to total assets 
ratio. Prior research documents that the firm’s propensity to disclose information 
voluntarily is related positively to firm size (A_SZ_A) (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In addition, we consider the target firm size relative to the 
acquirer firm size (REL_SZ), which we expect to be associated positively with voluntary 
corporate disclosure. Moreover, we consider M&A characteristics likely to be 
associated with the degree of information asymmetries, and thus potentially related to 
the demand for additional voluntary corporate IC disclosure. In equation 2a, we control 
for the type of target firm ownership (PUBL), the method of payment (SHARE), the 
industry relatedness (SYN), and the origin of the target firm (XBORD) (cf. Kimbrough 
and Louis, 2011).  
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In equation 2b, we regress IC disclosure in newspaper articles (NA_IC) on IC disclosure 
in press releases (PR_IC), while controlling for determinants of disclosure by 
information intermediaries, accounting standards applied (IFRS), industry-specific 
(IND), country-specific (CNTR) and year-specific effects (YR_A), and therewith we test 
hypothesis H 2 concerning the interdependencies between corporate voluntary IC 
disclosure, and related IC disclosure by information intermediaries. The independent 
variable of interest is the IC disclosure index for the press releases (PR_IC). If the 
business press refers to the acquirer firm’s press release, the coefficient for PR_IC will 
be positive and significant. If more profitable firms, and firms with a higher leverage, 
provide more detailed information, more information is also available to information 
intermediaries. Thus, we control for the acquirer firm’s profitability (A_PROF_A) and 
leverage (A_LEV_A). Dyck et al. (2008) demonstrate that business press coverage is 
determined primarily by size. Thus, we include the acquirer firm size (A_SZ_A) and the 
relative size (REL_SZ) as control variables. In general, public firms are required to 
disclose more detailed information, which is available to information intermediaries. 
Thus, we also consider the type of target firm ownership (A_PUBL). Earlier research 
does not investigate whether business press disclosure differs depending on M&A 
characteristics. Nevertheless, we include the other M&A characteristics (the method of 
payment (SHARE), the industry relatedness (SYN) and the origin of the target firm 
(XBORD) M&As) as control variables in equation 2b, too.  
To test hypotheses H 3a, H 3b and H 4, about the interdependencies between corporate 
mandatory disclosure and prior corporate voluntary disclosure, or disclosure by 
information intermediaries in equation 2c, we estimate the following model that 
regresses IC disclosure in the notes to the financial statements (PPA_IC), on IC 
disclosure in press releases (PR_IC) or by the business press (NA_IC), controlling for 
the accounting standard to be applied (IFRS), industry (IND), institutional environment 
(CNTR), and year-specific effects (YR_C). The independent variables of interest are 
PR_IC, the IC disclosure index for the press release, and NA_IC, the IC disclosure index 
for the business press. If voluntary and mandatory corporate IC disclosure substitute 
(complement) each other, the coefficient for PR_IC will be negative (positive) and 
significant. If the acquirer firm’s management considers previous disclosure by 
information intermediaries in the preparation of corporate mandatory disclosure, the 
coefficient for NA_IC will be positive and significant. When selecting control variables 
for determinants influencing corporate mandatory disclosure, we refer to the meta-
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analysis of determinants of corporate disclosure by Ahmed and Courtis (1999) (cf. 
discussion of control variables in equation 2a). We control for acquirer firm profitability 
(A_PROF_C), leverage (A_LEV_C) and size (A_SZ_C). In addition, we include the 
relative size (REL_SZ) and the type of target firm ownership (PUBL). We also consider 
M&A characteristics, such as the method of payment (SHARE), industry relatedness 
(SYN) as well as the origin of the target firm (XBORD), again as control variables in 
equation 2c (cf. Kimbrough and Louis, 2011). Table IV-2 and Table IV-3 present 
descriptive statistics for explained and explanatory variables. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum S.D. 
CAR  
-0.011 -0.008 -0.222 0.143 0.060 
A_PROF_A 17.603 15.295 -1.960 57.650 11.540 
A_PROF_C 17.269 14.805 -7.710 57.650 11.787 
A_LEV_A 0.173 0.150 0.000 0.650 0.127 
A_LEV_C 0.176 0.155 0.000 0.650 0.131 
A_SZ_A 17.242 17.060 14.630 19.340 1.110 
A_SZ_C 17.296 17.230 14.630 19.560 1.109 
PUBL 0.772 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.422 
REL_SZ 
-7.822 -7.753 -10.112 -4.288 1.119 
SHARE 0.326 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.471 
SYN 0.902 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.299 
XBORD 0.424 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.497 
RUMR 3.275 4.119 0.000 7.369 2.648 
CONF 0.511 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.503 
Notes:  
The table reports descriptive statistics for explained and explanatory variables, which are defined in Appendix IV-2. N =92 
Table IV-2: Descriptive statistics 
 (own analysis)  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Before we provide the results of the empirical analyses regarding the hypotheses 
developed in section 2.3, we discuss descriptive statistics about IC disclosure in press 
releases, newspaper articles and in the notes to the financial statement, related to 
M&As, as presented in Table IV-3. The IC disclosure index for press releases (PR_IC) 
indicates that firms disclose, on average, 12.67 IC items, which are 9.5% of all 134 
potential IC items. The mean of IC items is slightly higher for acquirer firms from 
Europe (14.08 IC items) than for those from the USA (11.26 IC items). Standard 
deviations of the disclosure indicate wide variations in disclosure indices for press 
releases. 
Consistent with García-Meca et al. (2005) we find that disclosure by IC subindices 
varies considerably. We find that, on average, 4.43 external capital items (PR_EXT) are 
disclosed by acquirer firms in press releases. For instance, Premier Foods highlight the 
opportunities in developing the supplier relations: “As the largest food producer in the 
UK, Premier will look to develop its strategic partnerships with the major UK food 
retailers” (Premier Foods, 2006). Disclosure on external capital seems slightly less 
comprehensive than on internal capital in press releases (PR_INT: mean of 5.97 items). 
Topics related to internal capital include research & development (R&D) and new 
products. Acquirer firms disclose, on average, only 2.27 human capital items in press 
releases (PR_HC). Johanson (2003) suggests that a lack of ownership of IC related to 
people leads to low human capital disclosure. Human capital related information is 
considered to be less reliable and valid than information on external and internal capital. 
Topics of human capital addressed in the press releases include the expertise of the 
management board, and the combination of the workforce of the acquirer and target 
company. For example, “The enlarged Yell Group will employ approximately 9,000–
10,000 sales executives” (Yell Group, 2006). 
Regarding disclosure in newspaper articles (NA_IC), we observe that the business press 
discloses, on average, 2.314 IC items per newspaper article related to a M&A. 
Journalists appear to verify and carefully select parts of the information provided by the 
acquirer firms, in their press release at announcement date. The limited space in news 
articles is one of the major reasons for the low disclosure score per article. We notice a 
similar pattern for IC subindices or press releases, and for newspaper articles. Most 
information is disclosed on external (NA_EXT: mean of 0.887 items per newspaper 
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article) and internal capital (NA_INT: mean of 0.904 items per newspaper article). For 
instance, The Wall Street Journal reports on the Federated Department Stores/May 
Department Stores merger: “Under Mr. Lundgren's leadership, Federated has taken 
steps to create a national chain and brand, rather than operating and advertising each 
division regionally” (Byron and Berman, 2005). The human capital disclosure subindex 
(NA_HC: mean of 0.522 items per newspaper article) is lower than the other disclosures 
subindices.  
Considering the note to the financial statement concerning the M&As (PPA_IC), we 
find that acquirer firms disclose, on average, 7.99 IC items after the completion of the 
M&A. Obviously, the acquirer firms disclose considerably more IC items in press 
releases than in the note to the financial statement. Information on external capital 
(PPA_EXT: mean of 4.15 items) is most frequently disclosed in the note to the financial 
statement. Brands and trademarks play a key role, as the example of Procter & 
Gamble’s statement, in the note to their financial statement, shows: “The majority of the 
intangible asset valuation relates to brands” (Procter & Gamble, 2007: 57). While the 
amount of external capital items, mentioned in the press release and in the note to the 
financial statement, does not differ significantly, fewer internal capital and human 
capital related items are disclosed in the note to the financial statement than in the press 
release. Disclosure on human capital (PPA_HC: mean of 1.26 items) is the least 
frequent, but also disclosure on internal capital (PPA_INT: mean of 2.58 items) is less 
frequent than on external capital. The decrease in the amount of IC may be attributed to 
the requirements of accounting standards for IC, to satisfy specific recognition criteria, 
to be recognized separately from goodwill. Acquirer firms avoid providing too detailed 
information on IC items. For example, the assembled workforce is not allowed to be 
recognized on the balance sheet. All IC items reflected in the purchase price, but not 
allowed to be recognized, are subsumed under goodwill. Taylor Woodrow discusses the 
goodwill components explicitly: “The total provisional goodwill arising is £336.7m and 
reflects anticipated synergy benefits […]. This includes […] merging the skills and 
experience of the Taylor Woodrow and George Wimpey workforce” (Taylor Wimpey, 
2008).  
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4.2. Correlation Analysis 
Table IV-4 presents the correlation matrix for the IC disclosure indices and control 
variables. According to the Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients, the IC disclosure 
index for voluntary disclosure in press releases (PR_IC) is associated positively and 
significantly with the IC disclosure index, for disclosure by information intermediaries 
in newspaper articles (NA_IC) (H 2: rBP;PR_IC,NA_IC = 0.1766, p < 0.10). Information 
intermediaries appear to use the information provided in corporate voluntary 
disclosures. The IC disclosure index, for press releases at M&A announcement, is 
associated positively, but not significantly with the IC disclosure index for the note to 
the financial statement, after completion of the M&A (PPA_IC) (H 3a and H 3b: 
rBP;PR_IC,PPA_IC = 0.1019, p > 0.10). Both Spearman rank correlation coefficients are 
slightly higher, positive and significant (H 2: rSP;PR_IC,NA_IC = 0.2322, p < 0.05; H 3a and 
H 3b: rSP;PR_IC,PPA_IC = 0.1734, p < 0.10). We also observe that the amount of IC items 
disclosed in corporate mandatory disclosure is associated positively and significantly 
with the amount of IC items disclosed by information intermediaries (H 4: 
rBP;NA_IC,PPA_IC = 0.2887, p < 0.01). When the management allocates the purchase price 
to intangible assets, it probably takes into account how information intermediaries, such 
as the business press, evaluate the information about IC disclosed in the press release. 
Moreover, the amount of purchase price actually allocated to intangible assets and 
goodwill, in purchase price allocations (IAGW2PP), is associated positively and 
significantly with the IC disclosure index for mandatory corporate disclosure 
(rBP;PPA_IC,IAGW2PP = 0.2145, p < 0.05). This result indicates that the amount of IC items, 
identified using the content analysis approach described in Section 3.2, captures the IC 
actually acquired and recognized by the acquirer firm. 
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To examine whether the results for general disclosure indices also hold for disclosure 
subindices, Table IV-5 presents the correlation matrix for the disclosure subindices. We 
find a positive association between the external capital subindices for disclosure, in 
press releases (PR_EXT), newspaper articles (NA_EXT: rBP;PR_EXT,NA_EXT = 0.2766, 
p < 0.01), as well as the notes to the financial statement (PPA_EXT: 
rBP;PR_EXT,PPA_EXT = 0.1532, p > 0.10; rBP;NA_EXT,PPA_EXT = 0.2814, p < 0.01). However, the 
association between external capital disclosure in press releases, and in the notes to the 
financial statement, is not significant. When reporting on the target firm’s external 
capital, business press journalists refer to press releases, and the acquirer firm’s 
management eventually considers how the business press evaluates it. This pattern is 
repeated for internal capital disclosure. The internal capital disclosure subindex for 
press releases (PR_INT) is associated significantly with the disclosure in news articles 
(NA_INT: rBP;PR_INT,NA_INT = 0.2832, p < 0.01), which is related significantly to the 
disclosure in purchase price allocations (PPA_INT: rBP;NA_INT,PPA_INT = 0.3560, p < 0.01). 
The human capital disclosure subindices do not follow this pattern. Human capital 
disclosure subindices are not significantly correlated (rBP;PR_HC,NA_HC = 0.1357, p > 0.10; 
rBP;NA_HC,PPA_HC = 0.0215, p > 0.10; rBP;PR_HC,PPA_HC = 0.1324, p > 0.10). Human capital 
related topics appear to be considered in a different way in the three disclosure 
channels. Furthermore, the amount of purchase price, actually allocated to external 
capital (internal capital) related intangible assets, is correlated positively and 
significantly with the external capital (internal capital) disclosure index for mandatory 
corporate disclosure (rBP;PPA_EXT,EXT2PP = 0.4223, p < 0.01; rBP;PPA_EXT,EXT2PP = 0.2274, 
p < 0.05). These results support our view that the content analysis described in Section 
2.3 is reliable.  
Moreover, we have a look at control variables in the correlation matrix in Table IV-4. 
Based on the magnitude and significance of related Bravais-Pearson correlation 
coefficients, we expect no severe multicollinearity in any equation of our system.  
4.3. Informativeness of Voluntary Corporate Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
In Section 2.3, we supposed that stock market reacts significantly to IC disclosure in 
press releases at announcement date, if the information is perceived as informative 
(hypothesis H 1). Table IV-6 reports the results of the regression estimates of equations 
1a and 1b. Since we must exclude 8 M&As, owing to missing values for announcement 
abnormal returns and/or control variables, the regression is run on 92 M&A 
announcements and related IC disclosures, in press releases made by sample firms. Both 
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equations provide overall significant results (p (F-stat) < 0.01); the adjusted R-squared 
is about 0.18. 
 





















































Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
PR_IC ? -0.0002  -0.33  
PR_EXT ?  0.0007  0.48 
PR_INT ?  -0.0018  -1.29 
PR_HC ?  0.0033  0.96 
A_SZ_A - -0.0317 *** -3.32 -0.0271 *** -2.63 
PUBL - -0.0245 ** -1.99 -0.0248 ** -2.05 
REL_SZ + -0.0178  -2.16 -0.0142  -1.64 
SHARE - 0.0177  1.25 0.0143  0.99 
SYN + 0.0060  0.23 0.0046  0.17 
XBORD - 0.0027  0.18 0.0035  0.23 
RUMR + 0.0062 *** 2.62 0.0063 *** 2.70 
CONF + 0.0020  0.14 0.0014  0.10 
IFRS ? -0.0285  -1.40 -0.0297  -1.48 
IND ? Incl. Incl. 
CNTR ? Incl. Incl. 
YR_A ? Incl. Incl. 
Constant ? 0.3745 *** 2.98 0.3302 ** 2.40 
Number of observations 92 92 
R-squared 0.3795 0.3948 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1817 0.1780 
F-statistic (p) 2.26 *** 2.31 *** 
Highest VIF 4.08 4.38 
Notes: 
The table reports R-squared, adjusted R-squared, F-statistic, the coefficients, t-statistics (t-stat), and variance inflation factors (VIF) 
from robust multiple linear ordinary least squares regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-trading-day-window around 
announcement of the M&A transaction (CAR) on disclosure indices for press releases (PR_IC; PR_EXT, PR_INT, and PR_HC) 
and a series of control variables. The variables are defined in Appendix IV-2. We present. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed tests for predicted signs, two-tailed otherwise), respectively.  
Table IV-6: Robust ordinary least squares regressions – Stock market reaction 
 (own analysis)  
 
Inconsistent with our prediction, IC disclosure in press releases is not reflected in the 
stock market reactions to the announcement of the M&A (PR_IC: p > 0.10) in equation 
1a. IC disclosures appear to contain no new and/or no credible information. In equation 
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1b, we distinguish among disclosures about external capital (PR_EXT), internal capital 
(PR_INT) and human capital (PR_HC) in press releases. None of the three disclosure 
subindices is perceived as informative (PR_EXT, PR_INT and PR_HC: each p > 0.10), 
and they are not reflected separately in the market reactions to the announcement of the 
M&A. Thus, the hypothesis H 1 is not supported. Since information on the target firm’s 
IC is not readily available prior to the M&A, we would suppose that the lack of 
informativeness of the IC disclosure was induced by a lack of credibility rather than by 
a lack of novelty. Our results for voluntary corporate IC disclosure related to M&As are 
in line with prior results presented by Hutton et al. (2003), which find that 
supplementary qualitative disclosure, in regular management earnings forecasts, is not 
credible without being supplemented by better verifiable quantitative information. IC 
related information provided in press releases hardly includes any verifiable 
information, such as monetary values of expected pay-offs, which can, subsequently, be 
compared with the amount assigned to individual IC items in the PPA. While we find 
that voluntary corporate IC disclosure is not informative in our setting of M&A 
transactions, Gu and Li (2007) conclude that voluntary disclosure of innovation 
strategy, for their sample of high-tech firms, is informative. Even for firms in this 
specific industry, not all aspects of innovation strategy disclosure are reflected 
significantly in the stock market reaction. More specifically, information on the timing 
of expected pay-offs of an innovation project are not considered as credible. A 
prerequisite for the recognition of IC acquired in M&As is the probability of generating 
future economic benefits. Expected pay-offs of IC, such as brands, customer 
relationships or patents, are not disclosed in press releases, but are needed eventually for 
their identification and valuation. This could also explain why IC related information 
provided in press releases is not reflected in stock market reactions.  
The sign and significance of coefficient estimates for control variables are nearly 
identical for equations 1a and 1b. Consistent with our expectation that announcement 
abnormal return for M&As with smaller firms and private firms is more informative, the 
coefficients of acquirer firm size (A_SZ) and the type of target firm ownership (PUBL) 
are negative and significant (A_SZ: p < 0.01, one-tailed; PUBL: p < 0.05, one-tailed). In 
contrast to the results of prior empirical studies, relative firm size is associated 
negatively with announcement abnormal return (REL_SZ). A long time period between 
rumor and announcement date positively affects the announcement abnormal return 
(RUMR: p < 0.01, one-tailed). None of the other control variables is statistically 
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significant at a level of less than 10 percent. For instance, we find no positive 
association between analyst and investor conferences and market reactions, which is 
inconsistent with the results of Kimbrough and Louis (2011).  
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we estimate the cumulative abnormal 
returns, based on alternative event windows for the announcement of M&A (e.g. [-5 
trading day; + 5 trading days]), different stock market indices (i.e. total market indices, 
such as STOXX Global 1800, as well as industry-specific indices), and estimation 
periods (e.g. 48 or 100 days prior to the event window). However, the results for 
regression model basically do not change.  
4.4. Information Dissemination on Intellectual Capital 
In Section 2.3, we developed hypotheses concerning the interdependencies between 
voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosure and disclosure by information 
intermediaries, about IC acquired in M&As (H 2, H 3a, H 3b, H 4). Table IV-7 reports 
the results of the three-stage least squares analysis of the system of equations 2a, 2b and 
2c. The regression analysis is run on 92 M&As and related IC disclosures. As the χ²-
statistic indicates, each of the three equations provides overall significant results 
(p < 0.01).  
First, equation 2a, that regresses IC disclosure in press releases on determinants of 
voluntary disclosure and a series of control variables, provides overall significant results 
(p (χ²-stat) < 0.01). The regression coefficient for the acquirer firm’s profitability is 
positive, but insignificant (A_PROF_A: p > 0.10, one-tailed). Prior empirical research 
also provides inconclusive evidence with regard to profitability (Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999). The acquirer firm’s leverage is associated significantly and positively with IC 
disclosure in press releases (A_LEV_A: p < 0.01, one-tailed). Consistent with the results 
of Kimbrough and Louis (2011), the acquirer firm’s management provides more IC-
related information in M&As paid for in equity (SHARE: p < 0.01, two-tailed). Without 
more detailed information, stakeholders perceive this type of payment as a signal that 
the acquirer firm is overvalued (Travlos, 1987). The coefficients for the other control 
variables are not significant, and thus do not appear to be associated with the amount of 
IC items disclosed in press releases.  
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Equation 2a Equation 2b Equation 2c 
 
PR_IC NA_IC PPA_IC 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Coefficient z-stat 
Pred. 
Sign Coefficient z-stat 
Pred. 
Sign Coefficient z-stat 
PR_IC   + 0.0559 ** 1.71 +/- -1.1181 *** -3.72 
NA_IC      + 6.7606 *** 2.61 
A_PROF(_A/_C) + 0.0805  0.85 + -0.0250  -1.82 + 0.2128 ** 1.95 
A_LEV(_A/_C) + 22.4807 *** 2.70 + -1.8056  -1.34 + 30.2219 ** 2.52 
A_SZ(_A/_C) + -1.4461  -0.92 + 0.4183 * 1.79 + -3.3825  -1.82 
PUBL - -0.6626  -0.24 + 0.7355 * 1.87 - -4.4948  -1.21 
REL_SZ + -1.7181  -1.08 + 0.4946 ** 2.06 + -4.3337  -2.16 
SHARE ? 6.5599 *** 2.78 ? -0.0353  -0.09 ? 8.5435 ** 2.29 
SYN ? -2.2742  -0.61 ? 0.6341  1.17 ? -1.1328  -0.25 
XBORD ? -1.5903  -0.60 ? 0.3557  0.91 ? -8.8488 *** -2.63 
IFRS ? 2.2307  0.85 ? -1.4542 *** -2.88 ? 11.6530 * 1.94 
IND ? Incl. ? Incl. ? Incl. 
CNTR ? Incl. ? Incl. ? Incl. 
YR(_A/_C) ? Incl. ? Incl. ? Incl. 
Constant ? 13.6137  0.67 ? -1.9699 -0.66 ? 19.7988  0.84 
Number of 
observations 92 92 92 
χ²-statistic   73.17 ***  62.19 ***  46.90 *** 
Notes: 
The table reports χ²-stat, the coefficients, z-statistics (z-stat) from three-stage least squares estimation of a system of equations 
concerning intellectual capital disclosure in press releases (2a: PR_IC), newspaper articles (2b: NA_IC) and purchase price 
allocation (2c: PPA_IC) on a series of control variables (_A in equation 2a and 2b; _C in equation 2c). The variables are defined in 
Appendix IV-2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed tests for predicted 
signs, two-tailed otherwise), respectively. 
Table IV-7: Three-stage least squares regression – Information dissemination 
 (own analysis)  
 
Second, we examine whether IC disclosure in press releases is associated with IC 
disclosure by the business press. Equation 2b provides overall significant results (p (χ²-
stat) < 0.01). The coefficient on IC disclosure in press releases is positive and 
significant (PR_IC: p < 0.10). IC disclosure by information intermediaries appears to be 
associated with corporate voluntary IC disclosure. Business press journalists take up IC-
related information and disseminate it to the daily business newspapers’ audiences. 
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Thus, hypothesis H 2 is confirmed. Although not all control variables are significant, the 
signs of the coefficients for the control variables are, generally, consistent with our 
expectations (except for A_PROF_A and A_LEV_A). Consistent with Dyck et al. 
(2008), disclosure by business press is associated with size (A_SZ_A: p < 0.10, one-
tailed; REL_SZ:  p < 0.5, one-tailed). Moreover, more information is provided by 
business press journalists if the target firm is publicly listed (PUBL: p < 0.05, one-
tailed).  
Third, we investigate how the mandatory corporate IC disclosure reflects prior corporate 
voluntary IC disclosure, and IC disclosure by information intermediaries. Equation 2c 
also provides overall significant results (p (χ²-stat) < 0.01). Consistent with hypothesis 
H 3a, and in contrast to the discussion of correlation matrices in Section 3.2, the 
regression coefficient for IC disclosure in press releases (PR_IC) is negative and 
significant. While acquirer firms, which disclose more detailed IC-related information 
already in their press release, are more cautious with regard to IC disclosure in the note 
to the financial statement, acquirer firms with less information on acquired IC in the 
press release provide more detailed information in the notes to their financial 
statements. Hypothesis H 3a is supported and Hypothesis H 3b is not supported; IC 
disclosure in the notes to the financial statement is associated negatively with prior IC 
disclosure in press releases. As suggested by hypothesis H 4, IC disclosure by 
information intermediaries is associated positively with mandatory corporate IC 
disclosure (NA_IC: p < 0.01). Hypothesis H 4 is confirmed; IC disclosure in the notes to 
the financial statement is associated positively with prior IC disclosure in newspaper 
articles. Most of the coefficients for the control variables are significant in equation 2c. 
As expected, the regression coefficient for the acquirer firm’s profitability, as well as 
for leverage, is positive and significant (A_PROF_C: p > 0.05, one-tailed; A_LEV_C: 
p > 0.05, one-tailed). In contrast to our assumptions, the acquirer firm’s management 
provides less detailed IC information if the acquirer firms and the target firm are large 
(A_SZ_C; REL_SZ). Probably, they fear regulatory interventions (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). In M&As paid for in equity, they appear to provide not only more 
detailed IC related information in press releases, but also in the note to the financial 
statement (SHARE: p > 0.05, two-tailed). Owing to a lack of visibility, stakeholders are 
expected to be more skeptical, with regard to IC acquired in cross-border M&As and, in 
turn, the acquirer firm’s management seems to be more cautious in providing IC-related 
information (XBORD: p > 0.01, two-tailed).  
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Our results indicate that the different disclosure channels are interdependent. Business 
press journalists appear to verify and filter the information provided in press releases, 
and thus, business press journalists only refer to the information provided therein to 
some extent. The acquirer firm’s management appears to consider how the business 
press evaluates the target firm’s IC, when deciding to disclose information in the notes 
to the financial statement, and to recognize intangible assets and goodwill. On the one 
hand, the business press’ propensity to disseminate information is affected by corporate 
disclosure activities. On the other hand, the business press itself shapes the 
shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ concerns and expectations, and consequently, 
influences corporate disclosure activities (e.g., Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Carroll and 
McCombs, 2003). Interestingly, the results indicate that mandatory corporate IC 
disclosure is associated negatively with voluntary corporate IC disclosure. Voluntary 
and mandatory corporate disclosures appear to substitute rather than complement each 
other. Our results, therefore, are in line with the results of Francis et al. (2008), who 
also demonstrate that voluntary disclosure activities, proxied by press releases, are 
related negatively to earnings quality, used as proxy for mandatory disclosure activities. 
Voluntary disclosure activities can be seen as the response to mandatory disclosure 
requirements. If a wide range of information of information is provided in mandatory 
corporate disclosure, the firms appear to use voluntary corporate disclosure channels 
more sparingly, or vice versa. Firms may want to save the resources needed to convey 
the same information through different disclosure channels, or to avoid the provision of 
inconsistent information in the different disclosure channels. 
5. Conclusion 
This study improves our understanding of the dissemination of information about IC 
acquired in M&As. Our results show that voluntary corporate IC disclosure is not 
associated significantly with stock market reactions. Therefore, we provide evidence 
that stakeholders appear to perceive IC disclosure in press releases on M&As as 
uninformative. Since information on target firm’s IC is not readily available, prior to the 
M&A, we suppose that the lack of informativeness of the IC disclosure was a result of a 
lack of credibility rather than a lack of novelty. The corporate information environment 
might act as a mechanism for establishing credibility. Thus, we examined the 
interdependencies between voluntary and mandatory corporate IC disclosure, and also 
IC disclosure by information intermediaries. Our analyses indicated that IC disclosures 
through different channels are not independent, but interdependent. The business press 
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refers to IC-related information in press releases. Mandatory corporate IC disclosure in 
the note to the financial statement, which includes the PPA for the M&A, is associated 
positively with IC disclosure in newspaper articles, but associated negatively with prior 
voluntary corporate IC disclosure in press releases on M&As. Our evidence suggests 
that the voluntary and mandatory disclosure activities appear to substitute rather than 
complement each other. Thus, disclosure by information intermediaries and corporate 
mandatory disclosure requirements are not sufficient to guarantee the informativeness of 
voluntary corporate disclosure in this specific setting.  
Our research design is subject to limitations. We selected one singular, but important 
disclosure event — the mandatory and voluntary disclosure and disclosure by 
information intermediaries about US-GAAP and IFRS business combinations — as our 
sample. It is not clear whether the results are generalizable to other more regular 
disclosure events. Another concern is related to the content analysis methodology. Its 
results are affected by reliability and validity issues. However, we were able to show 
that total, or external or internal IC disclosure indices, based on the content analysis of 
the note to the financial statement, including the purchase price allocation, are 
associated significantly with the amount of purchase price allocated eventually to total 
or external or internal IC.  
Nevertheless we were able to contribute to disclosure research. First, we empirically 
assessed the interdependencies between voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosure, 
and disclosure by information intermediaries, and contributed to our understanding of 
the corporate information environment. By analyzing disclosure about IC acquired in 
M&As, we focused on the corporate disclosure of qualitative information, in the context 
of a strategic decision. Second, we examined IC information provided by the business 
press. Third, we investigated the corporate information environment as a mechanism 
establishing credibility. Fourth, we contributed to the literature on IC disclosure by 
addressing IC disclosure, not only in the context of the annual report, but also in press 
releases and in newspaper articles. 
Our results, with regard to the investigation of entire corporate information 
environment, and the closely related issue of the disclosure informativeness, are of 
interest to researchers, accounting standard setters, management, and stakeholders. 
Stakeholders are well advised to cautiously scrutinize and assess more qualitative 
forward-looking information, such as voluntary corporate IC disclosures. Management 
should think about actions to increase the informativeness of its voluntary disclosures in 
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general, and the credibility, in particular, by more consistent voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure activities. Accounting standard setters should consider the impact of 
mandatory disclosure requirements, on the firm’s propensity to provide voluntary 
disclosure of forward-looking information. When investigating voluntary or mandatory 
disclosure activities, researchers should take the interdependencies of the different 
disclosure channels of the corporate information environment into consideration.  
 
  




Appendix IV-1: Category system of items (in English) 
Category system of items (English) 
External Capital Internal Capital Human Capital 
backlog based in absenteeism 
bargaining power branch apprenticeship 
brand capacity career 
client collaborative research commitment 
clientele communication compensation 
commercialization concession corporate culture 
company name copyright creativity 
consignment corporate information system developer 
contractor corporate structure dismissal 
customer database education 
customer base distribution employ 
customer loyalty distribution channel employee 
delivery distribution network employee satisfaction 
distributor efficiency employer 
export factory employment contract 
franchise formulation entrepreneurial spirit 
hallmark headquarters expert 
import incorporation expert knowledge 
key account infrastructure expertise 
label innovation full time 
launch integration incentive system 
logo intellectual property job cut 
major customer labor market job tenure 
marketing license jobs 
merchandise licensing agreement know-how 
negotiating power location labor union 
new customer media coverage layoff 
price policy new product management experience 
procurement organization manager 
provision organizational structure motivation 
purchasing patent new hire 
reputation plant part-time 
sales channel process cycle pension 
subcontractor product pipeline personnel 
supplier prototype qualification 
supply quality assurance recruiting 
supply chain quality management remuneration 
trade name R&D researcher 
trademark reorganization salary 
vendor restructuring scientist 
 royalty skills 
 site staff 
 subsidiary team 
 technology training 
 trade secret wages 
 web presence work climate 
 work environment workforce 
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Appendix IV-2: Variable definition and measurement 




































PR_HC Number of human capital items disclosed in 
press release 
Content Analysis 


















NA_EXT Number of external capital items disclosed in 
newspaper articles divided by number of 





NA_INT Number of internal capital items disclosed in 
newspaper articles divided by number of 





NA_HC Number of human capital items disclosed in 
newspaper articles divided by number of 
newspaper articles to M&A transaction 
Content Analysis 


















PPA_EXT Number of external capital items disclosed in 






PPA_INT Number of internal capital items disclosed in 






PPA_HC Number of human capital items disclosed in 





intangible assets and 
goodwill 
IAGW2PP Intangible assets + Goodwill
Purchase price   
Calculated based on 
hand-collected data 
Purchase price 
allocation to external 
capital-related IAs  
EXT2PP External capital-related intangible assets
Purchase price   
Calculated based on 
hand-collected data 
Purchase price 
allocation to external 
capital-related IAs 
INT2PP Internal capital-related intangible assets
Purchase price   
 
Calculated based on 
hand-collected data 
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CAR Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated 
using the market model (event window: three-
trading-day period around the announcement 
date [-1; +1]; estimation period: 100 trading 
days prior to event window [-110; -11]; 
benchmark market portfolio: STOXX 
Americas 600 for US-GAAP and STOXX 





A_PROF (Operating Income divided by Net 
sales/Revenues), for acquirer firm in year 






A_LEV Total long-term Debt divided by Total Assets, 
for acquirer firm in year before announcement 
(_A) or before completion (_C) 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
Acquirer firm size A_SZ Natural logarithm of market capitalization, for 
acquirer firm in year before announcement 





PUBL Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is 
a listed firm, and 0 otherwise, for year t-1 
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
Relative firm size REL_SZ Natural logarithm of (purchase price divided 
by market capitalization for acquirer firm in 
year before announcement) 
Calculated based on 
hand-collected data 
Deal payment SHARE Dummy variable equal to 1 if it is a stock-for-
stock M&A, and 0 otherwise 
ZEPHYR database 
Synergistic M&A SYN Dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and 





Cross-border M&A XBORD Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is 
based in a foreign country, and 0 otherwise 
ZEPHYR database 
Rumor period RUMR Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number days 
between rumor and announcement date  
ZEPHYR database 
Analyst or investor 
conference 
CONF Dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst or 
investor conference is mentioned in the press 
release, and 0 otherwise 
Content Analysis 
Accounting standard IFRS Dummy variables equal to 1 if the business 
combination is accounted for under IFRS, and 
0 otherwise 
Notes to the 
financial statement 
(hand-collected) 
Industry IND Dummy variables equal to 1 if the acquirer 
firm operates in a specific industry, 
classification based on primary one-digit ICB 
codes, and 0 otherwise  
WORLDSCOPE 
database 
Country CNTR Dummy variables equal to 1 if the acquirer 
firm is located in a specific country, and 0 
otherwise 
ZEPHYR database 
Year YR Dummy variables equal to 1 if the business 
combination was announced (_A) or 
completed in a specific year (_C), and 0 
otherwise  
ZEPHYR database 
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